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ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION ON LOCAL HISTORY

AT the opening session, on the morning of May 26th, a round table session was devoted to a discussion of local history, "the problem of its improvement and correlation, and the possibilities of cooperation by university departments of history, archives, historical societies, etc. Prof. Fred Landon was chairman of the session and the subject was introduced by Prof. D. C. Harvey, Provincial Archivist of Nova Scotia and Dr. J. J. Talman, Provincial Archivist of Ontario. Others who took part in the discussion were Professors George W. Brown, Chester Martin, A. G. Dorland, Chester New and R. G. Trotter, Mr. E. C. Kyte of Queen's University Library and Mr. J. McE. Murray, secretary of the Ontario Historical Society. The session was continued beyond the usual closing hour because of the interest shown in the discussion and at the close a resolution was passed: "That this meeting heartily recommends to the Council of the Canadian Historical Association the consideration of means by which the collection and preservation of local records may be encouraged throughout the Dominion. Prof. Landon was named as a committee of one, with power to add, to consider further means of encouraging the development of local history activities.

THE MILITARY REPUTATION OF MAJOR-GENERAL JAMES WOLFE

Presidential Address Delivered by

E. R. ADAIR

This is an age when heroes are viewed with a somewhat sceptical eye, when it is felt that mere blind veneration for the reputations of the past should not turn aside the chilly wind of historical criticism, that the legends devised to charm worshippers must be tested by the acid of facts.

So far General Wolfe has survived any serious attacks upon his reputation, very largely because he was fortunate enough to die in the moment of victory, a victory moreover that came like a blessed thunderbolt to an England that thought that all hope of it had departed, for, as Horace Walpole aptly says, Wolfe's final despatch couched "in the most artfull terms that could be framed" had "left the nation uncertain whether he meant to prepare an excuse for desisting, or to claim the melancholy merit of having sacrificed himself without a prospect of success."¹

But if his reputation has so far survived practically untarnished, it is not because he has been wholly exempt from all the dangers to which dead heroes are exposed. On the one hand he has been rendered at times a little ridiculous, by the praises of his more eulogistic biographers, of whom Beckles Willson is one of the worst,² and who have found it necessary to discover even in his earlier years those splendid qualities which they thought it proper for a hero to possess; that there was no particular authority to justify their views seemed quite immaterial. On the other hand two distinguished soldiers have expressed considerable doubts of his military skill, considerable hesitation in accepting the story of his masterly strategy. But their views do not appear to have had much effect, largely because they were incidental to biographies of Wolfe's military rivals—Major-General Mahon was writing the life of General Murray³ and Colonel Townshend that of his relative General Townshend⁴—and consequently these critics were considered to be naturally biased in favour of their own heroes and anxious to add to their glory even at the cost of unfairly diminishing that of General Wolfe. To the military critics might also be added the name of Col. William Wood, but the small pamphlet⁵ in which he voiced his doubts has been completely overwhelmed by his earlier and more famous work *The Fight for Canada* in which he accepts to the full the claims of Wolfe's supporters. In fact, it would hardly be unfair to say that the only controversy in regard to Wolfe that has attracted popular attention during the last thirty years has been that concerning the words that he uttered as he lay wounded on the Heights of Abraham, if he uttered any at all; this arose from Dr. Doughty's publication of the letter of Samuel Holland⁶ by which he practically snatched Wolfe's last words from his dying lips.

¹H. Walpole, *Memoires . . . of George II* (ed. of 1822) II, 384.

²B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe* (1909).

³R. H. Mahon, *Life of General the Hon. James Murray* (London, 1921).

⁴C. V. F. Townshend, *The Military Life of Field-Marshal George First Marquess Townshend* (1901).

⁵W. Wood, *Unique Quebec* (Quebec, 1924).

⁶*Canadian Historical Review*, I, 45-46.

If a historian is to examine the military reputation of a soldier, he must do much more than ask himself whether he attained high rank in the army of his country, whether he won victories, whether he was acclaimed by his contemporaries as a great general; for contemporary opinion may be wrong, either because it is blinded by patriotic enthusiasm or because all the facts are not available; and victories may be won as the result of accident or of the gross mistakes of opposing generals; and rank is too often the fruit of purchase or of influence, rather than of merit. Moreover, the historian must not only attempt to consider impartially the real facts of a soldier's military career, as seen by his opponents as well as by his own men, but he must also try and show what sort of a man the soldier really was, what were his character, his emotions, his virtues and his vices. For a general plays a game in which his fellow-men are the pawns; whether he does it by love or by fear, whether he succeeds in understanding them, or in being understood by them, how he gets on with his superiors, his equals, his subordinates, all these are factors that are vastly important in judging the soundness of his military reputation, because they may serve to explain the motives for his actions, and may enable us to judge whether his success was the fruit of careful planning or of pig-headed luck, whether he was trading on somebody else's skill or honestly relying on his own.

To picture the character of General James Wolfe is an extremely difficult task, for he seems to have been a man who was singularly devoid of friends—or at least of those who cultivated the art of writing. The only person, outside his immediate relatives, to whom he ever seemed to unburden himself was Captain Rickson, and even with his relatives he was too often posing for effect. Many people must have seen Wolfe, but in very few cases did he arouse enough interest to induce them to record in any detail what they thought about him. He seems to have gone his angular and somewhat discontented way alone. Of course, no sooner was he victoriously dead, than everyone who had ever met him began to batter their memories into producing such reminiscences as a hero deserved; everything that could be remembered about him was soon clothed with an anachronistic glory. Samuel Holland's letter referred to above is, for instance, a beautiful example of the art of interpreting the past in the light of the future; even Wolfe's disastrous attack on the Beauport lines on July 31 is referred to as "one amongst those masterly manoeuvres that led to the great and successful event of the 13th of September."⁷ And so, in order to get some idea of what Wolfe was really like, one is driven to rely on his own letters, of which a considerable number survive.

Of his physical characteristics little need be said, for everyone knows his thin lanky figure, his sloping shoulders, his curious triangular profile with its long nose and its puffy, yet retreating chin. He was not beautiful and what was worse, in his early years he was awkward and endowed with few social graces. This probably made him at first shy and then, as sometimes happens to shy men, created a rather acrid determination to stand on his rights and extort every tittle that was due to him. This goes far to explain his inability to see much good in the officers of his regiment whom he always seemed to find "loose and profligate", "persons of so little

⁷*Ibid.*, 46.

application to business and . . . so ill educated";⁸ it makes more understandable the secretive jealousy with which he treated his brigadiers at Quebec—"he asks no one's opinion and wants no advice" as James Gibson writes to Governor Lawrence.⁹ To maintain this attitude and to convince himself of its justice, he must succeed, for he had no other means of securing the centre of the stage. There is no question but what he showed great zeal in his profession, spared no pains in making his regiment efficient, realized the deficiencies in his own education and set to work to remedy them. In Glasgow he studied mathematics so that he might "become acquainted with . . . the construction of fortification and the attack and defence of places" and instead, to his despair, merely found that they had "a great tendency to make men dull" and that finding "out the use and property of a crooked line, which, when discovered serves me no more than a straight one . . . but . . . adds to the weight that nature has laid upon the brain and blunts the organs"; and elsewhere he solaced his loneliness with the reading of many books on the art of war—the list that he is able to suggest as desirable for a young ensign is almost overwhelming.¹⁰

But if Wolfe was conscious of the deficiencies in his education he was also rather too conscious of the measures he was taking to repair them and of the competence he was acquiring as an officer. He was vain and at times he was somewhat smug. With rather mock modesty he reckons it "a very great misfortune to this country that I . . . should be thought, as I generally am, one of the best officers of my rank in the service", though with what was almost a prophecy he added that "the consequence will be very fatal to me in the end, for as I rise in rank people will expect some considerable performances, and I shall be induced in support of an ill-got reputation to be lavish of my life, and shall probably meet that fate which is the ordinary effect of such conduct."¹¹ In conjunction with all this it must be remembered that he was given authority at an age when men to-day are commonly still under the direction of others, and during his long years in Scotland he was practically an autocrat over the lives and welfare of several hundred soldiers; this fed his vanity and ruined his temper. He himself realized something of this, for he wrote that he feared he might give way insensibly "to the temptations of power" and "become proud insolent and intolerable".¹² And he possessed few resources within himself that might have combatted this tendency. He had small sense of humour: his early letters are ponderous and filled with platitudes; there is a definite improvement during and after his visit to Paris in 1752; but there is rarely much fire or any striking phrase, and the only other quip that can be compared with his modest joke about mathematics is his famous remark about the ladies of Glasgow who "are cold to everything but a bagpipe—I wrong them, there is not

⁸B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 223, Wolfe to his father, Oct. 22, 1753; 280, Wolfe to his mother, Nov. 8, 1755.

⁹Doughty and Parmelee, *The Siege of Quebec*, V, 65.

¹⁰B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 107, Wolfe to his mother, Sept. 8, 1749; 295-7, Wolfe to Thomas Townshend, July 18, 1756.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 280, Wolfe to his mother, Nov. 8, 1755.

¹²*Ibid.*, 165, Wolfe to his mother, Jan. 2, 1752.

one that does not melt away at the sound of an estate; there's the weak side of this soft sex."¹³

Added to all this, he was prudish and proper and proud of it—even rather proud of his one meagre fling amidst the snares of London, one small wild oat amidst a large field of carefully tended wheat. All this was very admirable, no doubt, but it did not serve to commend him to his fellow men, even though one captain calls him "a Paragon";¹⁴ and with his fellow women, too, he was not always a great success. His mother was a difficult person whom he conciliated rather than loved; with the merchants' wives and daughters in the towns where he was quartered, his colonel's uniform carried him through most social difficulties; and with Miss Lawson he undoubtedly was, for a time, in love. A great deal of nonsense has been written about this, for there is no evidence at all that she was in love with him, and this blow to his self-esteem was probably at the root of his desire to go abroad. He made a great parade of his wish to study foreign military technique, but when he did go to Paris, he was the earnest young man who dined every now and then with the English ambassador and spent the rest of his time learning to speak French, to ride, to fence, and to dance, though in dancing his progress was slow. He really went to capture some of the social graces that he had discovered he lacked, and he set about the task as conscientiously as he did about his study of *The King of Prussia's Regulations for his Horse and Foot*. He was in Paris, but not of it: he had neither the money nor the social charm. But he had discovered that one "by discoursing with the other sex may learn some civility and mildness of carriage" though, as he very properly says, he would "never pay the price of the last improvement with the loss of reason."¹⁵ The year before he was killed he fell in love once more, this time with Miss Katherine Lowther and his affection was apparently returned, but the episode was too brief to have any influence upon his character.

Of amusements Wolfe apparently thought little, and outdoor recreation was taken mainly in order to improve his health, though he showed some liking for shooting, even if he did not particularly shine at it. His one real passion seems to have been for dogs and even when he could not have them with him, he owned several that were boarded out with his parents.

And so we get the completed picture of an earnest, puritanical young man, rather vain and determined to succeed, fond of power, somewhat difficult in temper, suffering, to use a modern cliché, from a social inferiority complex, and inclined to be very censorious of his equals and, in private, of his superiors, though in public he was accustomed rather carefully to tune his tongue to his material interests; inclined to discontent, for he often felt that he was getting the worst of the deal—he found Scotland horrible, but then Dover turned out to be just as bad; inclined to show off where it would impress the proper people,¹⁶ and always

¹³*Ibid.*, 212, Wolfe to his mother, May 13, 1753.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 144, Wolfe to Rickson, June 9, 1751; 109, Capt. Macrae to [?], Nov. 16, 1749.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 120-121, Wolfe to his father, Apr. 6, 1750; 165, 191, 194, Wolfe to his mother, Jan. 2, Nov. 25, Dec. 12, 1752.

¹⁶This is very marked in the series of letters to Lord George Sackville.

exaggerating the difficulties with which he was faced, so that the ultimate glory might be the greater.¹⁷ The truth of the story of his astonishing outburst of self-praise when Pitt entertained him just before he set out for the St. Lawrence, has been vigorously denied; true or not, it is quite in keeping with his character; he had at last arrived and he knew it.¹⁸

Over against all this must be set his brilliant efficiency as a regimental commander and his skill in training his men; his interest in their musketry practice was far beyond that of the average officer of the day;¹⁹ and this was supplemented by his care for their welfare, his kindness towards them in so far as it did not interfere with the necessities of a military life. As he said he knew "nothing more entertaining than a collection of well-looking men, uniformly clad and performing their exercise with grace and order."²⁰ The army—or rather the army in war—was his god; he did not care much for peace; his bravery was unquestionable, he pined for action and in war he was absolutely ruthless if it seemed necessary. He would allow the destruction of a detachment of his own men, so that a Highland clan might in revenge be exterminated; he could threaten to tie fire-rafts to the vessels containing the helpless French prisoners in order to prevent any more such contrivances being sent down against Saunders' fleet.²¹

And finally his almost constant ill-health must be taken into consideration. A recent biographer of Karl Marx has suggested that the latter's intellectual achievements were almost entirely the result of his Jewish parentage combined with a disordered liver.²² In the case of Wolfe I would not like to go so far as that, but ill-health certainly influenced his character. In Scotland he was afflicted with a skin disease that was said to be scurvy, at Salisbury he had gravel and rheumatism, and during his last years he suffered from tuberculosis of the kidneys and bladder:²³ it can hardly be wondered if he was at times difficult and ill-tempered, if he sometimes felt that there must be no delay, that every means must be taken, no matter what the cost, if he were to achieve before he died, the fame for which he so passionately longed. As Horace Walpole wrote: "The world could not expect more from him than he thought himself capable of performing. He looked on danger as the favourable moment that would call forth his talents."²⁴

His early military career need not detain us long: an ensign in the 12th Foot at fifteen, he became a captain at seventeen, a brigade-major and aide-de-camp to Gen. Hawley at eighteen, major and acting commander of the 20th Foot at twenty-two, lieutenant-colonel at twenty-three.²⁵

¹⁷e.g., in letters at beginning of both Louisbourg and Quebec expeditions.

¹⁸B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 415-416; W. T. Waugh: *James Wolfe* (Montreal, 1928), 189.

¹⁹B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 254-255, Wolfe to Captain Rickson, March 7, 1755.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 241, Wolfe to his mother, Oct. 31, 1754.

²¹*Ibid.*, 254-255, Wolfe to Captain Rickson, March 7, 1755; Knox, *Historical Journal*, ed. A. G. Doughty (Champlain Soc.), I, 445.

²²O. Rühle, *Karl Marx*.

²³B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 150, 403; J. C. Webster, *Wolfeana* (1927), 10.

²⁴H. Walpole, *Memoires . . . of George II*, II, 239.

²⁵J. C. Webster, *Wolfeana*, 3.

During this time he had taken part in the battles of Dettingen, Falkirk, Culloden and Laffeldt, in the latter of which he served with some distinction and was slightly wounded; but much of his attention, even in war-time, seems to have been directed by his superiors to routine regimental work.

A good deal of nonsense has been written about his youth and the overwhelming merit which must have given a poor unknown soldier such rapid promotion. In the first place he was not by any means lacking in influence or in powerful friends and he used both without any hesitation. His father was a brigadier-general still seeing service, though his gout prevented it from being very active, as late as 1745, and he naturally used his not inconsiderable influence in his son's favour; in 1749 Wolfe was looking forward anxiously to purchasing a "lieutenant-colonel's commission within this twelvemonth";²⁶ and when he obtained his commission in 1750 it was by the influence of Lord Bury, Lord George Sackville and the Duke of Cumberland—from a military point of view, three rather dubious sponsors.²⁷ And he finally became a full colonel in 1757, only after a long and bitter fight on his own behalf; his claim that all his "hope of success must be grounded upon right and just pretension," sounds a little hollow. Throughout his life he was always peculiarly sensitive to the promotions of other men; when he was in danger of being asked to serve at Halifax under an officer who was, so he said, "but a few months before put over my head, I thought it was much better to get into the way of Service, and out of the way of being insulted";²⁸ therefore he left for England at once.

Moreover Wolfe was no exceptional youthful prodigy; they caught them much younger in those days, and there were plenty of other officers as young or nearly as young as Wolfe himself. He was a lieutenant-colonel at a little over twenty-three, Monckton was one at a little under twenty-five, Townshend at twenty-four, John Hale at thirty, even Wolfe's own father, who was anything but a military genius, was only thirty-two.²⁹ And just the same applies to the much prized colonel's commission which Wolfe was given when he was thirty-one; Monckton gained his when he was thirty-three, and Hale, Townshend and Guy Carleton when they were thirty-four;³⁰ and these men are not exceptions, they are mentioned merely because they happen to be closely connected with Wolfe's career.

Down to 1757 Wolfe was steadily building up a reputation as a good regimental commander; in that year his first great chance came. Pitt, fresh to office, was anxious to do something to counteract the disastrous news from Germany; a military and naval diversion against Rochefort seemed to provide exactly what was needed. Though Sir Julian Corbett says that judged "by the most fastidious science, Pitt's expedition to Rochefort was absolutely correct", Sir John Fortescue in his *History of the British Army* asserts just as strongly that "military opinion had been

²⁶B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 93, Wolfe to Captain Rickson, Apr. 2, 1749.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 117, 120, Wolfe to his father, March 23, Apr. 6, 1750; 118, Wolfe to his mother, March 29, 1750.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 259, Wolfe to his mother, March 26, 1755; 433-434, Wolfe to Viscount Barrington, June 6, 1759.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 4.

³⁰Knox, *Historical Journal*, I, 163-4, n.1., 222-3, n.2., 328-9, n.3., 330, n.1.

against the expedition from the first. Ligonier, a daring officer but of ripe experience and sound judgment, wrote of it in the most lukewarm terms as likely to lead to nothing.³¹ Extraordinarily little was known about the fortifications of Rochefort and what information there was, was either on dubious authority or out of date. Though there were some good officers under him the leadership of the military forces was placed in the hands of Sir John Mordaunt, old and hesitating, and Wolfe, who had been on Mordaunt's staff in the late war and had since courted his niece, was made his quartermaster-general. The fleet was late in getting started, when it arrived off the French coast, there was further delay, owing first of all to an error in judgment on the part of Admiral Hawke and then to lack of a favourable wind, so that all hope of a surprise seemed to be destroyed. It has been pointed out that a surprise could actually have been effected, but the English leaders had no reason to know this and in fact within a few days the 3,000 French troops available had been raised to 8,000.³² There was undoubtedly a good deal of vacillation on the part of the general commanding, but the suggestions that Wolfe put forward at the later court of enquiry, as the ones that should have been adopted, were by no means sound. He asserted that Fort Fouras should have been carried by storm, that, as it was on a peninsula, it might have been attacked on all sides by the ships which could then batter it down. Meanwhile a feint should have been made towards La Rochelle and the Ile de Rhé. As against this scheme Admiral Knowles pointed out perfectly justly that bomb-vessels, let alone men of war, could not come within three miles of Ft. Fouras—even the over-confident French pilot Thierry could not take a bomb-ketch within shot of it. Consequently the fort could not be battered nor could the landing of the troops or their re-embarkation be protected. Furthermore the only two spots where a feint to the north could be made were near the point of Chatellaillon; and as a result of sounding by Admiral Brodrick it had been found that the transports could not come nearer to the shore than one and a half miles. Again the troops would have to disembark and re-embark entirely without protection, and as Wolfe himself admitted that the sandhills offered so much natural concealment that the landing could have been prevented by 1,000 foot and 300 horse, the folly of his whole scheme is apparent. It had, as a matter of fact, been considered by the military council on Sept. 24 and definitely turned down, largely on the advice of the admiral who could not undertake under the circumstances, to give any adequate naval protection. Again there was undoubted vacillation; but when on the night of Sept. 28 a landing at Chatellaillon was attempted, it was abandoned upon the perfectly proper ground put forward by the naval officers in charge of the boats, that the offshore wind was so strong that the landing would be appallingly slow, if it could be managed at all, as some of the boats would scarce be able to make any headway; to proceed would have been merely inviting disaster.³³

The expedition had been badly mismanaged; but Wolfe's suggestions

³¹J. S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Years War*, I, 209; J. W. Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, II, 308-9.

³²J. S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Years War*, I, 214-215, 219.

³³*Ibid.*, I, 209-221; Reports of the commission of enquiry and court-martial in the *Gentleman's Magazine* 1757, 491, 582-4; 1758, 28-29.

were impracticable and showed no appreciation of naval problems and no particular care for the men involved. In fact, he was quite frank in his private letters when he extolled the beauty of blundering, so long as it meant fighting, and laid it down "that, in particular circumstances and times, the loss of a thousand men is rather an advantage to a nation than otherwise, seeing that gallant attempts raise its reputation and make it respectable."³⁴ So colossal was his belief in his own judgment, moreover, that he wrote a rather condescending letter to his friend Captain Parr in which he asserted that he could have told Parr even before the expedition started "that we should attempt nothing, or execute ill what we did attempt. I will be open enough and vain enough to tell you that there might be a lucky moment to be seized for the public service, which I watched for; but it came too late, and there ended the reputation of three bad Generals".³⁵ It was easy to be wise after the event, and that wisdom, combined with the popular appeal of the vigorous action he had advocated and the censorious criticisms of the leaders of the expedition he had uttered, brought him his reward—the coveted commission as a colonel. This has been usually interpreted as a proper recognition for the one officer who wanted to do the right thing. It was almost certainly nothing of the sort, as can be seen if the political circumstances of the moment are considered. Pitt had just come into office and his first military action had been a decisive failure. Somehow it must be justified: so a commission of enquiry must be held and Mordaunt brought before a court martial, Pitt himself, very improperly, coming down to the court to make "an imperious speech" in favour of his plan.³⁶ Unfortunately for this scheme the court acquitted Mordaunt and did not show much appreciation for the plan. Meanwhile the one officer—Wolfe—who had shown himself ready to go bull-headed against the enemy and, irrespective of reasonable precautions, secure what Pitt wanted, must be rewarded. Seen in this light the whole business falls automatically into its proper political pattern.

On the whole the Rochefort expedition does not add to one's opinion of Wolfe's strategical ability, especially when it is remembered that what he advocated there was only too similar to what he tried out in his disastrous attack on the Beauport lines at Quebec on July 31, 1759; but it must be added that he also drew from the failure of the expedition a set of doctrinaire principles on the conduct of combined operations which were, in general, quite sound, though they hardly merit the extravagant eulogy which Corbett pours upon them.³⁷ Fortescue is not far wrong when he sums up the whole affair by saying that "it seems that the troops were sent on a fool's errand, and that the blame lay solely with Pitt".³⁸

But it is true enough to say that from now on Wolfe was a man.

³⁴B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 336, Wolfe to Major Walter Wolfe, Oct. 18, 1757; 339, Wolfe to Major Rickson, Nov. 5, 1757.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 344, Wolfe to Captain Parr, Dec. 29, 1757. Incidentally neither Conway nor Cornwallis were bad generals, and there is no good evidence, as is usually alleged (e.g., by Waugh, *James Wolfe*, 140) that the Prince of Wales sent for Wolfe to question him about Rochefort.

³⁶H. Walpole, *Memoires . . . of George II*, II, 263-5.

³⁷B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 339, Wolfe to Major Rickson, Nov. 5, 1757; J. S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Years War*, I, 221-2.

³⁸J. W. Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, II, 308-9.

marked out by Pitt for advancement, and when the expedition under Jeffrey Amherst was sent in 1758 against Louisbourg, Wolfe went as junior brigadier. The main plan of these operations is perfectly well known, therefore it will be enough to deal with those aspects for which Wolfe is given the lion's share of credit.

When Amherst reached Halifax he found that a plan for landing had been already drawn up by the brigadiers. It is alleged that this plan was Wolfe's; for this there is no evidence and indeed it is unlikely on the face of it, for as he showed at Rochefort and at Quebec he much preferred a strong frontal attack with a feint on the flank, and this is the basis not of this first plan, but of the later one adopted by Amherst, possibly on Wolfe's advice. Anyway, the original scheme was a bad one, because it took no account of the dangers of traversing the ten miles of unknown and difficult country between Miré Bay and Louisbourg, and because it divided the English forces into three parts with no safe means of sea communication owing to the prevalence of fog and surf which often made landing impossible.³⁹

The plan of landing ultimately adopted, quite possibly at Wolfe's suggestion, especially as he was given the leading part in its execution, consisted in a direct attack upon Cormorandière Bay, with two feints a little further to the east and a third beyond the harbour at Lorembec near the Lighthouse Point.⁴⁰ Notwithstanding a preliminary reconnaissance, the strength of the French at Cormorandière Bay was underestimated; Wolfe failed to reach the shore and was forced to order his men to retire. The day was saved by the dashing but wholly accidental landing of three subalterns and their men in a little inlet on the extreme right, which was protected by a slight ridge from the enemy's fire. Wolfe followed this up, the enemy were driven from their positions, and the whole English army landed with comparative ease.⁴¹ Wolfe with his usual habit of exaggerating the difficulties he had to overcome writes of the landing as "rash and ill-advised", "next to miraculous", but he forgets to make any mention of the three young officers and their men who were responsible for his success.⁴² Moreover after his somewhat biting criticism it is rather surprising to find that the total casualties on the English side were only 46 killed and 59 wounded—and of the 46, 38 were drowned by the overturning of the boats in the surf and were not killed by the enemy's fire at all. Both the danger and Wolfe's share in the glory seem to have been rather over-emphasized.

Once on shore the English began the formal siege of Louisbourg. Wolfe has been given an enormous amount of credit for establishing a battery at Lighthouse Point, which silenced the Island Battery and played

³⁹J. S. McLennan, *Louisbourg from its foundation to its fall* (London, 1918), 239-240, James Cunningham to Lord George Sackville, May 30, 1758; J. S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Years War*, I, 318.

⁴⁰Knox, *Historical Journal*, ed. A. G. Doughty, (Champlain Soc.), III, 3, Amherst to Pitt, June 11, 1758.

⁴¹J. S. McLennan, *Louisbourg from its foundation to its fall*, 247-253, 256-259; *Nova Scotia Historical Soc.'s Collections*, V, 116. Gordon's Journal; J. C. Webster, *Wolfiana*, 13-14; *Collection des Manuscrits . . . relatifs à la Nouvelle France*, IV, 160.

⁴²B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 384, Wolfe to Major Walter Wolfe, July 27, 1758; Wolfe to Lord George Sackville, July 30, 1758.

upon the ships in the harbour, and for rapidly extending his batteries round the north-west corner of the harbour and thence assisting materially in the reduction of the town; and all the while Amherst and his engineers, it is said, were plodding away at building their epaulements and setting up their guns against the land side of the fortifications. There is no doubt whatever that Wolfe worked rapidly and well; as one correspondent writes "There is no certainty where to find him—but, wherever he goes, he carries with him a Mortar in one pocket and a 24 pounder in the other."⁴³ But it is entirely unsound to suggest, as some historians have done, that it was Wolfe's sparkling ability that brought Louisbourg to her knees, while Amherst acted the part of a respectable figure-head.

In the first place the plan of occupying the Lighthouse Point and establishing batteries round the harbour was not Wolfe's at all; it probably was not even Amherst's, for Brigadier Samuel Waldo, who had commanded the land forces at the capture of Louisbourg in 1745, had sent Pitt, in November 1757, a plan of operations, accompanied by a chart which contained all these features clearly set out.⁴⁴ Pitt had this and there can be no doubt that he laid it before Amherst; and anyway the plan was rendered so obvious as to be almost inevitable when the French for lack of numbers were forced to abandon the Lighthouse Battery and the Batterie Royale. In the next place, Wolfe enjoyed no independent command; what he did was done at Amherst's instructions and was made possible only by the way in which, on occasion, Amherst sacrificed his own progress so that Wolfe might have the guns that he needed: "I sent away everything to Br. Wolfe that he asked, added to his Artillery two 18-inch and two 13-inch Mortars" is a typical entry in Amherst's journal. And when the engineers wanted to use Wolfe's guns elsewhere, Amherst insisted that he be allowed to continue.⁴⁵ Finally until he reached the north-west shore of the harbour, Wolfe met with little real opposition, for the Island Battery was "vieille et négligée, rongée et désunie par l'air et le sel de la mer",⁴⁶ the harbour side of the town had few guns, and except for Vauquelin in the *Aréthuse* the captains of the French men-of-war wholly neglected their duty of making Wolfe's batteries as untenable as they could, and in addition the constant fogs covered many of his operations.⁴⁷

What, on the other hand, was the position of Amherst? He has been charged with lack of progress because he was thinking of the siege in terms of European warfare,⁴⁸ while Wolfe had acclimatized himself to the American method—whatever that may be. This is quite unsound: Wolfe's methods were just as European as Amherst's and anyway, the whole argument is based on the assumption that Amherst knew in what

⁴³Quoted by Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, I, 117, from an "Authentic Account of the Reduction of Louisbourg", by a Spectator (London, 1758).

⁴⁴*Dominion Archives Report* for 1886, cli-cliii, Nov. 7, 1757.

⁴⁵*Journal of Jeffrey Amherst*, ed. by J. C. Webster, 52, 57. Knox, *Historical Journal*, III, 10-11, Amherst to Pitt, July 6, 1758.

⁴⁶Rapport de la Houlière quoted by R. Waddington, *La Guerre de Sept Ans*, II, 348.

⁴⁷"La brume épaisse dont nous sommes couverts nous dérobe les travaux des assiégeants qui établissent en sureté leurs batteries surtout dans les parties qui entourent la rade." La Houlière au Ministre, June 22, 1758. (*Collection des Manuscrits* . . . relatifs à la Nouvelle France, IV, 162-3.

⁴⁸W. T. Waugh, *James Wolfe*, 168.

bad condition the walls of Louisbourg were. He did not: Louisbourg was still universally considered the greatest fortress in America, though the men who were defending it were sadly aware "que la place est dans le plus mauvais état malgré les travaux et la dépense excessive qu'on a faits, parce que la nature des matériaux est très défectueuse et que l'intempérie des saisons détruit tout".⁴⁹ Careful preparations for the siege were certainly necessary and even Wolfe, looking across at the disastrous results of rashness at Ticonderoga, could write, "We have been extremely fortunate in this business. If Abercromby had acted with half as much caution and prudence as General Amherst did, this must have been a dear campaign to the French."⁵⁰ And Amherst had other and even better reasons for his apparent delay: the weather was often stormy and, what is commonly forgotten,⁵¹ surf on a rocky coast lasts a long time after the storm has subsided; consequently it was very difficult to get the necessary guns and supplies on shore. And even when this had been accomplished, largely as a result of the whole-hearted co-operation of the sailors from the fleet, his troubles were only just beginning. Almost the whole of the fortifications on the land side of Louisbourg were screened by a marsh that made the transport of guns extraordinarily difficult, and the difficulty was not rendered any the less by the raking fire from the *Aréthuse* which had taken up a position in the northwest corner of the harbour. All this meant that progress was inevitably slow, but when Amherst did get his guns in position and his batteries opened fire, the besieged realized the hopelessness of further resistance.

If there is any blame to be allotted for not bringing about the earlier surrender of Louisbourg, it must be laid at the door of Boscawen and the fleet. Their co-operation had been magnificent, but it might have been expected that with the Island Battery silenced they would enter the harbour and bombard the ships and the town. That they did not do so was probably due to a very understandable distrust of the Cape Breton coast and the Atlantic weather, combined with an overestimate of the possible danger from the French fleet; but they more than made amends by their brilliant boat attack under Balfour and Laforey; "ce coup de main audacieux . . . trancha le sort de Louisbourg."⁵²

Wolfe had done well, as he always did when he had well-conceived plans laid down for him to follow; he had carried his operations out with skill and vigour. Indeed Knox's anonymous correspondent puts the whole thing in a nutshell when he writes "Mr. Amherst has displayed the General in all his proceedings, and our four Brigadiers are justly entitled to great praises; Mr. Wolfe being the youngest in rank, the most active part of the service fell to his lot; he is an excellent Officer, of great valour, which has conspicuously appeared in the whole course of this undertaking."⁵³

But Wolfe was bitterly disappointed, he had wanted to go on to

⁴⁹La Houlière au Ministre, June 10, 1758, quoted in R. Waddington, *La Guerre de Sept Ans*, II, 346; J. S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Years War*, I, 323.

⁵⁰B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 395-6, Wolfe to his mother, Aug. 11, 1758.

⁵¹e.g., by W. T. Waugh, *James Wolfe*, 164.

⁵²R. Waddington, *La Guerre de Sept Ans*, II, 358.

⁵³Knox, *Historical Journal*, I, 253. Four brigadiers is obviously a mistake for three.

Quebec and finish the war. Again Amherst has been blamed for holding the hero back from his destiny; and again quite unfairly. Wolfe was so bitter that he criticized violently and without just cause the whole conduct of the siege: "This place could not have held out ten days if it had been attacked with common sense", "We lost time at the siege, still more after the siege, and blundered from the beginning to the end of the campaign",⁵⁴ are fair samples of his views; he also began somewhat peevishly and officiously to tell Amherst how he ought to run the rest of the war. The General's final reply was a model of courteous forbearance. The irony of the situation lay in the fact that Amherst was just as anxious to go on to Quebec as Wolfe was. On July 27 he wrote to Pitt, "If I can go to Quebec, I will"; on Aug. 1, Aug. 3, Aug. 5, Aug. 6 he discussed the matter with Boscawen, reiterating on each occasion the same theme "what I wished to do was to go to Quebeck," and on each occasion the admiral replied that he thought it impossible.⁵⁵ This is a sufficient answer to Wolfe's petulant disregard of facts, of the difficulties of weather, of getting the artillery back into the ships, of victualling and repairing the Louisbourg works before the army and fleet could possibly set out up the St. Lawrence. So Wolfe went through with his raiding expedition on the Gaspé coast, then threw in his hand in a rage and sailed for home. From the Louisbourg affair he had emerged far better than from that of Rochefort, but there is still no evidence of the great strategist or of the soldier who has any understanding of, or much sympathy with the problems of naval operations.

Amherst remained in America labouring to put together once more the scattered pieces of Abercromby's defeated army; Wolfe was in England and, as he was on the spot, received a good deal of personal glory for the capture of Louisbourg. Therefore it was only natural that in next year's campaign he should be given an important command, his first independent command, for though he was nominally under Amherst as commander-in-chief in America, the difficulties of distance eliminated all real control. On the basis of his previous achievements, it was a perfectly justifiable appointment and it is interesting to note that as early as Dec. 1758, three of the most competent officers in America, Monckton, Murray and Burton, had suggested it to Pitt.⁵⁶ This is important, because it goes to prove that both Monckton and Murray at least embarked upon the campaign with a respect and liking for their commander. At Wolfe's special request they were appointed brigadier-generals under him and to them Pitt added a third—George Townshend.

As these three brigadiers are rather intimately associated with the problem of Wolfe's military reputation it might be well to spend a few words upon them. Robert Monckton, the senior brigadier, was the second son of Viscount Galway; born in 1726, he was six months older than Wolfe, and after service in Germany he had spent the last seven years in America, mainly in Nova Scotia, where in 1755 he had been appointed

⁵⁴B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 429, Wolfe to Major Walter Wolfe, May 19, 1759; 402, Wolfe to Col. Rickson, Dec. 1, 1758.

⁵⁵Pitt, *Correspondence with Colonial Governors*, ed. by G. S. Kimball, I, 307; *Journal of Jeffrey Amherst*, 73-74.

⁵⁶J. S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Years War*, I, 398, quoting S. P. Col. (America and West Indies), 76, Dec. 29, 1758.

lieutenant-governor. Quiet, competent and experienced, he was thoroughly conversant with the conditions of war against the French and Indians along the St. Lawrence.

The second brigadier was George Townshend, eldest son of Viscount Townshend, and just three years older than Wolfe. In the war of the Austrian Succession he had seen decidedly more service than Wolfe had, being in action at Dettingen, Fontenoy, Culloden and Laffeldt; it is interesting to note that accounts from both Wolfe and Townshend of the conduct of the battle of Dettingen survive, and there is no question, but what Townshend's judgment on this battle was the sounder of the two.⁵⁷ The same may be said of his remarks on the battle of Laffeldt. In 1755 Townshend quarrelled with the Duke of Cumberland and later resigned from the army; but Pitt, on coming into office in 1758, offered him a commission as Colonel of Foot, which Townshend accepted, requesting an appointment on active service as soon as possible. Townshend had served with Monckton in 1745 on the staff of Lord Dunmore, but there is no evidence that he and Wolfe were personally known to one another before his appointment to the Quebec expedition. He was probably the most intellectually brilliant of the commanders before Quebec; a man of wide interests, he had sat in the house of commons and played some part in political life, he was an artist of very considerable skill, and possessed of a keen sense of humour which found vent, on occasion, in some extremely good and witty caricatures. In addition he was a soldier of experience and ability, who applied his brain as well as his muscle to the conduct of his profession.

Murray, the third brigadier, the fifth son of Lord Elibank, born in 1721, was six years older than Wolfe; he had been a soldier for nearly twenty years and Wolfe had already served with him at Rochefort and at Louisbourg and had come to value his vigour, independence and military skill.

It has been alleged, that as all three of his brigadiers were the sons of noblemen, they more or less combined to look down on Wolfe, and that he felt abashed and quite naturally irritated before such splendour.⁵⁸ For this view there seems no justification: Monckton and Murray were chosen at Wolfe's special request and at any rate, at the beginning of the campaign, he liked them. There is no evidence at all that the brigadiers had any tendency to hang together in opposition to Wolfe, until, when success or failure was trembling in the balance, they were practically driven to do so by Wolfe's secretive policy and his determination to stand upon his military rank and authority.

Lastly, but by no means least, there was Charles Saunders, admiral in command of the fleet. Older than his military colleagues, he had seen over twenty years of distinguished service in the navy. The harmony and co-operation between Amherst and Boscawen at Louisbourg had been admirable,⁵⁹ and Saunders was to show that he and his fleet were ready to make even greater contributions to the final success of the expedition

⁵⁷B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 36-38, Wolfe to his father, July 4, 1743; C. V. F. Townshend, *Life of . . . Townshend*, 24-30, Townshend's Journal.

⁵⁸W. T. Waugh, *James Wolfe*, 248.

⁵⁹B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 388-389, Wolfe to Lord George Sackville, July 30, 1758, had borne unhesitating testimony to this.

against Quebec. But Saunders was a reticent man and as late as May 19 when the army and the fleet had assembled at Louisbourg, Wolfe did not expect that he would do more than "send four or five of his smallest ships of the line to assist at Quebec, and remain with the rest at an anchor below the Isle aux Coudres";⁶⁰ we know now how much more splendidly Saunders intended to co-operate in Wolfe's attack on the city. But here again, while there is not the slightest hint of anything but the most proper behaviour on the part of the reserved and efficient Saunders, Wolfe on one or two occasions seemed to find reason to complain of his attitude.

Thus Wolfe started out with almost every advantage that a general could desire; were the French in as good a position, or were there defects in their military arrangements which would make Wolfe's task easier?

Of the corruption and peculation in Canada which Bigot and his subordinates had raised almost to the dignity of a fine art, there is little need to speak; it is well known and anyway it affected the military situation in 1759 only indirectly, and then probably not as much as most people imagine, for while Bigot saw to it that the king paid extravagantly for what he got, he also tried to see that the king got enough to carry on operations as efficiently as possible. Consequently Montcalm, while he disliked Bigot's dishonesty, admitted that he was reasonably effective, and on several occasions we find that it was Bigot who was supporting Montcalm in his desire to take early action in preparing for the protection of Quebec, while Vaudreuil would do nothing.⁶¹ And therein really lay the greatest stumbling block to the adequate defence of New France, the greatest ally that Wolfe was to acquire—the Marquis de Vaudreuil. Opinionated and unintelligent, weak yet always obstinate at the wrong times, vain and flamboyant, determined to steal any glory there was for himself and throw all the blame on other people, he had not even the merit of being a rogue, the furthest he had the courage to go was in the adjustment of the truth to serve his own interests; and to crown it all he was possessed to the full of that quality which has burgeoned so often and so unfortunately on Canadian soil, an egotistic suspicion of anyone who had not been born or at least lived for many years in Canada. Consequently it cannot be expected that there would for long be very much co-operation between Vaudreuil and Montcalm. Vaudreuil was not only governor-general but also the supreme commander of all the armed forces in New France, and at times he seemed to take almost a pleasure in preventing Montcalm from doing anything at all; the zenith of his tepid condescension is reached in a plan of operations he produced on April 1, 1759, when he wrote "Comme j'aurai toujours grand plaisir à leur (i.e., Montcalm and Levis) faire part de tous les mouvements que j'ordonnerai, je serai à même de faire usage des réflexions que les circonstances et les lieux leur suggéreront".⁶² Two months later he was to receive so vigorous a rap over the knuckles from Berryer, the minister of marine,⁶³ that even his self-satisfaction must have been pierced, but it was too late, the damage had been done.

As early as September 1757 Montcalm had urged the necessity of

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 428, Wolfe to Major Walter Wolfe, May 19, 1759.

⁶¹e.g., Montcalm au Ministre, May 24, 1759, *Collection des Manuscrits*, IV, 228.

⁶²*Manuscrits du Maréchal de Lévis: Lettres et pièces militaires*, 161.

⁶³See R. Waddington, *La Guerre de Sept Ans*, III, 256-257 for Berryer's letters.

erecting a battery on Cap Tourmente that would rake with ease any ships that might try to come through the Traverse; for he had no illusions about the strength of Quebec: "Les fortifications en sont si ridicules et si mauvais qu'elle seroit prise aussitôt qu'assiégée." These suggestions were repeated again and again down to the spring of 1759, but Vaudreuil did nothing; "malheureusement l'indolence a encore triomphé des conseils les plus salutaires",⁶⁴ as Montcalm's journal records. By May 1759 it was too late to build the battery, so it was proposed at the council on May 23 to sink eight or ten large French ships in the Traverse and so block the road; but when investigations were made the French learnt to their surprise that the fairway was far too wide to be blocked in this manner "nos marins canadiens . . . rougissent donc de honte . . . d'avoir exposé les armes du Roi et toute une colonie aux insultes pour ne s'être pas donné la peine de rien sonder."⁶⁵ In the same way the suggestion to erect a battery on Pointe de Lévis or to hold it with an adequate entrenchment produced no results, and consequently the English were able to seize it when they pleased.⁶⁶ The real truth was that while Montcalm believed that Quebec would be attacked, Vaudreuil was either too blind or too obstinate to admit that this was possible. "A Québec," wrote Montcalm in April 1759, "l'ennemi peut venir si nous n'avons pas d'escadre . . . Cependant nulle précaution—la réponse, nous aurons le temps."⁶⁷

Such was the state of affairs at Quebec and it is important for our purpose to realize exactly how the situation stood, for not only did it make the initial phases of Wolfe's expedition a relatively simple matter, for he met with none of the opposition that ought to have been encountered, but these dissensions within the French high command made it far more difficult for them to resist his actual attack with any success.

When Wolfe reached Halifax on April 30 he found that ice conditions had prevented Durell from patrolling the St. Lawrence and consequently Bougainville and his provision squadron had been enabled to slip up the river to Quebec. It has often been said that the information that he carried that the English were about to attack Quebec, gave the French time to perfect their defences; as has been shown above, little was done and anyway, had Durell been sailing up the river instead of Bougainville, news of his arrival would have been carried just as soon by signals to

⁶⁴*Journal de Montcalm*, 307-8; *Rapport de l'Archiviste de . . . Québec*, 1923-4, 15, Memoir sent to France in 1758; *Documents relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, X, 928. Memoir on the Position of France and England in America; *Quebec Literary and Historical Society, Documents*, 9th Series, Johnstone, Dialogue des Morts, 108. Lévis had the same view that Quebec was indefensible, see *Calendar of Northcliffe Collection, Dominion Archives*, 213.

⁶⁵*Journal de Montcalm*, 523-4, 526, 557; Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, IV, 167-8, *Journal de Foligné*; *Siège de Québec en 1795 copié . . . par l'Hon. D. B. Viger* (Quebec, 1836), 7.

⁶⁶Knox, *Historical Journal*, I, 392, author's note; *Rapport de l'Archiviste . . . de Québec*, 1923-4, 15, Memoir sent to France in 1758; *Ibid.*, 1933-4, 121-122. Here M. De la Pause speaks very strongly of the importance the French ought to have attached to holding Pointe de Lévis.

⁶⁷Montcalm à Belleisle, Apr. 12, 1759, quoted by R. Waddington, *La Guerre de Sept Ans*, III, 263; Vaudreuil, Plan of operation, Apr. 1, 1759 in *Collection . . . de Lévis*; *Lettres et pièces militaires*, 157; *Documents relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, X, 876, 877. Montcalm's Memoir of Sept. 1758 and Vaudreuil's Remarks thereon.

Quebec. All that Bougainville can be credited with, is the bringing of encouragement and some supplies.

On leaving Louisbourg on June 6 Wolfe ran true to form by sending home to Pitt a letter starting with a spirited enumeration of the defects in all that was under his command, even blaming Saunders because he was making him send off his letter to Pitt so early in the voyage. But even Wolfe had had to admit that Amherst had laboured with great zeal and success to provide him with everything he needed; in fact he had at his disposal an extremely efficient and well-supplied army and a large and invaluable fleet.⁶⁸

By July 1 after a brilliant feat of navigation, the English forces had reached Quebec, a camp had been established towards the western end of the Isle of Orleans and Pointe de Lévis had been seized; and over against the English forces lay the French entrenchments stretching along the edge of the old north shore line from the River St. Charles to the river Montmorency. But it must be remembered that the fact that Wolfe could occupy Pointe de Lévis at all was the result not only of neglect on the part of the French to fortify it, but also of some information that a prisoner had given them on the evening of June 30, to the effect that the real attack was going to be made on Beauport and the occupation of Pointe de Lévis was a mere diversion. Both Montcalm and Vaudreuil believed this and in consequence countermanded the vigorous assault against the English across the river which the former had planned for that night. This fortunate accident probably saved the English from having to capture Pointe de Lévis all over again and in the face of heavy odds.⁶⁹ As it was, within twenty-four hours they had established themselves and the opportunity was gone.

What was the military problem that faced Wolfe? In words, it was quite simple—to bring Montcalm to open battle, either by forcing him to abandon his entrenchments, by luring him out of them, or by making a direct attack upon them; and the direct attack upon an enemy entrenched upon his own chosen ground is obviously little more than the last resort of a great self-confidence or of a great despair. On the other hand Montcalm could be induced to leave his position by a variety of expedients, of which the two most promising were a threat to his communications, or a serious blow to the safety of Quebec.

How did Wolfe decide to solve this problem? In the first place, it must be remembered that he had several great advantages over the French; he could divide his forces with reasonable safety, because the ships or the boats would provide rapid communication between the different parts of his army; the guns of the fleet could be used to protect the landing of his troops; and the ships or their boats could provide a formidable diversion without calling upon more than a very small number of his soldiers to give them assistance. Before he reached Quebec Wolfe had been thinking of

⁶⁸B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 423-4, 431-3, Wolfe to Pitt, May 1, June 6, 1759.

⁶⁹*Journal de Montcalm*, 562-3, 565; *Quebec Literary and Historical Soc. Documents*, 1st Series, Evénements, 5-6; *Ibid.*, 4th Series, *Journal du Siège de Québec en 1759* par J. C. Panet, 11; *Bulletin des Recherches Historiques*, IX, 329-330, *Journal de M. Récher*; *Siège de Québec en 1759 copié . . . par l'Hon. D. B. Viger* (Quebec, 1836), 15-16; *Rapport de l'Archiviste de . . . Québec*, 1920-21, 161-2, *Journal du Siège de Québec*, (by De Vienne?).

landing his main force on the Beauport flats and attacking the enemy across the river St. Charles, while a possible feint might be made above Quebec to distract their attention.⁷⁰ When he arrived, he found that Montcalm had been so inconsiderate as to entrench his own men on the very spot where Wolfe had been intending to land; therefore his plans had to be recast. What Wolfe says in his journal makes it almost certain that all he did was invert his original design: "to get ashore if possible above the town", to which Saunders agreed, and to land Townshend's brigade "below the Falls of Montmorency to draw the Enemy's attention that way and favour the projected attempt." Murray reconnoitred up the south shore on July 4 and reported on the following day that he was satisfied "with the practicability of the attempt at Michel".⁷¹ Then the scheme seems to have been abandoned for the time being at any rate, probably for the same reason that made him drop a similar idea a fortnight later, that the landing of the troops would be so slow that the enemy could attack them with ease;⁷² under the circumstances a very sound decision. The French on their side were perfectly aware of the possibility of landing immediately above Quebec; in Jan. 1759 M. de Pontleroi had drawn up a memoir dealing with this subject, but he felt that as long as the town batteries could prevent boats getting up the river, the shore line was secure; and although early in July there was some alarm felt, Montcalm and Vaudreuil thought that the adding of a few Indians to the 300 men stationed on the cliffs above Quebec, would be enough for safety.⁷³

Meanwhile the English troops had established themselves on the night of July 8 on the east bank of the Montmorency, as a diversion in favour of the attack that had been planned above the town. Townshend in his journal criticizes very vigorously the careless way in which Wolfe allowed the encampment to be left unprotected and, as a result of a successful Indian raid, he set to work himself to prepare some adequate entrenchments; for doing this Wolfe rebuked him with considerable violence.⁷⁴ The entrenchments were absolutely justified and, if Wolfe is not to be charged with negligence and an unwillingness to permit another man to do what he had forgotten, his actions can be explained only on the ground that he intended the unprotected men as a bait to persuade Montcalm to attack. Remembering his plan for the extermination of a Highland clan which was referred to above, this is not as impossible as it might seem; but it does not add to one's good opinion of Wolfe, whichever solution of the puzzle is accepted as the true one. Montcalm, however, was not risking an attack and for the next few days there was a distinct pause in the operations. So far Wolfe's tactics had, on the whole, been sound.

⁷⁰B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 428, Wolfe to Major Walter Wolfe, May 19, 1759.

⁷¹Wolfe's Journal (in the McCord Museum, Montreal) under July 3, 4, 5; Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, V, 37-8, Journal of Major Moncrief; Wolfe's letter to Pitt on Sept. 2 (B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 455) does not suggest that this landing at the Montmorency was a feint, but Wolfe's letter did not by any means tell the whole truth.

⁷²B. Willson, *Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 455-6, Wolfe to Pitt, Sept. 2, 1759.

⁷³Collection . . . de Lévis; *Lettres et pièces militaires*, 102; *Rapport de l'Archiviste . . . de Québec*, 1920-1, 162, 168; *Lettres du Marquis de Montcalm au Chev. de Lévis*, 175.

⁷⁴Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, V, 242-244, Townshend's Journal.

On July 12 the bombardment of Quebec began from the Pointe de Lévis and the town batteries could now be dominated; on July 16 both tide and wind were favourable for the ships to pass Quebec and go up the river, and although they failed on that night, because the wind died away at the critical moment, they succeeded on the night of July 18.⁷⁵ On the following day Wolfe "reconnoitred the country immediately above Quebec and found that if we had ventured the Stroke that was first intended (i.e., at St. Michel) we should probably have succeeded." But the French were alarmed and as he wrote to Pitt, the scheme was now too dangerous.⁷⁶ Still he seems to have failed altogether to realize the tremendous advantage control of the river above Quebec now gave him and although Carleton very successfully raided Pointe-aux-Trembles on July 20-21, it was merely an experimental diversion and from now on Wolfe turned his attention to a frontal attack on the eastern end of the Beauport lines. But even in regard to this Wolfe could not make up his mind; as Montcalm had refused most judiciously to play his part in Wolfe's game, he seemed hardly to know what to do and Gibson wrote on July 20 "Within the space of 5 hours we recd at the generals request 3 different Orders of consequence, which were contradicted immediately after their reception; which indeed has been the constant Practice of the Gen. ever since we have been here to the no small amazement of everyone who has the liberty of thinking. Every step he takes is wholly his own; I'm told he asks no one's opinion and wants no advice."⁷⁷ All the same the French could have given him very good advice, because they knew quite well that he could make them fight when he pleased, if he were only able enough to realize it. On July 19, after the ships went up the river, M. Dumas was at once sent off with 600 men, and 300 more along with the cavalry were added on the following day, so that the shore immediately above Quebec might be safeguarded against a landing; the Samos battery was set up and Montcalm's journal records what all the French officers were fearing "Si l'ennemi prend le parti de remonter le fleuve et peut descendre dans un point quelconque, il intercepte toute communication avec nos vivres et nos munitions de guerre." Therefore to make assurance doubly sure, the roads up from the shore to the top of the cliffs at the Anse au Foulon, Sillery and St. Michel were well broken, so as to render the ascent more difficult.⁷⁸ All the same M. de la Pause puts his finger clearly on the weak point in the French position, that with the appearance of the fleet above Quebec "tout le monde regarde cette marche comme très décisive pour l'avenir. L'on craint que la communication avec nos derrières ne soit interrompue et . . . nous ne pouvons pas autant nous diviser qu'eux sans courir les risques trop évident de nous faire battre en détail." But

⁷⁵R. H. Mahon, *Life of Gen. . . . Murray*, 114-115.

⁷⁶Wolfe's Journal under July 19. He first wrote "infallibly" then crossed it out and put in "probably"; B. Willson, *Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 455-6, Wolfe to Pitt, Sept. 2, 1759.

⁷⁷Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, V, 65, J. Gibson to Governor Lawrence, Aug. 1, 1759.

⁷⁸*Journal de Montcalm*, 578, 580; Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, V, 314, 315, Relation du Siège de Québec; *Ibid.*, IV, 9-10, Montcalm à Bougainville, July 20, 1759; *Quebec Literary and Historical Soc. Documents*, 1st Series, Evénements, 49; Collection . . . de Lévis; *Lettres du Marquis de Montcalm au Chev. de Lévis*, 203, July 28, 1759.

this Wolfe did not grasp, so he turned his attention to the Montmorency which from being a mere diversion now became a main frontal attack. All this is precisely confirmed by Admiral Holmes' letter of Sept. 18 in which he says that the plan of attacking above Quebec had been proposed to Wolfe "when the first ships passed the Town, and when it was entirely defenceless and unguarded; but Montmorency was then his favourite scheme, and he rejected it."⁷⁹

It is not necessary to discuss in detail the follies of his disastrous and costly repulse on July 31. He undertook the assault on the Beauport lines directly against the advice of his general officers, who expressed their strong dislike for it. It was badly planned, and based on an entirely erroneous conception of the ground where the attack was to be made, a mistake for which Wolfe must take the responsibility; he cannot shift the blame on to the shoulders of the grenadiers who allowed their enthusiasm to get out of hand. The attack lacked inevitably all the elements of a surprise, the soldiers had to sit, "exposed to the heat of the Sun and a furious Canonading from the Enemy for 7 hours and $\frac{1}{2}$ ";⁸⁰ and it was made against the east end of the French entrenchments where it would do least harm to the enemy; what they were really afraid of was an assault upon their lines between Beauport and the St. Charles, which, if successful, would cut their army in two and probably result in the surrender of a large part of their left wing; this Wolfe seems never to have thought of. Even had the English won, they could have done so only after great losses, for the whole road to the west of Beauport "was nothing else but one intrenchment at the back of another"; and they would not have prevented the French from retiring to a strong position across the St. Charles. It was, in short, a mere gamble on the possibility of the French-Canadian militia breaking from their trenches before the threat of an attack; instead they stayed and shot the English down; a fortunate storm alone enabled the landing parties to retire with safety.⁸¹ And the causes of the disaster were quite properly pointed out by the Chevalier de Johnstone to be much the same as those that brought Abercromby to defeat at Ticonderoga.⁸² Practically all the time Wolfe had played straight into Montcalm's hands; and well might Montcalm say as he looked across at Wolfe's camp on the Montmorency "Drive them thence, and they will give us more trouble; while they are there they cannot hurt us; let them amuse themselves."⁸³

So far Wolfe had failed and failed badly; he became more vacillating

⁷⁹*Rapport de l'Archiviste de . . . Québec*, 1933-4, 98, 100, Continuation du Journal de la Campagne 1759; Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, IV, 296, Letter of Admiral Holmes, Sept. 18, 1759.

⁸⁰Wolfe's Journal under July 30; Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, V, 66-67, James Gibson to Governor Lawrence, Aug. 1, 1759; Knox, *Historical Journal*, I, 449-452.

⁸¹*Collection de . . . Lévis; Lettres du Marquis de Montcalm au Chev. de Lévis*, 168, July 1, 1759; *Calendar of Northcliffe Collection, Dominion Archives*, 211-212, Plan of Operations by Lévis; *Dominion Archives Report*, 1923, App. C, Bourlamaque Papers, 58, Vaudreuil to (Lévis?); Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, V, 93-94, Memoirs of John Johnson; *Rapport de l'Archiviste de . . . Québec*, 1931-2, 93, Copie de la Relation envoyée à M. de Crémilles; *Quebec Literary and Historical Soc. Documents*, 9th Series, Johnstone, Dialogue des Morts, 119-120.

⁸²*Ibid.*, 122.

⁸³Knox, *Historical Journal*, I, 426.

than ever; trying a variety of schemes, but still failing to see the right one. He thought of a direct assault on Quebec from the river and along with Saunders examined the town, but on the advice of Mackellar, the chief engineer, decided that such an attack was quite impracticable;⁸⁴ this was undoubtedly the desperate plan to which he referred in that letter to Admiral Saunders which has been so frequently misinterpreted.⁸⁵ He sent Murray up the river with 1,200 men to destroy the ships, and burn the magazines of supplies supposed to be at Deschambault, and in general to provoke the French to attack him wherever possible;⁸⁶ it was too many men for a mere raid and too few if any position was to be taken and held. Wolfe was, in fact, still thinking of Beauport as the main point of attack and the upper river as a mere diversion. But Murray's work was well done and succeeded in thoroughly alarming the French for the safety of their communications and supplies, with the result that Bougainville was put in command of some 2,000 men—the élite of the French forces—whose duty it was to guard the shore line up to Jacques Cartier, thus materially weakening the strength of the main French army. In addition the successes of Amherst had caused the departure early in August of Lévis and 800 men for Montreal. But among the English leaders serious difficulties were arising; Wolfe had not seen eye to eye with Saunders over the battle of July 31 and elsewhere the period of delay and indecision had undoubtedly bred discontent. With Townshend, Wolfe seems to have been at odds ever since the incident of the entrenchment of the Montmorency camp on July 10. Moreover, Townshend probably found Wolfe's rather old-maidish habits, his display of propriety, and his lack of humour decidedly funny and whiled away some of the periods of inaction in drawing caricatures. If Wolfe ever saw them, he was not the sort of person to appreciate their humorous aspect. And added to all this Wolfe fell sick, his chronic ill-health being aggravated by despair at his failure. Therefore about August 29 he determined to appeal to his brigadiers for suggestions and advice, still reiterating his own belief in the frontal attack on the Beauport line. The brigadiers in their famous reply criticized very soundly the idea of making any further assault between the St. Charles and the Montmorency, and advocated an attack above Quebec, probably above Cap Rouge, pointing out with complete justice that by cutting Montcalm's communications in this way he would be forced to come out and fight. To this reply they appended a plan of operations,⁸⁷ and to say, as Waugh does, that these two documents "contained no idea of importance which Wolfe had not thought of before" is unwise hero-worship, for if he had realized the possibilities of this plan, he was all the more culpable for failing to adopt it earlier.

As the brigadiers well knew, the French were having their troubles, too. The problem of getting provisions to Quebec was becoming more and

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, II, 36-7, Aug. 18, 1759; B. Willson, *Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 462, Wolfe to Saunders, Aug. 30, 1759; 470, Wolfe to Pitt, Sept. 2, 1759.

⁸⁵e.g., by W. T. Waugh, *James Wolfe*, 274.

⁸⁶Knox, *Historical Journal*, III, 165, Murray to Holmes, Aug. 11, 1759; Kimball, *Correspondence of W. Pitt with Colonial Governors*, II, 156, Wolfe to Pitt, Sept. 2, 1759.

⁸⁷B. Willson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 466-7; C. V. F. Townshend, *Life of . . . Townshend*, 205-8; Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, II, 242; R. H. Mahon, *Life of . . . Murray*, 128-129.

more acute; the English ships were making it difficult to bring them down as in the past by water, and transport by road was slow and arduous, because the road was very bad, especially in wet weather, and the carts were too few and were always breaking down;⁸⁸ still on August 23 there had slipped through by water a convoy that would keep the army fed until Sept. 10 but no longer, and on Aug. 29 the ration of bread was reduced from one pound to three-quarters, in the hope of postponing the day of starvation.⁸⁹ Moreover, in consequence of these hardships, and still more of discouragement resulting from the length of the campaign, large numbers of the Canadians "dont le genre de guerre est de faire un coup subit" were deserting and going home.⁹⁰ Therefore it was becoming very obvious that for reasons both psychological and practical, Montcalm might well be forced to fight if pressure were brought to bear on his communications: this had been true for at least a month, and at last Wolfe was stirred by the brigadiers' letter to action, and action along the right lines. On Sept. 3 the troops were evacuated from the camp at Montmorency, though Wolfe made a last desperate attempt to trap Montcalm into attacking what looked like an unprotected camp; Montcalm very wisely refused to accede to his officers' requests for action, and in the morning the English withdrew.⁹¹ But even yet Wolfe was not entirely converted to the idea of throwing all his men into an attack above Quebec, or if he were, he was still acting unwisely, for on Aug. 31 he drastically weakened his force by sending some 1,600 men down the river on a raiding expedition. They were not present at the final battle, as they did not return until Sept. 20.⁹²

Having transferred the greater part of his army to Pointe de Lévis and above, there is little doubt that Wolfe in all good faith accepted the brigadiers' plan; there is not an iota of evidence that he had anything else in his mind. The plan was a good one, previous experiment had shown that a landing could be effected, in fact, the landing at Deschambault under Murray on Aug. 19 was almost a dress rehearsal for the Anse au Foulon a month later; exactly the same preparations were used, there had been the same alarming of the French elsewhere, even the landing was about the same time, 4.00 a.m.—the only difference being that the boats went up river instead of down.⁹³ In addition it was pretty certain that the brigadiers' plan would produce results; the only real point to settle was where the landing was to be made. This is the perfectly simple

⁸⁸*Quebec Literary and Historical Soc. Documents*, 1st Series, Evénements, 51, 56, Aug. 1, 16, 18; Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, IV, 45, Bigot à Bougainville, Aug. 16, 1759.

⁸⁹*Journal de Montcalm*, 595, 599, Aug. 23, 28; Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, IV, 65-66, Vaudreuil à Bougainville, Aug. 23, 1759; 67, Cadet à Bougainville, Aug. 24, 1759; Knox, *Historical Journal*, II, 53, note; *Rapport de l'Archiviste de . . . Québec*, 1920-21, 196. *Journal du Siège de Québec* (par De Vienne?); *Bulletin des Recherches Historiques*, IX, 193-4, *Journal de M. Récher*.

⁹⁰Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, V, 293, *Journal Abrégé d'un Aide-de-Camp*; *Journal de Montcalm*, 576-7, July 17, 1759; *Siège de Québec en 1759 copié . . . par l'Hon. D. B. Viger* (Quebec, 1836), 22.

⁹¹J. S. Corbett, *England in the Seven Years War*, I, 457; Knox, *Historical Journal*, II, 58-59.

⁹²R. H. Mahon, *Life of Murray*, 129; Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, III, 124; Knox, *Historical Journal*, II, 54-5, 136.

⁹³W. Wood, *Logs of the Conquest of Canada*, 319, *Sutherland's Log* under the date Aug. 18.

explanation of the passing backwards and forwards on the river both of the generals and of the ships—for while the former were spying out the land, the latter were confusing the enemy as to their ultimate intentions. So on Sept. 7, Monckton, Murray, Townshend and Wolfe all went up in the *Hunter* to look at Pointe-aux-Trembles, after the ships had threatened Cap Rouge; on the 8th "Genl. Wolfe went a reconnoitering down the River" while a reconnaissance or a feint was made against Pointe-aux-Trembles; on the 9th the weather was thoroughly bad and operations were suspended; on the 10th Wolfe took Townshend, Monckton, Holmes, Mackellar, Carleton and Capt. Chads down to Goreham's Post on the south shore to examine at what point a landing might be made. By this time he had certainly selected the place he preferred, for on that same day he wrote to Col. Burton, giving him exact details.⁹⁴ Both the idea and the general outlines of the plan were the brigadiers', though Wolfe had certainly considered an attack above Quebec early in July and had definitely abandoned it. The details of method and the selection of the place of landing were Wolfe's, though Murray had reported that, early in August when on his way up river with Admiral Holmes, he had made a feint of landing at the Anse St. Michel next to the Anse au Foulon.⁹⁵

The first point to be settled, therefore, is whether the Anse au Foulon or some spot above Cap Rouge would have been the better. A great deal of discussion has been rather wasted on this question. It has been pointed out that a landing at the Foulon placed the English across only the upper road from Quebec to Montreal, while one made above St. Augustin would have given Wolfe control not only of the upper road but also of the lower one that ran from Quebec through the St. Charles valley and joined the upper one close to that village. In this way French communications would have been completely cut, their line of retreat to Montreal destroyed, and a complete surrender of the whole French army inevitable, once they were defeated. All this is perfectly sound, but against it, is urged the fact that the landing at the Foulon was a direct and immediate threat to Quebec and therefore forced on a battle at once; this is also quite true. Frankly, neither of these arguments matters very much; even if Wolfe and the brigadiers knew anything about the importance of the lower road, and there is no evidence that they did, the one thing they were thinking of, was to bring Montcalm to battle away from his entrenchments. Wolfe believed, and in fact it was perfectly true, that the French were getting straitened for supplies, and the only area from which they could draw their supplies was Montreal; therefore any serious threat to his line of communications would force Montcalm to act, and, when the transport was slow moving waggon trains, the threat was just as serious from the Foulon as from St. Augustin. On the other hand Wolfe could advance on Quebec as easily, though not quite so quickly, from St. Augustin as he could from

⁹⁴Knox, *Historical Journal*, II, 79-80, 84, 85; Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, IV, 121, Remigny à Bougainville, Sept. 11, 1759; V, 185-6, Journal of the Particular Transactions, Sept. 6-10; 266-7, Townshend's Journal, Sept. 7, 8, 10; *Quebec Literary and Historical Soc. Documents*, 4th Series, A Journal of the Expedition up the St. Lawrence, 17; B. Willson, *Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, 477-8, Wolfe to Col. Burton, Sept. 10; 485, Wolfe to Monckton, Sept. 12; W. Wood, *Logs of the Conquest of Canada*, 231, 240-1, 293-4, 320-1.

⁹⁵R. H. Mahon, *Life of . . . Murray*, 123.

the Foulon; Quebec was quite indefensible and Montcalm knew it,⁹⁶ and there is not the slightest doubt but that he would not have dared to let it be captured without a battle even if he had wanted to do so.⁹⁷ Vaudreuil's opposition and the psychological effect on his troops would have been too great. As to bringing about the surrender of the whole French army, it might possibly have been done after the battle on the Heights of Abraham, it quite probably would not have resulted from a battle near St. Augustin, for the French Canadians would merely have faded off through the woods. Therefore, so far as potential results are concerned, there is little to choose between the brigadiers' landing place and Wolfe's; either would have produced a battle.

The story is very different when the question of a reasonable chance of success is considered. The establishment of the English army somewhere on the shore road above St. Augustin could undoubtedly have been accomplished with adequate safety, and the fact that they would have had to fight Montcalm and Bougainville's forces combined would have made little difference. This was hardly the case at the Anse au Foulon. Of course there was no real geographical difficulty about the landing: De la Pause when he surveyed the north shore, probably in June or July, found "Un grand chemin" down which two men could descend side by side; and an anonymous French officer describes it as "a convenient Road . . . wide enough even for carriages".⁹⁸ The French knew the danger but they also knew that a guard of 100 men or so, on the alert and giving the alarm at once, could hold the cliff top until reinforcements could arrive—if those reinforcements were reasonably close at hand; that is why the regiment of Guienne was placed by Montcalm in reserve behind the Anse St. Michel on Sept. 5 only to be sent back on Sept. 6 by Bougainville at the urging of Vaudreuil.⁹⁹ Wolfe's plan made no allowance whatever for an adequate French defence of the Foulon and he was saved from disaster only by two accidental circumstances over which he had no control.

In the first place, at Cadet's earnest request, Bougainville was going to send down a convoy of provisions by water to Quebec on the night of Sept. 12; the sentries were warned to let it pass and, when the English boats came along, accepted the explanation a Scotch officer gave in French that they were the convoy and no noise must be made; consequently the alarm was not given until it was too late.¹⁰⁰ This was not part of Wolfe's plan and the English knew nothing whatever about the convoy until two

⁹⁶See above, 21.

⁹⁷There is no contemporary French authority that doubts that Montcalm would be obliged to fight Wolfe, if the English landed on the north shore above Quebec.

⁹⁸*Rapport de l'Archiviste de . . . Québec*, 1933-4, 95. Itinéraire de ma Route; Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, IV, 253, Journal of a French Officer, Sept. 5.

⁹⁹Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, IV, 93, Montcalm à Bougainville, Sept. 5; 96, 99-100, 101-102, Vaudreuil à Bougainville, Sept. 5, 6; 103, Montreuil à Bougainville, Sept. 6; Malartic, *Journal des Campagnes au Canada*, 280-1; *Quebec Literary and Historical Soc. Documents*, 1st Series, Événements, 61; *Rapport de l'Archiviste de . . . Québec*, 1933-4, 130, 131, Continuation du Journal de la Campagne 1759 de M. de la Pause; *Dominion Archives Report*, 1899, Supplement, 179, Montcalm à Vaudreuil, undated, but probably in August.

¹⁰⁰Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, IV, 126, Cadet à Bougainville, Sept. 12; 203-4, Journal de Foligné; V, 187, Journal of the Particular Transactions; 213-4, Townshend's Rough Notes on the Siege of Quebec; *Quebec Literary and Historical Soc. Documents*, 1st Series, Événements, 65, 80; *Collection . . . de Lévis; Lettres de Divers Particuliers*, Montreuil à Lévis, Sept. 15, 1759; *Rapports de l'Archiviste de . . . Québec*, 1920-1, 199.

deserters came on board the *Hunter* at 11.00 p.m. on the night of Sept. 12.¹⁰¹ Had the leading boats not heard this news, and still more, had there been no convoy at all to cover their descent, the attempted landing might have been very disastrous. The second accident which gave Wolfe's plan a possibility of success was the fact that Montcalm had ordered the regiment of Guienne to camp at the head of the Anse au Foulon on Sept. 12, only to have this order postponed by Vaudreuil with his famous "nous verrons cela demain".¹⁰² What would have happened had the English advance-guard been opposed by a whole regiment of regulars instead of Vergor's sleeping handful need not be emphasized. But for these two unforeseen accidents, Wolfe's famous plan would have been little better than a gamble with his men's lives as stakes; the plan proposed by the brigadiers might have been much less spectacular, but it would have produced the same results, without the risk of a serious disaster.

Lastly, Wolfe's position when he did reach the Heights of Abraham was so unsound on the basis of any recognized military tactics that it has induced Major-General Mahon, in order to explain and justify his operations, to invent a fantastic story of treachery on the part of French officials and a frail lady luring Bougainville from his post.¹⁰³ Wolfe's communications with his ships and his guns were thoroughly bad, and he was obviously in danger of being attacked by Montcalm in front and by Bougainville in the rear. He was relying on the superiority of his troops over the French, and I think that even under these circumstances he would probably have won the day. But he was undoubtedly saved from a very dangerous position by three factors, two of which, at least, must have been entirely unforeseen: the decision of Montcalm to fight at once, a decision that was by no means inevitable though approved of at the time by all his officers, the culpable negligence of Vaudreuil in not making sure that Bougainville was warned as promptly as possible of what was happening, and the unpardonable refusal of de Ramezay to send the guns for which Montcalm had asked.¹⁰⁴ There was no diversion by the ships to hold Bougainville up the river as has been suggested; the *Sutherland* remained where she was almost opposite Cap Rouge, the rest of the ships dropped down to the Foulon and the *Sutherland* then followed.¹⁰⁵ But the feint made by the fleet off Beauport and the bombardment of the town from the batteries on the Pointe-aux-Pères were soundly conceived and admirably executed.

The essential part of the battle lasted barely a quarter of an hour; Wolfe's two-deep line of which a good deal has been written, was not the result of considered policy, but of the fact that, if he held his reserves,

¹⁰¹Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, V, 50, Journal of Major Moncrief; 111-113, Memoirs of John Johnson; W. Wood, *Logs of the Conquest of Canada*, 232, the *Hunter*, Sept. 13.

¹⁰²*Bulletin des Recherches Historiques*, IX, 139, Journal de M. Récher; *Journal de Montcalm*, 610; Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, V, 50-1, Journal of Major Moncrief. Vaudreuil's letter on the subject written after the event, is almost certainly a lie.

¹⁰³R. H. Mahon, *Life of . . . Murray*, 170-187.

¹⁰⁴Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, IV, 126-7, Vaudreuil à Bougainville, Sept. 13; J. W. Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, II, 379. He goes so far as to say that had Montcalm received all the guns he might have had he could have blasted the English army off the field.

¹⁰⁵Doughty and Parmelee, *Siege of Quebec*, III, 107; R. H. Mahon, *Life of . . . Murray*, 182-3; W. Wood, *Logs of the Conquest of Canada*, 242, 321-2.

he had too few men to make a three-deep line or a four-deep line. But anyway the victory was won. Vaudreuil was in ignominious flight and the fall of Quebec was practically a foregone conclusion, though de Ramezay could not be said to have acted with great courage. As a consequence French historians have since been faced with the awkward predicament of blaming de Ramezay, one French Canadian, in order to save Vaudreuil, another French Canadian, from the shame of this surrender, there being no foreign-born scapegoat available.

How then should the military reputation of Major-General James Wolfe be regarded? Neither at Rochefort nor at Louisbourg did he show any real strategical ability. Had he died in 1758, on his way back to England, his name would have been known to few historians; but, as it is, hypnotized by his later victory, they have interpreted his actions and policies at Rochefort and at Louisbourg wholly in the light of what they believed he did at Quebec. And the judgment that has been passed upon his Quebec campaign owes far too much to the appeal of its romantic, but fictitious setting. There were all the appurtenances of the Gothic School of writers ready to hand: the climbing of unscalable cliffs in the dead of night, the lines of solemn poetry read in the wings, the standing at dawn before the frowning fortress-capital of New France, the exaggeration of the size of the French army, the sweeping Highland charge, claymore in hand, and finally the wounding or the death of nearly all the leaders on both sides. Few could resist the temptation to find in Wolfe an almost infallible hero, when he was set against such a background as this.

But when we come down to earth and study what actually happened, we soon discover how different the real story is: the disastrous defeat of July 31, brought about almost entirely by Wolfe's bad judgment; the fumbling, the lack of any real plan, the month of futility that followed, the appeal to the brigadiers, and the final scheme that developed very largely under the stimulus of his subordinates, and to which Wolfe contributed those factors whose success must depend almost entirely upon blind chance.¹⁰⁶ It was daring, it was dramatic, but it was hardly the sound military strategy in which a general, responsible for the lives of his soldiers, ought to indulge.

Wolfe has been acclaimed as a master of combined operations, yet for weeks he failed to use the advantage his ships gave him above Quebec, and he knew very little of the problems of naval action or of the sea; he hated it—to him it was always a green-faced monster—and he had a peculiar gift for making light of those difficulties that other men had to meet, while his censorious tongue seemed to urge him on to amplify their faults. These are not qualities of a great general. Wolfe was a thoroughly good regimental officer, a commander who would care well for his men, for they were the raw material he must use in war, a subordinate for whom hard work and danger had no terrors. But beyond this he never went; when thrown upon his own initiative, when faced by a general, such as Montcalm, who knew exactly what he had to do, when asked to weave the strategic elements of a complicated situation into a coherent pattern, Wolfe still remained a competent regimental officer despairingly faced with a problem that, alone and unaided, he did not know how to solve.

¹⁰⁶These views are very similar to those held by M. de la Pause, aide-de-camp to Lévis, and one of the most acute military critics in the French army in Canada. (*Rapport de l'Archiviste de . . . Québec*, 1933-4, 154).

LES DÉPUTÉS DE LA VALLÉE DE L'OTTAWA

JOHN SIMPSON

(1788-1873)

Par FRANCIS-J. AUDET

Né en Angleterre en 1788, John Simpson était devenu marchand. Il ne fut pas heureux en affaires et après avoir essayé divers commerces, il dut déposer son bilan. Il vint au Canada en 1815 avec sa femme et les enfants qu'elle avait eus d'un premier mariage. Madame Simpson était la fille de Richard Tickell, de Londres et Bath, Angleterre, et elle avait épousé en premières noces M. Ebenezer Roebuck, mort aux Indes où il était employé dans le service civil. Elle en avait eu entre autres enfants, un fils, John-Arthur, né en 1801, qui fut député aux communes anglaises et devint l'agent de l'Assemblée législative du Bas-Canada à Londres.

Richard Tickell eut un fils unique, Richard, qui entra dans l'armée, fut envoyé au Canada et se noya accidentellement dans la rivière Niagara pendant qu'il était en charge d'un détachement se rendant au lac Érié. Le gouvernement accorda à sa soeur, madame Simpson, cinq cents acres de terre que celle-ci vint réclamer. Cette concession fut faite dans le canton d'Augusta, Haut-Canada. Les Simpson y construisirent une résidence à l'endroit aujourd'hui appelé Maitland, à cinq milles à l'est de Brockville. Cette maison est maintenant connue sous le nom de *Longley House*¹.

Henry-J. Morgan dit que² John Simpson avait été secrétaire particulier de lord Dalhousie avant que d'obtenir le poste de percepteur des douanes au Côteau-du-Lac, en juillet 1822.

M. John Simpson occupa aussi les charges suivantes: commissaire d'écoles à Côteau-du-Lac, le 10 février 1822; commissaire pour l'amélioration de la navigation sur le Saint-Laurent, aux Cascades, le 8 juin 1830; commissaire pour compléter la construction d'un chemin entre Côteau-du-Lac et le Haut-Canada, le 18 juin 1830; juge de paix, le 16 août suivant; de nouveau commissaire pour l'amélioration de la navigation entre les Cascades et le lac Saint-François, le 18 juin 1831; commissaire pour la délimitation de la frontière entre le Haut et le Bas Canada, le 21 mai 1836; pour recevoir le serment d'allégeance, le 21 décembre 1837.

M. Simpson fut marguillier (warden) de l'église protestante du Côteau-du-Lac et servit en qualité de lieutenant-colonel durant la rébellion de 1837-38. Il avait été nommé major dans le quatrième bataillon de milice du comté d'York, le 1^{er} mars 1827 et il fut promu au rang de lieutenant-colonel, le 26 juillet de l'année suivante. Le 26 avril 1830, il était versé dans la réserve et il eut pour remplaçant le lieutenant-colonel Jean-Philippe Leprohon.

C'est John Simpson qui arrêta, le 25 décembre 1837, M. Jean-Joseph Girouard, notaire de Saint-Benoit, député du comté des Deux-Montagnes, et l'un des chefs de la révolte dans cette partie de la province.

¹Notes prises dans une lettre non signée, datée de New-York, le 22 octobre 1912. Voir Arch. Pub. du Canada, Search Reference No. 13767.

²*Dominion Annual Register* 1883, 331. Voir aussi *Gazette de Québec*.

Traqué par la police et les volontaires désireux de toucher la prime alléchante (\$2000.) promise à celui qui l'arrêterait, ne voulant pas non plus exposer plus longtemps ses amis à être poursuivis pour avoir abrité et aidé un proscrit dans sa fuite, M. Girouard résolut de se rendre aux autorités. Il écrivit à M. Simpson offrant de se livrer à lui, le tenant, disait-il, pour un honnête homme qui le protégerait jusqu'à ce qu'il fut logé en prison.

M. Simpson obtint la récompense offerte par le gouvernement pour l'arrestation de M. Girouard. Mais, si le loyalisme du colonel Simpson ne souffrait pas que l'on portât atteinte aux droits et à la dignité de la Couronne, il n'en avait pas moins bon cœur.

Le sénateur Léandre Dumouchel, qui avait bien connu M. Girouard, disait que M. Simpson avait remis les \$2000 à M. Girouard ou à sa première femme. Cependant, ni la veuve de W. B. Simpson, fils du lieutenant-colonel, ni la deuxième femme de M. Girouard n'avaient jamais entendu parler de la chose. D'un autre côté, on prétendit que la plus grande partie de cette somme, sinon le tout, fut consacrée par M. Simpson à alléger le fardeau de l'exil, puis au rapatriement des *patriotes* déportés aux Bermudes.³ Voici la vérité à ce sujet.

Le *Herald* de Montréal annonçait le 20 décembre 1838, que le colonel Simpson avait envoyé cent louis à un banquier de Chesapeake Bay pour aider aux huit exilés aux Bermudes de rentrer au Canada après l'amnistie de lord Durham. Ceci fut confirmé par le colonel le lendemain dans une lettre au capitaine Goldie, secrétaire militaire du gouverneur sir John Colborne.⁴

M. Simpson eut lieu de se repentir de son acte de générosité envers les exilés aux Bermudes. Ceux-ci, ayant atteint New-York, prirent part à une assemblée tenue par Robert Nelson, où l'on complotait l'invasion du Bas-Canada et l'établissement d'une république.⁵

Le lieutenant-colonel Simpson représenta le comté d'York à l'Assemblée législative du Bas-Canada du 28 août 1824 au 5 juillet 1827. Il se présenta de nouveau comme candidat le mois suivant, mais, en face d'une violente opposition, il dut se retirer et il publia dans la *Montreal Gazette* une adresse aux électeurs de son comté dans laquelle il disait entre autres choses "qu'il s'était dévoué pendant le dernier parlement aux intérêts et au bien-être de ses mandataires. Mais, ajoutait-il, je perdrais votre estime si je continuais aujourd'hui à être votre candidat dans une lutte qui est devenue une guerre de religion. Les machinations d'une faction vous ont induits à croire que le gouvernement de Sa Majesté en était un d'oppression, qu'il désirait vous charger de taxes et vous enlever votre religion, et que je m'étais fait l'avocat de ces abus. Mes adversaires ont employé toutes sortes d'artifices et de mensonges; ont soulevé toutes les passions et tous les préjugés, et il me fait peine de dire que quelques-uns de vos curés ne sont pas demeurés simples spectateurs de cette lutte mais qu'ils ont contribué par leur influence à cette excitation malsaine. On a été jusqu'à menacer ceux qui voteraient pour moi de les priver des sacrements. La tolérance de leur religion les enhardit à s'objecter à la mienne; l'emploi de bravi fut consacré par les services qu'ils

³Bulletin des Recherches Historiques, VII, 60.

⁴Archives Publiques du Canada, Série S.

⁵Voir lettre du 21 décembre 1838, dans les pièces justificatives.

pouvaient rendre à l'Église; les temples ont été violés par des bacchanales; un prêtre présidait à ces orgies. . . .

"Mes électeurs canadiens non accoutumés à ces scènes de désordre n'osaient pas approcher des hustings. Ceux d'origine anglaise, irlandaise et écossaise étaient décidés de ne perdre leur droit de vote qu'avec leur vie, ils s'organisaient, déterminés à s'emparer du poll et d'en chasser ces bandits. Des meurtres auraient peut-être pu être commis. J'ai préféré me retirer de la lutte plutôt que de voir une seule goutte de sang versée.

"Je puis retourner à la vie privée sans reproches et sans flétrissure et je conserverai le souvenir de l'honneur que j'eus à vous servir. Je continuerai à supporter le gouvernement de Sa Majesté autant qu'il sera en mon pouvoir et selon mes capacités.

"Vous remerciant du zèle que vous avez manifesté en ma faveur, je dois vous demander pardon de ce que je ne puisse continuer une lutte qui ne pourrait que mettre des vies en danger.

John Simpson"

L'attaque était vive et rude. Dans sa colère, M. Simpson ne ménageait pas ses expressions. Aussi la réponse des curés de la région ne se fit pas attendre. La lettre suivante qui ne manque pas de verdeur, mettait M. Simpson en demeure de se rétracter sans retard.

"A John Simpson, Ecuyer, au Côteau-du-Lac,
"Monsieur,

"Il a paru dans la Gazette de Montréal imprimée et publiée sous l'autorité Royale par Robert Armour, Imprimeur de la très Excellente Majesté du Roi pour le district de Montréal, sous la date du 20 et 23 août courant une adresse aux Electeurs du comté d'York qui porte votre nom.

"Comme ce document contient plusieurs allégués faux et attentatoires à notre réputation et à notre caractère comme prêtres et curés, nous ne croyons pas pouvoir le passer sous silence.

"En conséquence nous vous requerrons par la présente de rétracter les allégués en question et de les contredire par un autre document sous votre seing et qui sera rendu aussi public par la voie de la presse que l'ont été les accusations que vous avez portées contre nous dans l'adresse susdite.

"A défaut par vous de vous conformer à notre présente réquisition sous huit jours à date de la réception de cette lettre, nous vous notifions que nous sommes décidés à vous poursuivre dans toute la rigueur de la loi.

"Mr. Manseau est chargé de nous faire parvenir votre réponse.
"Comté d'York, 24^e août, 1827.

"T. Paquin, prêtre, curé de St. Eustache,
P. J. De Lamothe, curé de St. Scholastique,
P. S. Archambault, Prêtre, curé de St. Michel
de Vaudreuil,
J. Z. Carron, Prêtre, Curé de l'Isle Perrot,
A. Manseau, Prêtre, curé des Cèdres,
L. M. Brassard, Prêtre, Curé de St. Polycarpe,
M. T. Félix, Prêtre, Curé de St. Benoit,
H. Hudon, Prêtre, Curé de Rigaud."⁶

La *Gazette* du 13 septembre écrivait au sujet de la lettre des curés et d'un article du *Canadian Spectator*:

⁶*La Minerve*, 6 septembre 1827.

“Les circonstances nous ont empêché de faire allusion dans notre dernier numéro à un article paru dans le *Canadian Spectator*, samedi dernier. Dans ce que nous écrivions au sujet de la poursuite que le clergé catholique du comté d'York menaçait d'exercer contre M. Simpson, nous croyions que nos observations étaient très modérées et que nous appliquions à la lettre des révérends messieurs une épithète convenable et appropriée. Le *Spectator* emploie une colonne et quart pour essayer de justifier la conduite qu'entendent suivre ces doux et humbles serviteurs de l'Évangile et les encourager à persister dans leur menace à moins que M. Simpson ne se rende à leur sommation.

“Si ces révérends messieurs s'étaient contentés d'adopter des mesures en vue d'affranchir leur caractère des imputations de M. Simpson, nous n'aurions pas formulé d'opinion en la matière, mais quand on voit qu'ils sont déterminés de “poursuivre avec toute la rigueur de la loi”, nous ne pouvons concilier les principes de la foi chrétienne avec l'esprit de rancœur manifesté par ces prêtres et nous répétons que cela ressemble beaucoup à de la malice vindicative et au désir de se venger. Ils étaient accusés d'avoir exercé leur influence comme prêtres pour promouvoir certains intérêts séculiers et d'avoir prostitué leurs fonctions sacrées par M. Simpson qui dit qu'ils avaient quitté leur sentier pour l'assaillir. Ils ont invité l'attaque et, maintenant, dans un mesquin esprit de vengeance de cloître, ils soutiennent leurs prétentions d'une manière étrange et si injustifiable que, quoiqu'on puisse rire de l'impuissance de leurs revendications, nous avons pitié de l'infatuation qui leur fait croire qu'ils aient aucune chance de succès.”⁷

C'était jeter de l'huile sur le feu; la chose, semble-t-il, n'en pouvait rester là. Cependant, le colonel Simpson ne publia pas de rétractation et les curés ne mirent pas à exécution leur menace de poursuivre. Qu'était-il donc survenu dans l'intervalle? Nous n'en savons rien. Mais, nous nous demandons si l'évêque de Telmesse, Mgr Lartigue, n'aurait pas entendu parler de cette élection lors de sa deuxième visite pastorale aux Cèdres en juillet 1827, ou encore, qu'il aurait lu les journaux de Montréal, ce qui est à peu près certain. M. l'abbé Auclair, auteur de l'Histoire de la paroisse de Saint-Joseph de Soulanges (Les Cèdres) nous dit que Mgr “donna aux gens de sages avis.” Il ajoute un peu plus loin que “Mgr Panet allait pouvoir enfin combler ses vœux (ceux de M. Manseau) et, à l'automne de 1827, il partirait pour Contrecoeur.” Ce rapprochement de faits et de dates signifie-t-il quelque chose? Il est possible que non, mais en l'absence de faits bien établis, il est aussi possible que oui. La haute politique de l'évêque de Québec conseillait de ne pas faire trop de bruit. Ses relations avec le pouvoir civil étaient assez tendues; la discrétion était donc de mise. La position de l'évêque et de la religion dans la province ne semblait encore que tolérée. Il restait encore bien des questions non réglées. Devait-on, dans ces circonstances, attaquer M. Simpson, ancien secrétaire particulier de lord Dalhousie, et qui était probablement encore dans ses bonnes grâces? La correspondance de l'évêché de Montréal ne paraît pas pouvoir jeter de jour dans cette affaire.

De 1827 à 1841, nous n'entendons plus parler de M. John Simpson si ce n'est de l'arrestation de M. Girouard dont nous avons parlé. Il devait consacrer tout son temps aux devoirs de sa charge de percepteur

⁷Voir le texte de l'adresse et de l'article de la *Gazette* dans les pièces justificatives.

qui n'était pas une sinécure, loin de là; les relations commerciales entre les deux provinces, et entre le Haut-Canada et l'Angleterre, augmentaient d'une façon sensible, avec l'accroissement de la population, et l'ouverture au trafic du canal Lachine qui facilitait la navigation et, par conséquent, les échanges commerciaux.

Sous l'Union, M. Simpson fut député du comté de Vaudreuil, du 8 avril 1841 au 23 septembre 1844.

"Pas moins de six élections du Bas-Canada, dit M. Louis-P. Turcotte,⁸ furent emportées par la violence, et plusieurs candidats importants durent céder devant la force armée". Et l'auteur cite le nom de M. Simpson comme l'un des six qui furent ainsi élus. Il avait défait M. André Jobin. Le bouillant colonel avait pris sa revanche de 1827! Il avait dû avoir l'aide du triste personnage qui gouvernait alors le Canada. Et, Glengarry n'était pas loin!

Madame Simpson mourut au Côteau-du-Lac, le 9 février 1842. Son fils, John-Arthur Roebuck aimait et admirait beaucoup sa mère. Voici ce qu'il en dit:

"She was very beautiful, very clever, fascinating, and young. It is not wonderful that she was sought for by many, that she married soon. The husband she chose (Mr. Simpson) was, like herself, young and handsome, but of no position. In choosing his wife he was guided more by passion than by prudence. Whatever may have been his defects, I have every reason to respect him, and to be grateful to him for his uniform kindness to us, his stepsons, and to our mother, whom he ever treated with the utmost gentleness and living courtesy. They were indeed a happy couple, as far as themselves were concerned. Fortune, however, did not befriend him. He was a merchant, and not successful; and after many schemes had been tried and failed, it was resolved that we should emigrate to Canada, which we did in the year 1815."⁹

Roebuck dit que M. Simpson survécut longtemps à sa femme et épousa une dame américaine dont il ne donne pas le nom, ni le lieu ni la date du mariage.

John Simpson décéda à Brockville en 1873, âgé de quatre-vingt-cinq ans.¹⁰

Son fils unique, William-B. Simpson, né en 1818, fut percepteur des douanes à Montréal. Il mourut en 1883.¹¹

PIECES JUSTIFICATIVES

To the electors of the County of York
Gentlemen,

When I presented myself to your notice at the last Election, I had but one end and object—The Public Good— You elected me, and I devoted myself to your interest and Welfare; but should forfeit all claim to your respect, were I to prolong a contest that has lost its original character and descended from a Political to a Religious warfare.

By the machination of a desperate and designing Faction you have been deluded—they have induced you to believe that His Majesty's

⁸*Le Canada sous l'Union*, I, 62.

⁹R. E. Leader, *Life and letters of John Arthur Roebuck*.

¹⁰B.R.H., VII, 60.

¹¹*Dominion Annual Register*, 1883, 331.

Government is one of oppression; that it desires to overwhelm you with taxation, and strip you of your religion, and that I was the strenuous advocate of such abuses—they have employed every artifice and racked their inventions for untruths—they have roused every passion and every prejudice—in whispers disseminated rebellion, and mistrust—and it pains me to say that some of your Curés have not remained idle spectators but have contributed their influence and their arts to this unholy excitement— Against such instruments and such arts could I contend? The refusal of the Sacrament was threatened to those who should vote for me.— the toleration of their religion gave them hardihood to object to mine—the employment of Bravoes was consecrated by the service they were engaged in—the sacred precincts of the Church violated by the Bacchanalian orgies of hired assassins—a priest administering to their drunken revels, and welcoming with his own hands branded with infamy and murder—was this a lesson of Christian charity “go and sin no more” or was it persuasively directing them to go and do likewise.

My Canadian supporters unaccustomed to such scenes of tumult and excess were afraid to approach the Hustings— My English, Irish and Scotch were determined to lose their rights but with their lives, and vowing vengeance were collecting themselves in a body resolutely determined to take the Poll from these ruffian bandits—in such a cause—so encouraged—murder must have ensued and I should little merit the high distinction I was aspiring to, if I could sacrifice one life in its attainment. In such a struggle though assured and certain of success, I ought to have been abandoned by you if I could have purchased it with your blood—in such a time and with such prospects before us, should this Revolutionary Faction succeed, his Majesty will need every heart and every arm and I should have conspired against his person and government if I had deprived him of one of those devoted brave and faithful subjects.

I can go back to private life without stigma and reproach my retirement will not be embittered by regrets for lives unavailingly lost—and it will afford me calm pleasure to reflect that whilst I had the honour to serve you—I was influenced by no faction—swayed by no party—and in serving you faithfully fulfilled your intentions by supporting His Majesty's Government to the utmost of my power and ability.

Thanking you—fervently thanking you—for the zeal manifested in my favour, I have to entreat your pardon for not continuing a contest that I should only prolong at the risk of your lives and believe me, should this Faction prevail—the contest will soon be for Civil Liberty, which the basest only will outlive.

I have the honour to be

Gentlemen,

With respect and attachment

Your most obedient servant

J. Simpson.

Sept. 13th 1827

Circumstances prevented our alluding in the last impression of the Gazette to an article in the Canadian Spectator of Saturday last. In what we said respecting the threatened prosecution of Mr. Simpson by the Catholic Clergy of the county of York (our remarks upon which, are severely reprehended by the Spectator) we certainly thought that our

strictures were extremely moderate and gentle and that we applied to the document, and its reverend authors and apposite, just and appropriate epithet. The *Spectator* dedicated a column and a quarter to an attempted justification of the course intended to be pursued by these meek and lowly servants of the gospel, and recommends them to persist in what they threaten unless Mr. Simpson complies with their requisition.

Had the reverend gentlemen declared their intention of adopting measures whose object would be only to free their characters from what they assert to be false and unfounded imputations, we would not have promulgated an opinion upon the matter—but when we observe them expressing a determination “to prosecute with the utmost rigour of the law” we cannot reconcile the great leading and characteristic features of the Christian faith with the rancorous spirit thus manifested by the ministers, and we repeat that to us it savours highly of vindictive malice and an eager longing for revenge. They were declared to have exerted their influence as priests for the promotion and success of certain secular concerns, a prostitution of their sacred function which was justly branded with reproach by Mr. Simpson—they stepped out of their peculiar path and it was in their novel attitude that their opponent assailed them. They courted, they invited the attack, and now in the petty spirit of cloister vengeance they assert their secular assumptions and pretensions in so strange and unjustifiable a manner, that while we laugh at the impotence of the attempt, we pity the infatuation that can inspire them with any chance of success.

The concluding observation of the *Spectator* is unworthy any serious refutation.

Coteau du Lac
Dec. 21st 1838.

Sir,

In the Montreal Herald of last night it is stated that “the prisoners on landing at Chesapeake Bay had *One Hundred Pounds* to divide amongst them which had been lodged in the hands of a Banker by Mr. Simpson of Coteau du Lac” this circumstances if unexplained might convey an erroneous impression to His Exc^y the Commander of the Forces and connecting the infamous conduct of those Prisoners on their arrival in New York at McKenzie’s meeting with the efforts previously made by me on their behalf it might be inferred that my sympathy continued unabated and that I was not unwilling to afford their secret succour and encouragement.

Although to avoid public clamour for an unpopular action I certainly intended that the transmission of this money shou’d remain undivulg’d, yet, I see no reason to blush that it has been reveal’d. I need not tell you that through my mediation the amnesty was obtain’d, or, that on the Disallowance of the Ordinance on the 28th June Lord Durham issued the Pardoning Proclamation of the 9th October and that the Prisoners were at liberty to Return from their Exile; but recollecting the part I had taken it appear’d incumbent on me to furnish them the means and four or five days after the date of that Proclamation I Remitted £100 to them at Bermuda being at the rate of \$50. each a sum not more than sufficient to enable them to Return to Canada. At this time all was quiet and the possibility of a second Rebellion never occur’d to me but cou’d

I have foreseen their disgraceful Exhibition at New York they had starv'd ere I had forwarded a shilling to them.

Whether my conduct was wise or prejudicial as regards that amnesty (and the result has been sadly against me) is not now the question, it met the approbation of the Government of the time being, but that I *may not be deem'd capable of covertly succouring* the Enemies of the Country I beg leave to say that as an officer of Her Majesty's Government I felt the impropriety of *ever* doing good by stealth to Exiles characteriz'd as they had been by a Traiterous conspiracy to subvert the Government and that unwilling to subject myself to the possible misconstruction of my motive for an act *done in concealment* I inform'd Mess. Chs. Buller and Turton the Chief Secretaries of my intention and that I had their *entire concurrence and permission before I remitted* the money to Bermuda.

Connected with this subject and in corroboration of that alteration of feeling the conduct of the Exiles since their Return wou'd naturally produce, permit me to inclose the copy of my letter to Colonel Thomas of Burlington in reply to letters from them for *further* assistance from me, the letters were on the day of their receipt forwarded by me to the Attorney General.

Suffer me to add that I do not offer this explanation to exonerate myself from any suspicion I imagine is possible to be entertain'd against my Honor by His Exc^y the Commander of the Forces but in the character of one in time of general perfidy jealous of the misconstruction of an act, innocent if not praise worthy at the time but which at a *later period* had been both criminal & *Disgraceful*.

I have the honor to be

Sir,

Your Most Ob. Humble S^t.

Jno Simpson.

Captain Goldie,

Sec^y

&c, &c. &c.

Montreal.

SIR CHARLES BAGOT AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY QUESTIONS

By THE REV. WM. ORR MULLIGAN

When Sir Charles Bagot decided to admit French-Canadian representatives into his cabinet for the carrying out of proper representative government, he became immediately the object of a series of bitter criticisms in Canada and even in England which traduced him and his work so much that his reputation has suffered most undeservedly and severely ever since. English-speaking Canadians have been more disposed to follow the rancorous, partisan and unjust criticisms of Major Richardson,¹ than the discerning, sympathetic and judicious appreciations of Dr. Ryerson.² The detractors of Bagot, past and present, make much of his sympathy with the French Canadians. They consider him so partial to their claims and so indifferent to other Canadian and imperial interests as to have endangered the British connection. A curious commentary on this attitude may be seen in the nomenclature of the streets of the city of Montreal. In the centre of that great and busy city in the English district there are the names of Stanley, Peel, Metcalfe, Mansfield, all close together, but no Bagot. Only in the east end and in a solid French quarter is his name to be found. Quebec province has named a county in his honour. The Canadian National Railway has its Bagotville—but English-speaking Montreal and Quebec have ignored him.

The aim of this paper is to correct an obvious misinterpretation of the work of Bagot after re-considering a number of the factors and some of the material on which he has been judged. Of the five governors, Durham, Sydenham, Bagot, Metcalfe and Elgin, whose abilities, industry, leadership, and advocacy, gave us our modern Canada, I hope to show that Bagot occupies a more important place than that usually given him, and that our estimate of him and his work should be reconstructed on a different basis. For the present occasion I shall deal only with Bagot considered as an authority on American-Canadian boundary questions. Of the five governors who came to us he was the best informed on Canadian questions of importance at his time—the north east coast, and the north west coast boundary questions. He was quite familiar with American usages and methods. During his ministry at the Hague he had much to do with the difficult Belgium and Holland division of territory and thus became conversant with the bearing and importance of questions of religion and language on political policies. He thus brought a rich and varied experience to bear upon the problems which confronted him as governor-general of Canada and in dealing with them he had the courage to do what he deemed right rather than expedient or politic. But at the time of his appointment Canadian affairs were seriously complicated with American ones especially in the frequent occurrence of "border incidents" and the rights of parties concerned. In dealing with the issues involved in

¹Major Richardson, *Eight Years in Canada* (Montreal, 1847), 200 f.

²The Rev. Dr. Ryerson, *Some Remarks upon Sir Charles Bagot's Canadian Government* (Kingston, 1843); Ryerson, *The New Canadian Dominion* (n.p. [Toronto?], 1867).

American-Canadian boundary questions there has been a marked disposition on the part of Canadian writers to ignore entirely, or at most to treat very cursorily the social and political conditions prevailing in Britain, Europe and the United States at the different times these boundary problems required settlement. These conditions should have more attention than our own historians have been disposed to give them, because they not only exercised considerable influence on the procedures adopted in dealing with American-Canadian questions but they had also, in consequence of these procedures much to do with the results which followed.

Were not the appointments of Sir Charles Bagot to Canada and of Lord Ashburton to the United States influenced as much, if not more, by the British, American, and European social and political condition of affairs than by the purely local Canadian conditions? A brief survey of these will convince the doubter that they were.

In Britain a new government under Sir Robert Peel had taken office in September 1841. Immediately it was compelled to deal not only with a series of grave problems in foreign politics world wide in extent, but also with others as grave in nearly every part of the empire as then constituted. Gravest of all and most distressing were the social and economic conditions existing in Great Britain at that time.

The Peel government had to face a foreign situation full of dangers and uncertainties. In Europe almost every country was seething with discontent which broke out in frequent uprisings and rebellions against the rulers and governments then in power. The year 1848 is synonymous in European history with "revolution". Previous to 1848 the factors which make that year a sign-post of social and political upheaval had been gathering force not only in Europe but in Britain and her colonies. Foreign affairs demanded their best efforts to avoid war with France. A collision of interests in far-off Tahiti in the South Sea Islands furnished the war mongers with the necessary *casus belli*. Had not both governments been able to hold them in check, war seemed inevitable. Britain was already engaged in the far east in a long drawn unpopular war with China which was not terminated until the signing of the Treaty of Nankin in 1842.³

Bad as was the state of affairs in Europe those within the Empire were worse. There were the humiliations, ignominies and problems arising out of the disgraceful and disastrous Afghan War.⁴ As a direct outcome of the Afghan troubles India became unsettled and two wars with Indian peoples followed in quick succession. South Africa was also the cause of serious concern, both to the British leaders there and in London. "The great trek to the north" by the Boers took place in 1838-1840 and brought them into collision, not only with new tribes of warlike natives, but also with the British settlers in Natal. In 1841 antagonisms between the whites and the natives and Briton and Boer became so acute that preparations for war were made by the British authorities.⁵ In the West Indies there was

³Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, LIX, Aug.-Oct., 1841, 523-603, 758-802; A. J. Grant and Harold Temperley, *Europe in the 19th Century 1789-1914* (London, 1913); R. B. Mowat, in *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, 1923), II, 182-185. This work will be referred to under the initials C.H.B.F.P. G. P. Moriarty, C.H.B.F.P., II, chap. 5, 215-219.

⁴C.H.B.F.P., II, 203-209.

⁵W. P. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell* (Oxford, 1930), 132-149; Jan H. Hofmyer, *South Africa* (London, 1931), 64-82; Eric A.

much suffering and dissatisfaction. Business in general in these islands was ruined consequent on the abolition of slavery in 1833 and the agricultural, commercial, political and social readjustments occasioned by such a profound change in the status and outlook of the great majority of the inhabitants made such slow and dubious progress that the confidence of many of those directly interested in the welfare of the Islands and their inhabitants gave way to despair and conditions bordering on anarchy began to prevail.⁶ Canada was also a centre of discontent. The bitterness engendered by the rebellion of 1837 still remained.⁷ "The fires of insurrection had been put out, but the ashes were still hot."

Worst of all, far more distressing, and fraught with almost revolutionary dangers were the conditions at home in Britain. They furnished a fitting introduction to the "hungry forties". "The winter of 1841-42 was one of the worst in an industrial and economic sense through which this country has ever passed." The facts amply justify this conclusion. Food prices were high, wages unbelievably low, unemployment widespread in country, village, town and city. A succession of bad harvests combined with the corn laws made bread very dear—10d to 1/2d being paid for the quartern loaf. In the factory towns and cities of Lancashire and in the industrial centres of Yorkshire tens of thousands of workers earned less than a shilling a week. "In Leeds there were 20,000 persons whose average earnings were under 1/-, and in Stockport many people earned less than 10d." Living conditions were appalling. Trade was depressed. Agriculture did not pay. Artisans could not get work. The mass of the people could not get sufficient food. Deaths from starvation occurred in several towns and cities. The government could not give any direct assistance because the necessary legislative and social machinery did not exist. Moreover the national revenues were falling; deficits were increasing; the treasury was well nigh empty.⁸

The miseries of their own people, the industrial and commercial distress, the state of affairs in many parts of the empire as well as in other countries urgently required the removal of all causes opposed to peace, progress, and prosperity. Peel and Aberdeen were for the settlement of all issues that were causing trouble and unnecessary national anxiety and expenditures.⁹ The first of these to which both these statesmen gave their attention was that involving Britain, the United States and Canada. The circumstances were appropriate and the need was very great. The United States was having troubles enough of its own.

The American social and political outlook too was a serious one. "The presidential campaign of 1840 was the most extraordinary that the country

Walker, *A History of South Africa* (London, 1928), 202-241; Kenneth N. Bell and W. P. Morrell, *Select Documents on British Colonial Policy, 1830-1860* (Oxford, 1928), 449-502.

⁶Bell and Morrell, *Select Documents*, 370-444.

⁷W. P. M. Kennedy, *Statutes, Treaties and Documents of the Canadian Constitution, 1713-1929* (Toronto, 1930), 453-454.

⁸Hansard, Speeches on "Distress of the Country", LIX, Aug.-Oct. 1841, 523-603, 734, 758-802; *Ibid.*, Dr. Bowring, "Distress at Bolton", 1017-1043; A. E. Bland, P. A. Brown and R. H. Tawney, *English Economic History, Select Documents* (London, 1914), 516-521; J. A. R. Marriott, *England since Waterloo* (London, 1923), 161.

⁹Hansard, LIX, Aug.-Oct. 1841, 523-603; A. A. W. Ramsay, *Sir Robert Peel* (New York, 1928), 254.

has ever known." Harrison was elected and took office in March 1841, but died a month later, and John Tyler succeeded him. The commercial and financial affairs of the country when he came into power were in a grave state of confusion and uncertainty. On both boundaries, north and south, the young republic found animosities increasing in number and bitterness. Canada was resentful over the claims of American citizens to what they deemed was Canadian territory. Mexicans and Texans and Americans were practically at war in the south.¹⁰ Dangers and opposition without her borders, turmoil and uncertainty within them and divided counsels among the leaders of state were not sources of optimism and encouragement to the men who had the real welfare of the United States at heart. Notwithstanding the battle cries of the politicians there was a large body of opinion desirous for peace and stability.¹¹ The adjustment of controversial and provocative issues with other countries was a *sine qua non* for such stability. The gravest of all these issues were those between Great Britain and the United States, some of them of long standing, and all pressing for settlement.

Several of these concerned Canada; the north eastern boundary question; "The *Caroline* affair" and its consequent McLeod case; and the north western boundary. Not only Britain desired peace, and the removal of all causes that disturbed it; the United States was also anxious for peace.

The settlement of the differences with the United States was thus one of the first objects to which Peel and Aberdeen gave themselves.¹² Leaders in both countries realized the urgency. It was the task of each country to appoint the men who would ably and satisfactorily secure the final adjustment of the controversial and irritating problems that caused so much bitterness and misunderstanding. This was not any easy matter. True and effective diplomacy requires that ambassadors to foreign countries or representatives to important commissions shall be acceptable to the governments to which they are accredited. Should they be otherwise, suspicions are aroused and the successful accomplishment of their tasks is imperilled. It is important that they be *personae gratae* to those with whom they are to deal. It is even more important that they should have the courage and steadfastness which come from a judicious and competent knowledge of the issues to come before them.¹³ The strong desires of both Peel and Aberdeen were to have men acceptable to the Americans. Sir Charles Bagot, they appointed governor-general of Canada; Lord Ashburton to the United States.

Both these appointments were deemed good on many grounds. Ashburton as a young man had spent several years in the United States. He had listened to debates in the house of congress when Jay's treaty was under discussion. His business connections with the Americans were many, as were also his social relations. While resident in the United States he had married the daughter of William Bingham, a senator for Penn-

¹⁰James D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (Washington, 1897), IV, 36, 72, 73, 112-150, 162-177; A. P. Newton, C.H.B.F.P., II, 220-247, 253-261, 247-253.

¹¹Richardson, *op. cit.*, III, 585; IV, 36, 72, 73, 392-397; R. G. Adams, *A History of the Foreign Policy of the United States* (New York, 1925), 212-222.

¹²*The Greville Memoirs*, V, 73; Ramsay, *Sir Robert Peel*, 254.

¹³A. F. Whyte, *The Practice of Diplomacy, an English rendering of François de Callières's "De la maniere de negocier avec les souverains"* (London, 1919).

sylvania. He had travelled in northern Maine where his father-in-law owned land and had visited the territory which was afterwards in dispute.¹⁴

Bagot was also acceptable and competent. President John Quincy Adams, never too well disposed to British representatives, expresses in his diary his personal opinion of Bagot and his work at Washington—"He has resided here three years, and though coming immediately after a war in which the national feelings here were highly exasperated against his country, he made himself universally acceptable. No English Minister has ever been so popular".¹⁵

Apparently the important issue for Peel and his government was the settlement of relations with the United States. The popularity Bagot enjoyed when British minister at Washington had therefore much to do with his appointment as governor-general of Canada. The evidence for this is quite clear. Buller, writing to Peel on the Canadian appointment, expresses his conviction thus:

"He must have no prejudices against the Government and people of the United States. It is essential on the contrary that he should be inclined to conciliate both, for the Governor General of Canada will, in fact, among his duties have in a general measure those of Ambassador to the United States."¹⁶

Peel too was of the opinion that:

"Bagot's influence in the United States was an important qualification in the eyes of Stanley."¹⁷

This was also the opinion of a member of Bagot's own family. His daughter-in-law, Mrs. Charles Bagot, writes:

"Owing to his popularity with the United States government, he was urged to accept the Governor-Generalship of Canada at the commencement of the difficulties arising in connection with the Canadian Boundary question."¹⁸

Two relevant extracts from the instructions issued by Stanley to Bagot show clearly that the international situation between Britain, America and Canada and the political atmosphere of the time had as important a bearing on his appointment to Canada as the local situation in Canada itself had. These extracts state:

"In reference to the relations between this country and the United States, I need not urge upon you the necessity of doing everything in your power to allay irritation, and to maintain upon the frontier a mutual good understanding between Her Majesty's subjects and those of the United States, and while you will be prepared promptly and efficiently to repel any unauthorized intrusion or aggression on the part of American Citizens, you will take effectual measures for preventing Her Majesty's subjects from affording by their conduct any just causes of complaint on the part of the United States.

"You will communicate confidentially and directly whenever you

¹⁴*Dictionary of National Biography*, (Lond., 1885), III, 190-191; Dudley A. Mills, "British Diplomacy in Canada", (*United Empire*, II), 683-712.

¹⁵Allan Nevins, *The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845*, 201.

¹⁶G. P. de T. Glazebrook, *Sir Charles Bagot in Canada* (Oxford, 1929), chap. 1, 1-17. Extract from the "Buller-Peel Correspondence", by Paul Knapland.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, Peel to Stanley.

¹⁸Mrs. Charles Bagot, *Links with the Past*, (London, 1901), 95.

may deem it necessary with Her Majesty's Minister at Washington, of course, keeping me informed of all that passes, and generally with questions which may arise of the Relations with the United States Government and People. You will consider yourself as acting under the same instructions, and vested with the same discretionary authority as have from time to time been conveyed to your predecessor."¹⁹

In the *Colonial Gazette* of February 16th, 1842, on the same page and in the same column are three news items referring to Bagot, Ashburton and Elgin, which indicate much activity at the colonial office.²⁰ The new government in Britain was setting its affairs abroad in order after its own fashion. It is worth noting that Lord Sydenham had asked as a successor a man who had training as a practical politician. Stanley sent a trained diplomat.

In the diplomatic field, Bagot had taken part in some very important international events with credit to himself and advantage to his country. In two of his most important positions, those at Washington and St. Petersburg, he had to deal with American and Canadian boundary questions of far-reaching importance. These experiences had fitted him eminently for the governor-generalship of Canada and its implications in 1841. During his American ambassadorship, twenty-five years previously, he had to deal with such a variety of boundary problems, incidents and issues that of sheer necessity he became familiar with the whole frontier of Canada.

Briefly considered they show that: Bagot arrived in Washington on March 21, 1816, and in less than three months had to deal with his first American-Canadian boundary question in the issues arising out of the disputed ownership of the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, off the coast of Maine. He writes to Sir J. C. Sherbrooke, governor of Canada, that he has received a communication from the American secretary of state, in which certain Americans ask their own government to assist them in securing possession of lands situated on these islands, which, they state, were still being held by the British government and alleging this to be in violation of the 8th article of the Treaty of Ghent. He asks Sherbrooke to acquaint him (Bagot) with "the real situation of the property in question and whether any and what objection exists to its being restored".²¹

Eighteen months later he again wrote Sherbrooke on this matter and not until an additional five months had passed was he able to direct the governor general in Canada on the authority of Her Majesty's secretary of state for foreign affairs that possession of the islands was to be given the Americans.²²

A troublesome issue in American-Canadian relations was that of the rights of Americans in Canadian fisheries. In the treaty of 1783 and in the Treaty of Ghent these rights were not clearly defined. Small wonder then that difficulties arose which frequently threatened to become dangerous, and Bagot was apparently busy preserving peace, at the same time

¹⁹Public Records Office, London, C.O.42/481, Stanley to Bagot.

²⁰British Museum, Newspaper Library, Colindale, *The Colonial Gazette*, Wednesday, Jan. 19, 1842.

²¹Public Archives of Canada, Bagot Papers, I, Canadian Correspondence, 1816-1819. Bagot to Sherbrooke, June 14, 1816.

²²*Ibid.*, Bagot to Sherbrooke, May 13, 1818.

protecting the rights of his fellow subjects. Despatches to Admiral Griffiths, Vice Admiral Pickmore, Vice Admiral Sir C. Hamilton, Sir David Milne, Sir John C. Sherbrooke and others show Bagot had full powers in the fisheries agreement, but did not want any high-handed acts to spoil the success of the discussions. However, he is not going to be hoodwinked, or is he going to permit the Americans to take full advantage of his generosity. Neither did he tie the hands of his co-workers indefinitely.²³

Bagot was thus brought into touch with maritime boundary problems in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Newfoundland.

Other boundary questions had arisen in the meantime. In a despatch to Sherbrooke dated November 3rd, 1817, we have Bagot's first recorded contact with the boundary issues connected with the north west coast of America. He had heard "A rumour that the U.S. Sloop of war Ontario which has recently sailed from New York is believed to be destined for the Pacific Ocean, and has instructions to proceed to the mouth of the Columbia River on the North West Coast of America". Should Sherbrooke think proper he "may privately put the North West Company upon their guard against any design which may possibly be in contemplation to re-establish the settlement which the American Government formerly attempted to make at the mouth of that river, and which they endeavored to claim the restoration soon after the war under the 1st Article of the Treaty of Ghent".²⁴

Is there any truth in the rumour? Bagot wanted certainty, so he wrote Simon McGillivray, Esq., New York, of the North West Fur Company, to find out, and McGillivray assured him the rumour was correct, but he would not give the source of his information. Bagot soon after saw Adams, and got official confirmation of the sloop's departure, and the assurance that there would be no disturbing in any way the trade of the North West Company.²⁵

"Border incidents" were numerous enough to give Bagot several opportunities to acquire a wider knowledge of the lines that separated the United States from Canada. On the 29th April 1816, the American government had passed an act "to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes and to preserve peace on the frontiers". Bagot wrote Lt. General Sir Gordon Drummond, drawing his attention to the provisions of the act, "all intercourse for the purposes of trade with the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States is interdicted under very severe penalties, and that all other intercourse is placed under such restraints as amount in fact to a total exclusion of British subjects from the territories in question". His Majesty's subjects are to be warned of the dangers they are exposed to by any violation of this act.²⁶

From Canada came a complaint by the Duke of Richmond: "You will see by a despatch that I have thought it proper to represent through Bagot an outrage committed by the American Officer commanding at Rouse Point Lake Champlain."²⁷

²³*Ibid.*, 17, 19, 35, 40, 54-60, 76, 100, 121.

²⁴*Ibid.*, Bagot to Sherbrooke, Nov. 3, 1817.

²⁵*Ibid.*, Bagot to Sherbrooke, Dec. 1, 1817.

²⁶*Ibid.*, Bagot to Drummond, June 1, 1816.

²⁷Historical Manuscripts Commission: Report on the Manuscripts of Earl

From "border incidents" to boundaries, his activities swing again. We read that Adams had met Calhoun, who asked him (Adams) "to enquire of Mr. Bagot whether he had any authority to agree to a temporary line between the British territories and ours to the North West, and said he was establishing a line of posts in that direction to cover our frontier, and prevent the British Traders from crossing the line to trade with the Indians within our boundaries. I called afterwards at Calhoun's office, where he showed upon the map the positions where the new posts are to be established."²⁸

Two momentous arrangements effecting the boundaries of Canada and the United States were made during Bagot's term of office at Washington,—the Convention of 1818 and the Rush-Bagot Agreement. With the first, Bagot was only indirectly concerned; he was not one of the negotiators. But among its provisions it fixed the boundary between the British possessions in North America and the United States at the forty-ninth parallel of latitude, running from a point south of the Lake-of-the-Woods to the Rocky Mountains. The Oregon country boundary was left open for later consideration. With the second arrangement—Bagot's name with that of Rush goes down in history, "The Rush-Bagot Agreement", as an example of what nations can do for peace and goodwill by the limitations of armaments on their borders. It is, however, with the boundary aspect of these agreements we are dealing. Bagot was continually allaying the friction caused by clashes on the borders because of wilful or unwitting invasion of territories. The armed forces on the great lakes were not of the type to rest in idleness. They were too desirous of justifying their calling and occupation.²⁹ An unauthorized stepping over the line, and troubles ensued. Bagot learnt, or had to learn, where the lines on land, or river or lake ran, and where there were doubts had to have the doubts removed.

In the light of later developments, the work, direct or indirect, required in these negotiations gave him not only a valuable training and experience and wide knowledge of the two countries but also an insight into the workings of American diplomacy and an understanding of the American mind. It is also to be observed that he was jealous for the rights of his countrymen and sought to safeguard them in every legitimate way.³⁰

From Washington, Bagot went to St. Petersburg. Even there American-Canadian boundary questions followed him. On September 4th, 1821, Czar Alexander the First issued his historic ukase in which he declared Behring's Bay a *mare clausum*, the practical purpose of this declaration prohibiting American, British and other seamen and traders doing any business, on the whole north west coast of the continent. Britain and the United States promptly protested. Both countries denied the right

Bathurst, preserved at Cirencester Park (London, 1923), 454. Richmond to Bathurst, 21st Aug., 1818.

²⁸*Diary of John Quincy Adams*, 201.

²⁹Bagot Papers, I, Bagot to Commodore Owen, Aug. 14, 1816; Bagot to Sherbrooke, Aug. 14, 1816; Bagot to Sir Robert Hall, Dec. 5, 1816; Admiral Sir Robert Hall to Bagot, June 4, 1817.

³⁰*Ibid.*, Bagot to Sherbrooke, July 6, 1816; Bagot to Griffith, Aug. 20, 1816; Bagot to Sherbrooke, Jan. 10, 1817; Bagot to Milne, June 30, 1817.

of the Russian emperor to exclude their nationals from the seas and shores which he had declared closed.⁸¹

Nothing, however, was done immediately. European affairs were occupying the emperor's attention rather closely at the time. However, on October 5th, 1823, Bagot wrote Canning in part that he had had one or two preparatory and informal conversations with the Russian minister, Mr. Poletica, upon the north west coast business, but that they were delaying matters pending the arrival of Mr. Hughes, the American chargé d'affaires at Stockholm, who was to bring instructions from Washington to Mr. Middleton, their representative at St. Petersburg. He proceeds to give his own views on the matters at issue.

"I have half a mind to exceed my instructions and try if I cannot get a degree of longitude instead of latitude for our line of demarcation. It appears to me that if we take a degree of latitude we leave Russia with undefined pretensions to the Eastward and in the interior of the continent, whereas a degree of longitude would describe both the boundary on the coast and within the continent at the same time. I do not know whether Russia would listen to such a proposition but it would I think be a great point if we could get somewhere about the 139th degree of West Longitude as the line. . . . This would make the latitude of our boundary about 59½ North instead of 57 with which you say you would be contented. If I am to secure 57 it may, at all events, be as well to begin by claiming something more and I have some notion of bringing forward the idea."⁸²

In a later despatch he informs Canning in part that he knows the object of the United States is to obtain a boundary which shall give them both banks and the exclusive navigation of the Columbia River from its mouth to the Stoney Mountains "and to secure this they would desire a line drawn from about Widbeg's Harbour in something more than 46 N. latitude . . . to the most northern bend of the river in something more than 51 N. latitude."⁸³

Bagot proceeds with the discussions and negotiations but between American claims and Russian pretensions nothing satisfactory was done. He expresses the opinion that the adjourned question of the Columbia had only 4 or 5 years more to sleep and if his suggestions were acted upon "would be thus quietly and finally disposed of in a general agreement". Meantime the Russian emperor has shown an "invincible reluctance" to renounce any part of the Russian claims based on those advanced by the Emperor Paul in 1799. These set the Russian boundary at 55 N. latitude.⁸⁴

The Russian correspondence of Bagot reveals the mind of a keen and competent negotiator who felt the limitations of his instructions and who

⁸¹H. W. V. Temperley, "The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1820-1827", C.H.B.F.P., II, 66; H. W. V. Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827* (London, 1925), 104-107, 492; Temperley, "Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington, 1818-1825" (*American Historical Review*, Oct. 1912, Jan. 1913), 309-345, 537-562; Josceline Bagot, *George Canning and His Friends* (London, 1909), II, 220-221.

⁸²Bagot Papers, Vols. 18 ff., The Russian Correspondence, 1820-1824, Bagot to Canning, Oct. 5, 1823.

⁸³*Ibid.*, Bagot to Canning, Oct. 29, 1823.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, Bagot to Canning, Feb. 27/Mar. 10, 1824.

frequently exceeded them, and that, on occasion, he ran no small risk of having his work disapproved by the foreign secretary at London.³⁵

If the final results of the Alaskan boundary commission have not been very satisfactory to present day Canadians, no blame can attach to the British minister at St. Petersburg who was later a governor-general of Canada. He, at least, would not and did not concede everything to the Russians and Americans.

On August 4th, 1824, Bagot informs Canning that Poletica thought the case for a Russian settlement was hopeless and the whole matter, so far as Bagot was concerned, fell through. He felt the failure keenly.

"I regret it greatly on public grounds also, as I should like very much to have been the person to sign a Treaty of such magnitude and importance, and I should have ended my days handsomely by so doing. But diis aliter visum est, and I cannot at all see what is to be done."³⁶

To his friend Sir Arthur Wellesley he wrote in part:

"I sent a messenger last night to England to acquaint Canning with my failure in bringing this Government to any reasonable arrangement respecting the N. W. Coasts of America, about which I have been long in negotiation. Our Government may come into the Russian terms if they please, but I will not. The more I examine the Russian pretensions the less founded and more preposterous I find them. I have exceeded my utmost instructions, in the hope of making an arrangement, and I should very much doubt whether this Government will ever get such offers again."³⁷

Professor Temperley in his comprehensive and thorough "Foreign Policy of Canning" gives small credit to Bagot in the Russian negotiations. He seems to have studied the Canning side from Canning's despatches and not to have paid just attention to Bagot's despatches. It is difficult to escape the feeling, after making all allowances for the situation in international affairs, that Bagot was "let down" in some degree by Canning.³⁸

Soon after he left St. Petersburg to go to the Hague, and doubtless felt, that, so far as he was concerned, boundary questions on any of the American coasts would trouble him no more.

In the succeeding years Canadian affairs had been gradually assuming large proportions of international interest and a disquieting aspect as well. Internally there were the dissensions and bitterness attendant on rebellion. Relations with the neighboring republic were very unsatisfactory, even to the point of being politically dangerous.

The British government under Peel, as we have seen, had resolved on a settlement of the controversial and unsettling issues outstanding between them and the United States and which vitally concerned Canada. Bagot's appointment to Canada was influenced by this policy and it is a fair contention was linked up with the Ashburton negotiations. In at least one part of Ashburton's work Bagot could be an immense help.

It is very frequently overlooked that in Lord Ashburton's instructions

³⁵*Ibid.*, Bagot to Canning, Oct. 29, 1823; Feb. 28, 1824; March 10, 1824.

³⁶*Ibid.*, Aug. 24, 1824.

³⁷*Ibid.*, Bagot to Wellesley, March 30, 1824.

³⁸Temperley, *Foreign Policy of Canning*, 491-493.

he had to deal with other matters besides those of the north east boundary question, surrender of criminals, remedial justice, etc. There was the problem of the Oregon territory on the north west coast of America. A despatch by the Earl of Aberdeen to G. H. Fox, Esq., the British minister at Washington dated October 18th, 1842, is rather revealing.

Aberdeen is of the opinion that the time is now opportune for making arrangements to adjust the only remaining subject of territorial differences "the line of boundary west of the Rocky Mountains".

"You are aware that Lord Ashburton was furnished with specific and detailed instructions to the treatment of this point of difference between the Governments, in the general negotiations with which he was intrusted, and which he has brought to a satisfactory issue."

"For reasons which it is not necessary here to state at length, that point after having been made the subject of Conference with the American Secretary of State, was not farther pressed."

"The main ground alleged by his Lordship for abstaining from proposing to carry on the discussion with respect to the North Western Boundary, was the apprehension, lest by so doing, the settlement of the far more important matter of the North Eastern Boundary should be impeded or exceeded to the hazard of failure."³⁹

Ashburton therefore dropped the Oregon dispute. Bagot was of a different opinion. He was very shortly settled in Kingston—scarcely two months—when he sent his despatch to Stanley with information "relative to the boundaries in dispute between the United States and Great Britain." He expresses his lack of confidence in his own opinions on the north eastern boundary issue but he does not hesitate to write with conviction on the question which concerns the other side of the continent, which was also a part of Ashburton's commission to settle. In this despatch Bagot writes:

"In regard to the North Western Boundary, I can scarcely exaggerate my sense of the importance of taking some action upon it immediately. American settlements are rapidly increasing on the Western side of the Rocky Mountains, and if Great Britain delays only a few years to plant there a population connected with herself and attached to her institutions, she will find herself completely extruded from the country by her more active competitors. This is a result very much to be deprecated. Independently of the fertility of the country and the opening which it would afford for our population, the advantages of such a port on the Pacific as the Mouth of the Columbia are incalculable. The matter is just beginning to excite interest in the United States, and I would therefore recommend that Her Majesty's Government should at once decide on the course to be pursued by them and act on it without delay, and thus anticipate the pretensions which will otherwise be put forward by the United States."⁴⁰

These surely are not the words of a man indifferent to the territorial rights of his countrymen or of one who cared less for the British con-

³⁹Imperial Blue Books on Affairs relating to Canada Boundaries, 1842-1846. Correspondence relative to the Negotiations of Disputed Right to the Oregon Territory on the North West Coast of America subsequent to the Treaty of Washington of August 9, 1842. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, London, 1846. Earl of Aberdeen to Mr. Fox, Oct. 18, 1842.

⁴⁰Bagot Papers, I, Canadian Correspondence, Bagot to Stanley, March 4, 1842.

nection than he did for the solution of a racial religious linguistic governmental difficulty in the country of which he was governor-general. A quarter of a century previously, when British minister at Washington, he had written Sir John C. Sherbrooke to take measures to protect British interests in the north west. But the North West Company was a trifle over-cautious and perhaps a little afraid. From St. Petersburg, Bagot had written Canning in 1823, that the adjourned question of the Columbia River had only four or five years more to sleep and "could be quietly and finally disposed of in a general agreement." But Bagot was not listened to, either in Canada or in Britain, and the whole matter drifted on—to the final disadvantage of both.

In Canada as in the despatch to Stanley he urges the colonization of the Oregon district. It is the opinion of some competent American judges that the decision on the Oregon boundary question in favour of the United States hung finally on the fact of colonization. Bagot perceived this before the issue came up for settlement, but his suggestions were ignored. Yet here was a man who kept before him in his three great positions in America, Russia and Canada, the need of his country for a port on the Pacific. Vancouver this summer celebrates its jubilee as a city and as the Canadian seaport on that coast. Temperley has well written "The Canadian steamers and captains that now plough the sea from Vancouver to China, do so all unconscious of the man who maintained their rights and foresaw their future a century ago." A deserved tribute to Canning. But long after Canning was dead his friend Bagot had in mind another outlet on the Pacific Coast: that of the Columbia River. Had he been supported by the interested parties in Canada in 1817 and by Lord Stanley in 1842, the case for Britain would have been far stronger than it was in the final settlement of 1846, and Canada to-day it is reasonable to assume, would have had a longer coast line on the Pacific to the south, a larger Province of British Columbia in area, and another port besides Vancouver and Prince Rupert.⁴¹

A man of wide experience, and with first hand knowledge of the American mind at home and of American methods in negotiation, Bagot was not the type of diplomat likely to give foolish and unrealizable suggestions to his government. "Fifty Four Forty or Fight" for him would have been only what it was: not the battle cry of a nation maintaining its rights, but rather a party election cry designed to catch votes. He would have valued it accordingly.

Among the many complaints about the sacrifice of Canadian interests

⁴¹Frederick Merk, "The Oregon Pioneers and the Boundary", (*American Historical Review*, XXIX), 681-699; M. L. Wardell, "Oregon Immigration Prior to 1846", (*The Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society*, XXVII), 41-64; Henry Commager, "England and Oregon Treaty of 1846", (*Oregon Historical Quarterly*, XXVIII), 18-38; Leslie M. Scott, "Influence of American Settlement upon the Oregon Boundary Treaty of 1846", (*Oregon Historical Quarterly*, XXIX), 1-19; Katherine B. Judson, "The British Side of the Restoration of Fort Astoria", (*The Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society*, XX), 243-260; 305-330; *Ibid.*, "Polk and Oregon, with a Pakenham Letter", 301-302; Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, IV, 392-397; Joseph Schafer, "The British Attitude Toward the Oregon Question, 1815-1846", (*American Historical Review*, XVI), 273-299; James White, "Boundary Disputes and Treaties", *Canada and its Provinces*, VIII, 917-927; Willis Fletcher Johnson, *American Foreign Relations*, I, 403-429; C.H.B.F.P., II, 253-261; Herbert C. F. Bell, *Lord Palmerston*, (London, 1936), I, 369-370.

to American selfishness and aggressiveness and British expediency, at least one of Canada's great pro-consuls, Sir Charles Bagot, has the good record of having done his utmost to maintain and extend the boundaries of British North America, on the several occasions he was called upon to help define them. That others failed to support him should not detract from the honour to which he is entitled.

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE McLEOD CASE

By ALBERT B. COREY

During the night of December 29, 1837, the American owned steam-boat *Caroline*, suspected of aiding a filibustering expedition, was attacked while tied to the dock at Schlosser, New York, and destroyed by an armed force from Upper Canada under the command of a royal naval officer, Commander Andrew Drew. One man, Amos Durfee of Buffalo, was killed; a number of other United States citizens were wounded. Out of this incident developed the most troublesome issue of the Canadian rebellion period which, so far as Canadian-American and British-American relations were concerned, lasted from 1837 to 1842.

This is not the place in which to review the storm of protest and the border excitement in the United States nor the jubilation in Upper Canada which the destruction of the *Caroline* unloosed. Suffice it to say that within three months John Forsyth, the secretary of state, instructed Andrew Stevenson, the United States minister in London, to demand redress of the British government.¹ This demand Stevenson presented in a voluminous letter of exceptional vigor on May 22, 1838.² Palmerston acknowledged the letter, but not until March 21, 1841, three years later, did Henry S. Fox, the British minister in Washington, formally accept on behalf of his government responsibility for the destruction of the *Caroline*.³ To be sure, as early as March 6, 1838, Stevenson reported that in several informal conversations it seemed clear that Palmerston would justify the act and assume responsibility for it.⁴ There was no hint that redress would be forthcoming. On November 6, 1838, Palmerston ordered Fox to avow the destruction of the *Caroline* as a public act,⁵ an order

¹A considerable portion of this paper is based upon correspondence in the Archives of the State Department in Washington, D.C. The various series referred to, together with abbreviations for convenience of citation, follow:

- (1) Instructions to United States Ministers in London from the Secretary of State, cited as *G. B. Instructions*.
- (2) Despatches to the Secretary of State from United States Ministers in London, cited as *G. B. Despatches*.
- (3) Notes to the British Minister in Washington from the Secretary of State, cited as *Br. Legation, Notes to*.
- (4) Notes from the British Minister in Washington to the Secretary of State, cited as *Br. Legation, Notes from*.
- (5) Letters from territorial United States to the Department of State, cited as *D. S. Misc. Letters*.
- (6) Letters from the Department of State in answer to the above, cited as *D. S. Domestic Letters*.

For Forsyth's instructions to Stevenson, see *G. B. Instructions*, XIV, 266-271, Forsyth to Stevenson, March 12, 1838.

²*G. B. Despatches*, Vol. 45, Stevenson to Forsyth, May 24, 1838.

³*Br. Legation, Notes from*, Vol. 20, Fox to Webster.

⁴*G. B. Despatches*, Vol. 45, Stevenson to Forsyth. Practically all of Stevenson's correspondence with Forsyth and Webster and with Palmerston is to be found also in the thirteen volumes of the *Andrew Stevenson Letter Books* and the twenty-six volumes of *The Papers of Andrew and John White Stevenson* in the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

⁵Canadian Archives, *Series Q*, Vol. 251, p. 227, Palmerston to Glenelg, November 8, 1838.

which for some unexplained reason he did not obey. Had Fox obeyed instructions or had Palmerston formally acknowledged acceptance of responsibility to Stevenson, it is possible that the case of Alexander McLeod would never have arisen to perplex British, American, and Canadian governments and to produce an excitement on both sides of the Atlantic which made war seem a real possibility.

During these three years of diplomatic fencing, the St. Lawrence border between Canada and the United States was kept in a continuous state of turmoil by the exceptional amount of filibustering which took place from the American side of the line and by occasional expeditions from the Canadian side. In New York state both officials and private citizens were constantly on the watch to arrest Canadians who had taken part in the *Caroline* expedition. A number of persons suspected of participation were actually arrested during 1838, but all were discharged for lack of evidence. Eventually Alexander McLeod, deputy sheriff of Niagara, U.C., who had already been arrested and discharged, was again taken into custody at Lockport, New York, on November 12, 1840, and charged with arson and the murder of Amos Durfee. This was the beginning of what is known as the McLeod case.⁶

The original difficulty arose because the British government had failed publicly to avow responsibility for the *Caroline*. On December 13, 1840, Fox attempted to make good this lacuna. In a letter to Forsyth⁷ he insisted (although he admitted that his statement would have to be confirmed by the British government) that the destruction of the *Caroline* was "the publick act of persons obeying the constituted authorities of Her Majesty's Province . . ." He hoped that the United States would see the necessity of releasing McLeod at once especially since "the case [was] naturally occasioning a great degree of excitement and indignation within the British frontier." He continued, "I earnestly hope that it may be in your power to give me an early and satisfactory answer . . ." Forsyth's reply on December 26 expressed a desire to prevent ill-feeling and a determination not to interfere with the jurisdiction of the New York courts. Neither he nor the president were "aware of any principle of international law, or indeed of reason or justice" which entitled offenders to immunity before legal tribunals even though they "acted in obedience to their superior authorities, or because their acts have become the subject of diplomatic discussion between the two Governments."⁸ Fox was surprised and chagrined and in reply remarked upon the "very grave and serious consequences" which would result from adhering rigidly to Forsyth's position.⁹ Forsyth retorted with asperity that no further discussion would be "useful or proper" since Great Britain had made no reply to the demand for redress of May 22, 1838.¹⁰

Meanwhile congress became interested in the issue. A few weeks

⁶For an excellent account of the McLeod case which disposes of the questions relating to acceptance of responsibility by Great Britain for the destruction of the *Caroline*, the efforts of the United States government to obtain McLeod's release from judicial process in New York, and the innocence of McLeod, see Alastair Watt, "The Case of Alexander McLeod" (*Canadian Historical Review*, XII), 145-167.

⁷*Br. Legation, Notes from*, Vol. 20.

⁸*Br. Legation, Notes to*, VI, 186-189.

⁹*Br. Legation, Notes from*, Vol. 20, December 29, 1840.

¹⁰*Br. Legation, Notes to*, VI, 190, December 31, 1840.

after the arrest of McLeod, it took action. On December 21, 1840, Millard Fillmore of New York submitted a resolution in the house of representatives calling upon the president to transmit to that body all the correspondence with Great Britain concerning the *Caroline* and McLeod.¹¹ On December 31 another resolution requiring the printing of the correspondence precipitated a long and acrimonious debate in which both parties aired all the political dirty linen they could gather. States rights, war and peace, the status of treaties with Great Britain all received attention. A few days later, in a more moderate debate, it was proposed to refer the whole subject to the committee on foreign relations.¹² Congressmen seemed to desire a continuance of peace with Great Britain, although many were still indignant over the hauteur of Fox's letters to Forsyth.

The political battle royal came in the following February, (1841) when Francis W. Pickens of South Carolina, chairman of the committee, introduced the report which he had written himself, and the battle continued until the end of the special session of the new congress in September, 1841. The report gave the facts of the case, stated the principles involved, and then proceeded to a violent attack on Great Britain, whose objects and ambitions knew "no bounds". It ended with the hope for a peaceful and honorable adjustment of the *Caroline* and McLeod cases.¹³ A fierce debate took place immediately. Fillmore and John Quincy Adams attacked the report on the ground that it was too bellicose. Pickens replied that it was a plain and fearless statement of fact, that it was not intended to ruffle feelings, that its real object was to prepare the people of the United States for the problems they must face, the chief of which was that of national defence. Fillmore and others took the opposite view—that it was unwise to stir up feeling against Great Britain until the United States had sufficient defences on its frontiers to withstand attack. In the country at large the New York *Observer* expressed current opinion when it said on February 20 that the report was meant for home consumption only, in order to accustom people to speak above their breath when speaking of the British. In the senate, except for a few innocuous speeches on March 1, there was no excitement.¹⁴

At this point, i.e., on March 4, 1841, Daniel Webster became secretary of state. In an exchange of letters with Fox he completely reversed the position taken by Forsyth; he acknowledged that there was no justification in international law for punishing as criminals those who acted under military orders, but he averred that the federal government was helpless to interfere with the jurisdiction of the courts of New York. He held out hope that the case might eventually be transferred to the supreme court of the United States.¹⁵

In order to understand the ebb and flow of opinion on both sides of the Atlantic it is well here to give a brief summary of the progress of McLeod's trial. While congress was debating *Caroline* matters in January, 1841, Canadian authorities sought to bail McLeod out of the jail at Lock-

¹¹*Congressional Globe*, IX, 44.

¹²*Ibid.*, IX, 90, January 4, 1841.

¹³*Ibid.*, IX, 170-171, February 13, 1841.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, IX, 218.

¹⁵For a complete statement of the United States official position, see *Br. Legation, Notes to*, VI, 196-210, Webster to Fox, April 24, 1841; also *British and Foreign State Papers, 1840-1841*, XXIX, 1129-1139.

port, New York, but this was prevented by the opposition of the local mob. In February, Governor William H. Seward asked the chief justice of the supreme court of New York to preside at the forthcoming trial at Lockport and requested the attorney general of the state to defend McLeod in order to ensure a fair trial.¹⁶ On March 15 Webster ordered the United States attorney general, Crittenden, to Lockport to protect McLeod's interests.¹⁷ Owing to a technicality, the trial was postponed until June, but by that time it was decided to refer it to the supreme court of the state. That court upheld the jurisdiction of the state courts to try McLeod for murder and remanded the case for trial by the lower court. McLeod now had a choice of carrying his suit directly to the supreme court of the United States or of standing trial before a local jury. He chose the latter in order to avoid spending another winter in jail and because a verdict of not guilty in a local court would satisfy the border population of his innocence. The venue of the trial was now changed to Utica, and there McLeod was tried and acquitted on October 12, 1841.

Meanwhile, on June 10 and for three days thereafter, there took place in the United States senate a vigorous debate, during the course of which party politics were confused with the principles of international law.¹⁸ The main questions debated were whether Webster in his letter of April 24 to Fox had abjectly accepted the demand for the release of McLeod and whether he had gone beyond his rightful powers in ordering Crittenden to defend McLeod's interests. Associated with attacks on Webster there were an outburst of glorification of American nationalism and an almost fanatical opposition to all things British. Said Thomas H. Benton of Missouri in a ringing attack, "To strike—to crush—to plunder—to terrify—and to make peace—this is their policy . . ." In advocating the maintenance of American national interests he declared that it would be "better far to throw away the books, and go by the heart. Then, at least, they [Americans] would always have the consolation of being on their country's side." As for Webster, his letter of April 24 to Fox, "besides its fatal concessions", had been "deficient in manly tone—in force—in resentment to injurious imputations—and in enforcement of our just claims. . . . The letter demands nothing—literally nothing; and in that respect degrades us as much as the surrender upon a threat had degraded us." Webster's political friends, especially Rufus Choate of Massachusetts, defended him by asserting with substantial truth that Benton and others were attempting "to excite just [in the sense of 'mere'] sensibilities" and were not trying to enlighten the country on the facts or the merits of the case.

In the house, where the debates began on June 24 and lasted until September, an attempt was made to embarrass the administration by assertions that Webster's capitulation could bring one result only—war. As the debates continued the tempers of the members rose. Redress for the *Caroline* was insisted upon. In florid language Aaron V. Brown of Tennessee proclaimed:

"Sir—the waves of Niagara have extinguished the fires of that vessel—they have silenced forever the agonizing shrieks of her remain-

¹⁶*D. S. Misc. Letters*, Seward to Forsyth, February 27, 1841.

¹⁷*D. S. Domestic Letters*, XXXI, 360-363.

¹⁸For the debates, see *Congressional Globe*, X, and Appendix.

ing crew—but the cry for vengeance still comes up from her deep and agitated bosom, in tones louder than the thunder of her own mighty cataract.”

The debates are particularly interesting because of the intensity of party spirit and because each side insisted that the other's policy would lead to war. Fittingly did the reporter remark at the end of the debate on July 13: “When the hour expired, [that is, the time set apart for debate on McLeod and the *Caroline*] the subject was dropped, and the bill, making temporary provision for lunatics in the District of Columbia, was taken up and passed.”¹⁹

In Albany too there were stiff debates in which party spirit was evident. But the tone of debates there was set by Governor Seward, who insisted upon the preservation of the rights of the state in his message to the Assembly in May.²⁰ He would continue to do all in his power to secure a fair trial for McLeod, but he would allow nothing to be done which would compromise “in the least degree, the rights, dignity, or honor of this state.” In his correspondence with Governor Sydenham in Canada²¹ he was equally definite, and at no time did he relinquish his position in the slightest degree.

What was fair bait for legislators was, of course, fair bait for people in the country at large. In the press one finds six separate issues attacked and defended. The first was whether Great Britain, by its avowal of the *Caroline*, had the right to demand McLeod's release; the second, whether Great Britain ought not first to grant redress to the United States; the third, whether the balance in weighing trans-border offences was not heavily weighted against the United States; the fourth, whether the state of New York had jurisdiction in the McLeod case; the fifth, whether Webster had sold out the American birthright to the British; and the sixth, whether war was likely to result with Great Britain if McLeod were condemned and executed. The leading papers took sides and attacked each other with unusual vigor and heat. When Thurlow Weed's *Albany Evening Journal* praised the decision of the state supreme court for having upheld “the honor and dignity of the State”, the *New York Journal of Commerce* remarked: “And this, in the estimation of the *Journal*, appears to have been the essential point at issue”. Whether the United States and Great Britain should become involved in war, with all its attendant evils was a matter of little importance in comparison with the vindication of Seward's position.²² It and other papers pointed out that the leading members of the New York bar refused to accept the decision as valid.²³

As the summer wore on and the time for the trial at Utica approached, a general apprehension appears to have arisen that McLeod would not receive a fair trial and that war with Great Britain would result. But as the day came nearer it was evident that excitement was dying down, largely

¹⁹Quoted in the *New York Observer*, July 17, 1841.

²⁰Charles Z. Lincoln, ed., *Messages from the Governors, etc.*, III (1823-1842), (Albany, 1909), 932-933.

²¹*New York Journal of Commerce*, May 27, 1841, Seward to Sydenham.

²²*Ibid.*, July 15, 1841. The *National Intelligencer* (Washington) and the *Daily Advertiser* agreed with the *Journal*. The *Globe* (Washington), on the other hand, stood staunchly by the official position.

²³*New York Journal of Commerce*, July 19; *National Intelligencer*, July 22; *Poughkeepsie* (N.Y.) *Eagle*, quoted in the *National Intelligencer*, July 22.

because many who had formerly thought that McLeod ought to be punished now believed that American dignity and honor had been sufficiently sustained, and "that having carried the point, the punishment of McLeod could answer no end or object", that therefore the government of New York "would not be justified in putting him to death."²⁴ So little interest was exhibited in the trial itself that the court room was but one-third filled.

English opinion went through a number of phases in 1841. The first news of McLeod's arrest excited moderate attention, although in certain quarters notable apprehension was felt. Lord John Russell in a personal note to Stevenson expressed the fear that "the Senate & public in the United States are acting in ignorance of the very strong feeling which will be excited here if MacLeod is condemned."²⁵ When news of the January debate in congress and of the Lockport grand jury's true bill reached England, the daily press printed it at length, and excitement went to fever heat. In anticipation of probable war, funds depreciated and the bank suspended specie payments. Melbourne's guarded but incisive and threatening language and O'Connell's insistence upon protection of British subjects abroad²⁶ did nothing to allay the public frenzy. Palmerston became so disturbed that he urged Stevenson to write privately to Van Buren urging him to do all in his power to release McLeod, whereupon Stevenson reported to the president: "The excitement is indeed violent among all Parties & the case is treated as one of the most monstrous character. Some of the . . . talk of seizing and retaliating upon Americans here. One thing is certain, if McLeod is executed, there will be *immediate war*! Of this you may rest assured."²⁷ Speed was essential if trouble were to be averted.

During the following three weeks excitement subsided when it became known that McLeod would probably be bailed and discharged.²⁸ Besides, the soft words of ministers in the debate over the naval and military estimates had a soothing effect upon public opinion. But just at this point, March 7, news of McLeod's further detention and of Pickens's report reached England. London and the country were immediately thrown into an uproar. Stevenson reported that many thought war inevitable, although he himself did not expect it immediately, and he even hoped to avoid it. Nevertheless he went so far as to advise Commodore Hull, who was with an American flotilla at Marseilles, "to get nearer home and within reach of orders from the [Navy] Department."²⁹ Even Joseph Hume found feelings running so high against the United States that he refrained from questioning ministers in the house as he had previously intended.³⁰

²⁴New York *Observer*, October 9, 1841, quoted also from the New York *Journal of Commerce*.

²⁵*Stevenson Papers*, XXIV, 30599-600, February 2, 1841.

²⁶*Morning Chronicle* (London), February 9, 1841.

²⁷*Van Buren Papers*, XLII, 9904-9907, February 9, 1841. The omitted word cannot be deciphered.

²⁸*G. B. Despatches*, Vol. 48. Stevenson to Secretary of State, March 3, 1841. Stevenson still thought that McLeod's condemnation and execution "would inevitably have led to a rupture between the two countries".

²⁹*Stevenson Letterbook*, July 10, 1836-Sept. 27, 1841, Stevenson to Hull, March 8, 1841.

³⁰*Stevenson Papers*, XXV, 30756-57, Hume to Stevenson, March 10, 1841. E. V. Harcourt wrote Webster a friendly letter on March 12 in which he assured Webster

Most of the papers, according to Stevenson, were "filled with articles of the most revolting extravagance & violence, & well calculated to agitate and influence the public mind, already too much predisposed for violent & rash measures".³¹ The *Times* headed its account, "Menacing and Insulting Report of the Committee of Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives". The *Morning Chronicle*, a government sheet, spoke of "Threatening War with England". The London correspondent of the *New York Journal of Commerce* reported that such declarations brought about

"One universal feeling of anger and indignation upon every lip and feature . . . and I do assure you that I have never beheld, or read of, anything at all equal to the manner in which the whole community from the highest to the lowest, in the lobbies to the Senate, or in the thoroughfares of the streets, at the clubs of the aristocrats, or the parlors of a pot-house, were so completely convulsed. From several conversations which I have had this morning, with persons of various grades of life, from every enquiry that I can make, and from all the close observation of which I am capable, I do find that the excitement was, and is, most excessive; that England has felt herself insulted, outraged, and menaced, and that, in the language of the *Times*, 'without the especial interference of the ALMIGHTY, any human means of averting war' does not seem to be entertained for a moment."³²

British honor had been outraged. Said the *Morning Herald*: "The release of Mr. McLeod is as indispensable to British honor as it would be creditable to American justice."³³ Matters still appeared critical by the middle of March, but thereafter excitement tended to subside. The Tories, generally referred to as the war party, were unwilling to project a war upon their own responsibility, although both the Tories and the Tory press remained adamant concerning the ultimate necessity of settling difficulties with the United States by force of arms. Melbourne's tottering government was not disposed to take measures which might lead to immediate collision with the United States, unless measures looking toward military preparedness could be so interpreted.³⁴ In fact, Hume, who would have introduced the subject in parliament, was induced to keep silent by ministers themselves. Moreover, arrival of the news that Webster had been appointed secretary of state and was giving the McLeod case his closest attention aroused an expectation among press and people alike that the United States would accede to the British demand for the

that "there is in this country but *one* feeling on the subject among all parties and ranks, that if he [McLeod] should be condemned, it would be such an outrage on *international* justice that we must throw away the Scabbard at once." He hoped for peace. Cf. *Daniel Webster Papers*, V, 16476-77.

³¹*G. B. Despatches*, Vol. 48, Stevenson to Secretary of State, March 9, 1841.

³²This is part of a long letter from J.W.G., the London Correspondent, March 9, in the *New York Journal of Commerce*, April 7, 1841.

³³*Morning Herald* (London), March 17, quoted in *New York Journal of Commerce*, April 9, 1841.

³⁴*G. B. Despatches*, Vol. 48, Stevenson to Secretary of State, March 18, 1841.

release of McLeod. Consols went up half a point.³⁵ For the next three months little comment appeared in the London press.³⁶

The essential issues between the two governments and the two peoples are now quite clear. In the first place the matter of primary interest to the British was the release of McLeod while to Americans McLeod's release was merely associated with the far more important question of securing redress for the *Caroline*.³⁷ But McLeod's predicament involved another issue which Englishmen were either unable or unwilling to understand. They could not accept the explanation that under a federal form of government separate powers and responsibilities exist. They made it a point of honor to demand McLeod's release, whereas the United States government was unable to secure it by any fiat of its own. The complicating factor was, of course, that both the government and the states-rights citizens of New York made it a point of honor to insist that justice take its course, regardless of the international consequences of such a procedure.

It is not difficult thus to see that the intensity of English feeling and expectation of war in March was matched again in August when it became known that the New York supreme court had refused to discharge McLeod. In both London and the provinces the press of all shades of opinion carried statements of the government's preparations for war or advocated such measures. In a particularly outspoken article on August 11, the *Times* asked if it were consonant with the dignity of Great Britain to wait until McLeod should be out of reach of help. Since his chance of fair trial was minute, preparations for war should be expedited at once. According to the correspondent of the *New York Journal of Commerce*, this article "created quite an effect, and received eulogies of men high in authority with both Whigs and Tories". On the 18th the *Times* again trumpeted warnings of danger: "The time for diplomatic expostulation and legal argument, is . . . already past". It ill became the United States, so weak in naval armaments, to assume its present attitude toward McLeod and Great Britain.³⁸

At this juncture the new parliament met for the first time on August 24. To quiet the country no mention was made in the speech from the throne of McLeod or of relations with the United States. Friendly assurances, it said, continued to be received from foreign powers. Palmerston's studied defence of his policies and his proof that good relations with the United States did exist was so successful that several Whig papers congratulated the country on its escape from war. The Tories were by no means satisfied, for at a meeting at the Colonial Club on August 30, presided over by Lord Mountcashel, a number of bellicose resolutions

³⁵*Ibid.*, Vol. 48, Stevenson to Secretary of State, April 7, 1841. Also correspondence of J.W.G. in *New York Journal of Commerce*, April 22, 1841; and reports in the *Journal* from the *Times* (London), April 2; *Sun* (London), April 1; *Spectator* (London).

³⁶Even the Russian government became quite concerned and undertook to express through its ministers in London and Washington the hope that there would be no war. Cf., *G. B. Despatches*, Vol. 48, Stevenson to Webster, April 19, 1841.

³⁷*Ibid.*, Vol. 48, Stevenson to Secretary of State, April 7, 1841; also Same to Same, May 18, in which Stevenson reported that excitement had "for the present ended".

³⁸This paragraph is based on many quotations from the English press in the *New York Journal of Commerce* from August 24 to September 7, 1841, and on J.W.G.'s correspondence.

were passed, and these, together with speeches delivered by several influential peers, were printed in the *Morning Herald* the following day.³⁹

Although the subject was still considered by Peel and Russell to be "one of deep importance", Aberdeen's "friendly and conciliatory" attitude⁴⁰ towards the United States and the government's abstention from committing itself to a definite policy prior to the trial in Utica had a calming effect upon public opinion. The press became less active in denunciation of the United States.

But just as hostility toward the United States seemed to have calmed down, news arrived in England of an incident which occurred on the border between Vermont and Canada East on September 19. On that day a band of volunteer dragoons crossed over into Vermont and abducted one Grogan, who, for the past two years, had gained notoriety for burning houses and barns in Canada.⁴¹ The border peoples became extremely excited and the press on both sides of the frontier took up the issue. Fortunately Grogan was released by Sir Richard Jackson on October 4. While the incident showed that the greatest caution had to be pursued in handling the case of McLeod in order to avoid retribution from Canadians, and perhaps consequences of a more serious nature as well, the incident soon passed into the limbo of the ordinary in both Canada and the United States.

Not so in England. So much was it felt in London that Grogan's abduction would aggravate relations with the United States that upon arrival of the news "the funds went down, speculators became paralysed, 'Change was crowded', the newspapers were sought for with extraordinary avidity, and rumors the most absurd, ridiculous, and terrific, were to be heard in all societies". Sunday papers added fuel to the excitement by announcing that "reprisals had commenced and war was inevitable". It was also reported that the British government was busy preparing the navy and army for emergencies. The *Times* aroused anxieties still more by printing a long letter in which the strategy for waging war with the United States was fully outlined.⁴² English resentment and expectation of war had been awakened again. In this state of mind Englishmen awaited news of McLeod's trial. When the news of his acquittal arrived, they admitted that the proceedings were creditable to American justice, but they refused to grant that the question of McLeod's "triability" had been settled.⁴³

Canadian exasperation with the United States exhibited a more even but nevertheless very high temperature. In view of the intermittent but continuous trouble along the border, the British government was especially anxious to prevent retaliation against the United States. To this end Sydenham was ordered to restrain the Canadians. At the same time he was ordered to assure them of the Queen's "determination to protect them

³⁹Quoted in *ibid.*, September 17, 1841.

⁴⁰*Stevenson Letterbook*, Mar. 21, 1839-Oct. 22, 1841, Stevenson to Webster, September 18, 1841.

⁴¹The *Globe*, September 29, 1841.

⁴²Correspondence of J.W.G., October 20, in the *New York Journal of Commerce*, November 10, 1841.

⁴³*Morning Chronicle* (London), quoted in *ibid.*, November 22, 1841.

with all the weight of Her power".⁴⁴ In Canada West, Sir George Arthur was a tower of strength, ever on the watch to prevent border outrages. That there were no incidents of importance until September, 1841, speaks well for the good sense of Canadians and Americans alike.

A perusal of Canadian newspapers shows a great divergence of opinion and of editorial practice. Some Tory papers began shortly after McLeod's arrest "to speak with much warmth" and waxed hotter and hotter as the months went by.⁴⁵ A number of Reform papers advocated caution and refused to admit the likelihood of armed hostilities.⁴⁶ In general, it may be said that all disliked the thought of war with the United States, but while the Reform papers remained moderate, the Tory papers often assumed a bellicose tone. When the trial was over, all were relieved, but the Tories felt indignant still. Some day, they felt, there must be a final reckoning of all outstanding disputes.

It is evident that, coming as it did in the midst of a long drawn out dispute over the Maine boundary and of tension which resulted from filibustering along the St. Lawrence frontier, the immense amount of bad feeling stirred up in 1841 by the trial of McLeod gave the several governments concerned a great deal of uneasiness. Since 1838 the British government, spurred on by Sir John Colborne, had been considering the advisability of establishing more effective defences against Patriot expeditions from the United States. In 1840, however, a change of policy was to be noted. In November of that year, Sir Richard Jackson, commander of the forces in Canada, drew up at the request of the war office a long memorandum⁴⁷ in which he urged either the erection of permanent works or the maintenance of a large standing army for the defence of Canada, not for the purpose of aggression against the United States. To this memorandum Sydenham gave unqualified support on December 24, 1840.⁴⁸ He pointed out the immediate necessity for acting upon Jackson's recommendations in view of the fact that recent events, among them McLeod's arrest, had made Canadian relations with the United States "much more critical". The British government shortly approved the plan in principle⁴⁹ and by the middle of 1841 decided to build permanent works and to maintain a large regular force in Canada, to establish which it was decided to spend £100,000 a year in addition to the regular military estimates.⁵⁰ It was, as Russell remarked, quite in keeping with the policy of maintaining British supremacy in Canada.⁵¹

Even before McLeod was arrested attention was frequently called in the United States to the dilapidated condition of that country's defences. In the year following McLeod's arrest, apprehension of war induced both

⁴⁴Canadian Archives, *Series G*, Vol. 108, pp. 170-172, Russell to Sydenham, March 8, 1841.

⁴⁵For example, the *Montreal Herald*, *Montreal Gazette*, *Quebec Gazette*, *Toronto Patriot*.

⁴⁶For example, the *Canada Times* (Montreal), *Kingston Chronicle*, *Hamilton Journal*, *Toronto Times*.

⁴⁷Canadian Archives, *Series Q*, Vol. 274, pp. 213-268, "Memorandum upon the Canadian Frontier".

⁴⁸*Series Q*, Vol. 274, pp. 202-204, Sydenham to Russell.

⁴⁹*Series Q*, Vol. 274, pp. 204-208, Russell to Lord Hill, February 22, 1841.

⁵⁰*New York Journal of Commerce*, July 27, 1841.

⁵¹Cf., Russell's speech concerning British supremacy in Canada, *Niles' Weekly Register* (Baltimore), Vol. 60, p. 369, August 14, 1841.

pointed comment and action. Referring to McLeod, Governor Seward called attention in February, 1841, to the almost undefended Atlantic and northern frontiers.⁵² Reports of the secretary of war and debates in congress referred especially to the lack of defences along the Atlantic, so that it was commonly held that coastal defences would have to be considered the first line of defence in case of war. Consequently a fortifications bill, introduced in July, 1841, and passed in September, provided the sum of \$2,226,000, of which \$160,000 was set apart for permanent works for the northern frontier and \$100,000 for additional ships on the great lakes.⁵³ The United States was not to be caught unprepared.

In another respect the McLeod case gave the United States government much uneasiness. Ever since 1839 the Hunters and other secret organizations, whose purpose it had been to invade and liberate Canada and to foment a war between the United States and Great Britain, had been active. All through 1841 reports were current that they were organizing for another expedition, that one of their objects was to capture McLeod, to kill him, and thus to precipitate war. There were rumours also of an expedition from Canada to rescue him. Under these circumstances we find Webster writing a personal note on March 11 to Spencer, the United States district attorney for the northern district of New York and counsel for McLeod, in which he said that "the President is exceedingly anxious for McLeod's personal safety and security. . . . The utmost care, we think, ought to be used to prevent any attempt either to rescue him by persons from Canada, or to use violence towards him, by persons on our side. . . . The main object of this is, to press the high importance of guarding McLeod from all possible danger—consequences of the most serious nature might follow, if he should become the subject of popular violence, either by his friends or his foes."⁵⁴ Webster also assured Fox of the government's intention to protect McLeod by a military force under the command of Major General Winfield Scott.⁵⁵ From March until October reports were constantly sent to the war department and to the state department concerning Patriot activities, and efforts, not always successful, were made to prevent the American border population from committing acts of violence against Canada.

In these various safeguarding efforts Governor Seward took a leading hand. He would not interfere with the jurisdiction of the courts, but he would protect McLeod from violence. By the first of September, 1841, he had visited Utica, the scene of the final trial; he had ordered an extra guard placed around the jail at Whitesboro; he had ordered the militia officers of Oneida county to be ready for duty and a special volunteer artillery force of one hundred men to be formed and armed at once; and he had employed secret agents to "traverse the line of canals" to get information of any designs on foot.⁵⁶ During September information was received of the deposit at Utica of a large quantity of gunpowder belonging to the Patriots. Seward redoubled his efforts. In a long letter to David Moulton, sheriff of Oneida county, he gave the most minute instructions

⁵²*D. S. Misc. Letters*, Seward to Webster, February 27, 1841.

⁵³*Congressional Globe*, X, *passim*.

⁵⁴*D. S. Domestic Letters*, XXXI, 357-358.

⁵⁵*Series G*, Vol. 227, pp. 311-318, Fox to Palmerston, April 28, 1841.

⁵⁶*D. S. Misc. Letters*, Seward to Webster, September 3, 1841.

for insuring McLeod's safety, both before and after the trial. Said Seward: "There is much reason to apprehend that the country would be involved in war if any injury should befall [sic] Alexander McLeod while he remains in the custody of the law . . . the honor of New York and of the United States is more deeply concerned in protecting him against danger until [his] vindication be accomplished."⁵⁷ In fact, Winfield Scott even believed that Seward would give McLeod a safe passage out of the country whether he were acquitted or convicted.⁵⁸

Nor did Seward act alone. Webster's anxiety caused him to order both the district attorney and the district marshal of the northern district of New York to aid or to act concurrently with the state authorities, and he had a special company of artillery sent to Rome, a few miles distant from Utica. President Tyler issued a forceful proclamation on September 25 against filibustering. In the course of a long conversation with Fox on September 30, he informed the British minister that he hoped to avert trouble with Great Britain should McLeod be executed. To this end he would refuse Fox a passport and, if necessary, force him to remain in Washington, or at least in the country, until Great Britain had had time to reflect more fully on the various aspects of the case. This Tyler said in "a friendly manner, but firmly and resolutely."⁵⁹

It would be interesting to speculate upon what might have happened had McLeod been executed. The British government had formulated no definite policy in advance, other than to make certain minor naval and military preparations, while the United States government was clearly anxious to avoid war at all costs. Public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic may well have forced both nations into a senseless and useless war. At any rate, when McLeod was acquitted there was a general sigh of relief from impending danger.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, Seward to Moulton, September 24, 1841.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, Scott to Secretary of War, September 21, 1841.

⁵⁹*Series G*, Vol. 227, pp. 613-625, Fox to Aberdeen, Confidential, October 12, 1841; also Fox to Sir Richard Jackson, Secret and Confidential, October 2, 1841.

AN UNSOLVED PROBLEM OF CANADIAN HISTORY

By F. G. ROE

The words of my title are those of a particularly competent Canadian historical scholar, recently deceased: the late Dr. W. L. Grant. He applies them to an episode in the history of Western Canada of which, for fairly obvious family reasons, he may perhaps be considered somewhat better qualified to judge than an ordinary student who must approach such problems along the more conventional lines of research. Dr. Grant is referring to the somewhat sudden and highly spectacular change in the route of the first Canadian railway to the Pacific Ocean, from the previously adopted survey through Battleford, Edmonton, and the Yellowhead Pass; to the existing route of the Canadian Pacific through Calgary and the Kicking-Horse Pass, some two hundred miles farther south. Dr. Grant remarks: "No satisfactory reason for the change has ever been given . . . it is one of the unsolved problems of Canadian history . . ." ¹ Of "reasons" of sorts—were it not for the intractable adjective in the foregoing quotation—there has been no lack; and they are almost as diverse as they are numerous. It will be the purpose of this paper to examine their nature and their value in the light of other relevant evidence.

It is needless to recapitulate here, in any detail, the various arguments *pro* or *con* which were hurled back and forwards by the champions of the two camps: the Canadian west as a land of unbounded possibilities; or a useless region, fit for nobody but Indians and fur-traders. A cynic might suggest that both parties won. The first of the two schools, aided by the psychological effect of a "secessionist" atmosphere in British Columbia, carried the case for a railway. The second, with a laudable anxiety to lessen the terrific burdens awaiting the Canadian tax-payer, contrived to redeem the original blunder of a nationally-owned system, and to place the load on the shoulders of private promoters; who almost miraculously were found willing to undertake such responsibilities in a region "which would never pay for the grease on the car-wheels". Neither is it my purpose to base my conclusions upon recondite source-material not available to ordinary students. While such might undoubtedly furnish justification for a reversal of previous findings, such as is commonplace in every department of knowledge; my object is also (in part) to show that what I believe to be the true solution of the problem of the change is to be found in evidence which is at the disposal of everybody who reads anything at all. For example, perhaps the very best general account I have read of the Hudson's Bay Company and its relations at large with the Canadian government, C. 1855-1870, and onward through the "railway era" of the following decade, is in John Macoun's well-known work, which in the 'eighties was probably in everyone's hands. ² My only serious criticism of Macoun as a political historian is that in defending the terms made with the "syndicate" for the construction of the first transcontinental railway, on the grounds of "adverse public opinion", "the best terms that could

¹Geo. M. Grant, *Ocean to Ocean*, 1873; ed. W. L. Grant, Radisson Society, Toronto, 1925, Intr. p. XIX.

²John Macoun, *Manitoba and the Great North West* (Guelph, 1882), 422-466.

be got",³ &c, it is nowhere even hinted that the creators of this adverse public opinion and the heads of the syndicate were principally one and the same body of men; who as railway-constructors and "Empire-builders" clutched eagerly at huge areas of the very land which, as fur-traders, they had slandered as being unfit for agriculture;⁴ and of which they included in their "much more than 25,000,000 acres", great blocks in the very territory through which they refused to build their railway.⁵

It is of course a well-known historical fact that the earlier projected routes for the first transcontinental railway lay very considerably to the northward. These favoured respectively, the line of the Fort Garry and Edmonton Trail, which lay along the line of the Grand Trunk Pacific from Portage la Prairie to Saskatoon; and less closely along that of the Canadian Northern from Saskatoon to Edmonton. (2) A route crossing at the Narrows of Lake Manitoba and thence north-westward across the Saskatchewan by Lac la Biche and Lesser Slave Lake, and so through the Pine Pass or the Peace River Pass.⁶ The more northerly of the two routes almost undoubtedly owed its selection to Macoun's enthusiasms in 1872 and 1875. After the second exploration, in particular, his exuberance knew no bounds, and frightened even those who believed in him;⁷ although in his *Autobiography* he apparently refuses to shoulder any responsibility,

³*Ibid.*, 606-621; cf. H. A. Innis, *A History of the Canadian Pacific Railway* (Toronto, 1923), 98-109.

⁴See particularly, A. H. De Trémaudan, *The Hudson Bay Road* (London, 1912), 128, 192-208, 228, 243, &c; W. T. R. Preston, *Life of Lord Strathcona* (Toronto, 1916), 22-62, 298. Cf. Sir Edward Watkin, *Canada and the States, 1851-1886* (London, 1887), 64, 120-143; B. Willson, *The Great Company* (Toronto, 1899), 481-496; Geo. Bryce, *Remarkable History of the Hudson's Bay Co.* (Toronto, 1904), 445-479.

⁵The "more than 25,000,000" is Innis's phrase: *op. cit.*, 98-109. Cf. C. M. MacInnes, *In the Shadow of the Rockies* (History of South Alberta, London, 1930), p. 60. The credit of first making this sinister identity clear in so many words belongs (I think) to W. T. R. Preston's valuable *Life of Lord Strathcona*, 1916.

Compare Macoun (*Silver Heights*, Winnipeg, Nov. 1881):—"At breakfast there were the Marquis (of Lorne), Mr. Smith, and myself, and we, of course, enjoyed the talk very much. The Marquis wished to thank me for the information I had given him the preceding winter and stated that he had followed the route that I had given him, the whole of the past season and found I was right in every particular. When Mr. Smith heard him say this, he turned with great unction and said: "Your Excellency, Mr. Macoun and myself are the only two men that have the right opinion about this country." I was almost prompted to say: "You old rascal, six years ago you wrote that the statements were all lies, and that I was untrustworthy in the statement I had made about it to the Government." In 1875 he was the head of the Hudson's Bay Company, and now, in 1881, he was acting the patriot for the Government in power. . . ." Macoun, *Autobiography*, (Memorial Volume, published by the Ottawa Field Naturalists Club, 1922), p. 195.

For an equally interesting chronological comparison, I know nothing better than Macoun himself: in 1875, 1882, and 1922 (see *Autobiography*).

⁶Macoun, *Autobiography*, 133, 178; virtually the same urged by Butler, *The Wild North Land* (London, 1878), App., 345-357.

⁷When asked in 1877 to prepare a report on the North Land for Mackenzie, the premier—"I was cautioned in plain words, not to draw upon my imagination": (*Autobiography*, 158). So also, Sir Charles Tupper, 1880:—"Macoun, for God's sake do not draw upon your imagination." (*Ibid.*, 164). On the North, Blodgett, U.S. climatologist, in Hind, *Report on the Assiniboine and Saskatchewan Exploring Expedition of 1858* (Toronto, 1859), 122, 124; Macoun, *Manitoba*, 141-176, (showing Fort Simpson, 61° N., 113° W., to be warmer, 1876, than Fort Macleod, 50° N., 113° W.: 770 miles S. (p. 167); C. R. Tuttle, *Our Northland*, (Toronto, 1885), 392-419.

preferring to leave that with Charles Horetzky, his engineer colleague on the first expedition of 1872.⁸ Macoun is beyond question, however, the one who furnished the "scientific" argument for the Peace River route.

Sandford Fleming, on the contrary, was strongly in favour of the Edmonton and Yellowhead Pass route; the route of Milton and Cheadle—whose journey of 1862-1863 was largely with the ultimate object of a railway in view—and of many another.

I have indicated the general alignment from Winnipeg to Edmonton, west of Edmonton, the two existing railways or formerly existing (prior to their amalgamation as the Canadian National) diverged slightly until after crossing the Pembina River. Here again the Canadian Northern followed the route of Milton and Cheadle, by way of Father Lacombe's early settlement at St. Albert, and onward past Lac Ste. Anne;⁹ while the Grand Trunk Pacific kept a somewhat shorter and more direct line a few miles to the south. From the Pembina the two roads ran virtually side by side, and through the Yellowhead Pass to the Tête Jaune Cache (or near it) on the Fraser headwaters. Here they finally part company; the one descending the Fraser Valley, *en route* for Prince Rupert; the other climbing over the watershed of the Canoe and Columbia Rivers, and ultimately following the valleys of the Thompson and the lower Fraser to Vancouver—the route pronounced "impassable" by Butler in 1873.¹⁰

The prairie section of this Yellowhead Pass route traversed the heart of what Palliser and his colleagues in 1857 termed the fertile belt;¹¹ a region whose manifest richness and abundant promise had been enthusiastically extolled by everyone who ever travelled through it, whether resident,¹² scientist,¹³ or "traveller" pure and simple.¹⁴ Their views were fully

⁸"Horetzky and I, having seen the two passes to the north, were considered fit to give an opinion, and he (*sic*) recommended that the railway be built past Lac la Biche. . . ." (*Autobiography*, 133, 178). Cf. Horetzky himself, *Report of Progress on the Explorations and Surveys for a Canadian Pacific Railway, up to Jan. 1, 1874*. (Sandford Fleming, Engineer-in-Chief, *et al.*, Ottawa, 1874); App. B., 45-55.

⁹Milton and Cheadle, *North West Passage by Land* (1901), 180-182, 198-201.

¹⁰Butler, *Wild North Land*, App., 351-352.

¹¹I am ignorant whether it was first so classified by Palliser. See its definition in the (H.B. Co.) "Deed of Surrender", 1869: E. H. Oliver, (ed.) *The Canadian North West* (Publs. of Can. Archives, No. 9; 2 vols., Ottawa, 1914, 1915), 11, 958, 1002.

¹²One might cite the early fur-traders endlessly, Umfreville, Henry, Harmon, Ross. I select one whom Macoun met. Rev. John McDougall writes (*c.* 1868):—"From the North branch of the Saskatchewan, extending a hundred miles north (from Carlton) "and then west along its whole length, is to be found one of the richest portions of Canada": McDougall, *Pathfinding on Plain and Prairie* (Toronto, 1898), 273. His other books contain many similar passages.

¹³Franklin (First) *Journey to the Polar Sea* (London, 1925), 106, 158; Richardson, *Arctic Searching Expedition. . . of 1847-1850* (London, 1852), Appendix, 391; *Journals . . . of the Palliser Expedition of 1857-1860* (London, 1863), 6, 9, 13, 35, 46, 90, 269, 282 (Palliser), 51, 63, 70, 145 (Hector), 90 (Sullivan); Hind, *Report*, 1858, 34, 35, 67 (Hind), 74, 75 (John Fleming).

¹⁴Paul Kane's "Long Grass Prairie", *Fort Pitt to Edmonton*, 1846: Kane, *Wanderings of an Artist* (ed. L. J. Burpee, Radisson Soc., Toronto, 1927), 90; Southesk, *Saskatchewan and the Rocky Mountains* (Toronto, 1875), 286; Milton and Cheadle, *op. cit.*, 40, 50, 56 (Red R. to Touchwood Hills), 170, 174, 199 (Carlton west); Grant, *Ocean to Ocean*, 153; W. F. Butler, *The Great Lone Land* (London, 1910), 256, 264, 331, 381; Butler, *Autobiography*, (London, n.d.), 138.

shared by Sandford Fleming and his comrades on the survey of 1872.¹⁵ This includes Macoun himself, until he saw the Peace River region, after leaving Fleming's main party at Edmonton in 1872; and again in 1875,—this time working south-eastward.¹⁶ After these respective visits, the north-land seems to have held the first claim upon his superlatives.¹⁷ In this respect he was not alone.¹⁸

Fleming's careful and skilled examination of the topography of the route¹⁹ vindicated the judgment also of Milton and Cheadle and others who had likewise considered it practicable—even to the remarkably low grades to be obtained through the Yellowhead Pass.²⁰ Although there is here (as almost everywhere on this question) some conflict of testimony,²¹ I think it is true that it was practically considered a settled conclusion that the route of the first transcontinental railway in Canada would be *via* Edmonton and the Yellowhead Pass. Not long after the project was handed over by the Government to the "syndicate", it was announced to the surprise of almost everyone—including some at least of those who had participated in Sandford Fleming's original survey²² that the new line would follow a route some 200 miles south of Battleford and Edmonton.

As I remarked at the outset, a number of reasons have been advanced in explanation of the change. Although the late Sir Cecil Denny was in the territory at the time, it is not probable that he was in the inner counsels of the syndicate; but he doubtless reflects contemporary popular opinion quite faithfully. He says the change of route was due "to the representations of wealthy cattle companies", together with scanty settlement in the more northerly districts.²³

This may be compared with a fairly recent historian of Saskatchewan, who makes very considerable use of early reminiscence. He writes: "It was a matter of common remark in those days that the railroad ran through

¹⁵Fleming, in *Can. Pac. Annual Report* (up to Jan. 1, 1874), App. A, 35-40.

¹⁶Macoun, *Manitoba*, 95, 109, 110; *Autobiography*, 58-62. He was the "enthusiastic botanist" of Grant's *Ocean to Ocean*.

¹⁷*Id.*, *Autobiography*, 107-113, 127, 129-134, 296.

¹⁸See Butler, *Wild North Land*, App., 345-358. "It will yet be found that there are ten acres of fertile land lying north of the North Saskatchewan for every one acre lying south of it. . . ." (358). Not altogether as exaggerated as one might think!

¹⁹*Annual Report* (up to Jan. 1, 1874), 162, 193.

²⁰Milton and Cheadle were unaware they had passed the summit, until they saw the waters flowing westward, July 9, 1863: (*op. cit.*, 245). Travelling by train to-day is much the same; I have fired locomotives over the Yellowhead Summit, and can speak from experience.

²¹Macoun is very confused and vague concerning this. He states that the Yellowhead Pass route was favoured by Fleming: (Macoun, *Autobiography*, 133, 157, 161, 164). This is authenticated elsewhere. As I have shown above (see note 8), Macoun was applied to, on behalf of a rival route through Pine or Peace River Pass, favoured by some Liberals after 1878 in opposition to the government's choice. But he says again (*in re* 1880):—"A number of gentlemen had taken up the railway route by Pine Pass in preference to that of the Yellowhead Pass and considered it their duty to belittle my statements and, in one or two instances, to make counter ones. . . ." (*Ibid.*, 163-164). Actually, I cannot find a single word in either the *Manitoba* or the *Autobiography* advocating the Yellowhead route; nor does it appear that he ever saw the Yellowhead Pass in his life!

²²G. M. Grant's indignation "cost him the friendship of a chief of the Canadian Pacific Railway": (*Ocean to Ocean*, Intr. VIII).

²³Denny MS. (in Prov. Legist. Library, Edmonton), 336. He was one of the original Mounted Police force of 1874: (*ob.* 1928).

the worst part of the country because the C.P.R. wanted to be sufficiently close to the boundary to keep out another line"²⁴

A western friend of my own, who has studied the politics of this obscure subject considerably, is of opinion that the close proximity of the Northern Pacific, and its frequent branches northward toward the Canadian border, had aroused fears in government circles for the spirit of national solidarity in the West, unless the new line came nearer to the international boundary; and that the government insisted on the change being made.

This view may perhaps find some confirmation from an already-cited history of the Canadian Pacific Railway, which is based upon official documents. The author writes thus:—

"To check possible competition from the Northern Pacific, and to meet the demands of settlers in the southern area, not only was a shorter route desirable, but one more southerly than the Government's line located through the Yellowhead Pass. . . ."²⁵

A generally well-informed railway historian, writing on the change, ascribes it to the fact of the southern route being some thirty miles shorter.²⁶

Another, equally authentic, states that the Canadian government was strongly opposed to any change whatever being made; and "only relented by stipulating that if the Rockies were penetrated at any other point, it should be at least one hundred miles north of the International Boundary. . . ."²⁷

The most recent historian of southern Alberta, in discussing this knotty problem, has this to say:—

(Yellowhead Pass): "It was held that such a route would open up the most valuable land in the north-west, and by escaping the so-called desert country to the south, would be cheaper to construct, and bring more speedy returns.

"The champions of the southern route urged, on the contrary, that a line which was closer to the American frontier would tap areas which were already being settled, and that the desert land of the south was a figment of certain explorers' imaginations.

"Had it not been for the condition imposed by the Canadian Government, that the railway must be at least a hundred miles north from the American frontier, it would probably have been constructed still further to the south"²⁸

There remains one witness whom some of the foregoing historians necessarily could not cite; and whom none of them did. That one is Macoun, in his *Autobiography*, already mentioned (1922). He says:—

"The bargain with the 'Syndicate' was scarcely concluded when they showed their determination to carry the road still further south" (i.e., than Edmonton)²⁹

²⁴John Hawkes, *Saskatchewan and its People* (3 vols., Chicago, 1924), I, 44; cf. John Blue, *Alberta Past and Present* (3 vols., Chicago, 1924), I, 314.

²⁵H. A. Innis, *Hist. Can. Pac. Ry.*, 102-103; cf. 98, 105, 304. Western residents of the old days can appreciate the force of the second incentive.

²⁶E. Protheroe, *Railways of the World* (London, n.d.; c. 1910), 658.

²⁷F. A. Talbot, *Railway Conquest of the World* (London, 1911), 230.

²⁸MacInnes, *Shadow of the Rockies*, 194-185.

²⁹Macoun, *Autobiography*, 183.

He further tells us that he was summoned to meet the "syndicate" in St. Paul (Minnesota) in the spring of 1881; at which time he saw the redoubtable "Jim Hill", and others, including "two gentlemen from Montreal", members of it, who are considerably left anonymous. The route westward to Moose Jaw was practically settled upon before Macoun's arrival; and the discussion was whether to make for Battleford and thence to Edmonton, or to proceed directly westward *via* Calgary and the Bow River Pass, if that should prove practicable. As a result of Macoun's assurances, revelations, prophecies, enthusiasms, or what not, concerning the open plains and easy grades—we must suppose that soil was mentioned, but he makes no allusion to it—Jim Hill announced, with some banging of tables, that "they would go by the Bow Pass, if they could get that way".³⁰

Possibly fearing that he might be suspected of undue self-aggrandisement, Macoun adds:—

"Years after this, Mr. Fleming told me that for good or for evil, I had sent the road into the Bow River Pass . . ."³¹

The different reasons mentioned by the various historians noted above are much more suggestive of propaganda to hide the actual cause for the change than of any real explanation. Singly, any one of them might bear some appearance of plausibility—prior to critical investigation. Taken collectively, they are worthless; since they nullify one another.

Two of our witnesses ascribe the change to the desirability of a shorter route. Macoun, however, (whose testimony here is worth neither more nor less than its value anywhere else) shows that they were actually considering a much longer alternative route; crossing from Winnipeg to the Rockies on three long right angles resting on Moose Jaw and Battleford. Even without this inner revelation, this argument is damned by another well-known historical fact. Dr. W. L. Grant points out that the railhead "was not far from Calgary, with no pass in sight, when the route through the Selkirks was discovered".³² This being the case, it was obviously impossible for the promoters to know in 1881, when their survey extended no farther than Moose Jaw, whether the route they had yet to discover would be shorter or not. This plea may be dismissed without further ado.³³

The Government's displeasure seems to be much better authenticated than its instigation of the change; and in any case, *both* explanations cannot possibly be correct.

The argument concerning competition might furnish a plausible—or

³⁰*Ibid.*, 183-185; cf. Innis, *Hist. Can. Pac. Ry.*, 105.

³¹Macoun, *Autobiography*, 185. Their engineer did not seem very enthusiastic about the "treeless plains"—"Where could they get the ties?"—"I told him at once that was not my business, it was his": (*Ibid.*, 184).

³²*Ocean to Ocean*, Intr., XVII; so also, G. H. Armstrong, *The Origin and Meaning of Place-Names of Canada* (Toronto, 1930), 244: s.v. "Rogers" (Pass); and R. G. MacBeth, *Romance of the C.P.R.* (Toronto, 1924), 84. The last furnishes some interesting particulars concerning "the more roundabout way along the Columbia" which might have been followed had Rogers Pass not been discovered; on this curious route which was chosen because it was shorter!

³³MacBeth, *facile princeps* among the slushy type of chronicler, has the Kicking-Horse route "125 miles less" (actually about 75 or so) Winnipeg to Vancouver; and ascribes it to W. C. Van Horne, who did not join the C.P.R. until months after Macoun's date: MacBeth, *op. cit.*, 84-86, 156; cf. Innis, *op. cit.*, 105.

even a reasonably probable—explanation; but the close proximity of the Northern Pacific is not so apparent. In 1880, that system was no farther west than Bismarck, North Dakota; which is almost exactly south of Brandon, Manitoba, on the 100th meridian of west longitude. In 1882, it had only reached a point in central Montana, Sully Springs; apparently near Miles City, which latter place lies due south from Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan. Bismarck, (south of Brandon) is in lat. $46^{\circ} 46'$ N. Missoula, Montana, is in lat. 47° N. and almost precisely south of Calgary. Between the places mentioned, the northernmost point of the line is at Helena, lat. $46^{\circ} 40'$ No.; and along the great southern bend of the Yellowstone near Billings and Bozeman, (Montana), it lies for a considerable distance as low as lat. $45^{\circ} 30'$ N.; or nearly two hundred and fifty miles from the International Boundary. I have searched in vain for those frequent branches toward the Canadian border, which betokened its sinister intentions,³⁴ and its not very rapid progress westward would seem to indicate that it already had its hands full.³⁵ One is not surprised that popular gossip should dwell upon a great transcontinental system's perfectly natural dislike of competition; but in serious histories we are entitled to expect some evidence in support.

Even had the shorter distance been known beforehand, so that it even could constitute an actual reason for the change, the shortest distance is not necessarily the most economical in railway operation. The obscurity in which this phase of the problem is veiled—in common with most others—is but little enlightened by the authoritative historian of the undertaking. As an economic and statistical account, Professor H. A. Innis's *History of the Canadian Pacific Railway* (1923) is of unsurpassed value. Its almost entire lack of critical comment on the ostensible motives offered at the time for episodes and policies of the character now under consideration is disappointing, in a scholar possessing such an obvious mastery of the outer history of this great achievement. Innis writes as follows:—

"The early discovery of Moberly led to the successful location of a line with a maximum grade of 105.6 feet per mile [*i.e.*, '2% grade'] "concentrated within twenty miles on each side of the summit. . . . The highest points were the Rocky Mountain summit, 5,300 feet above sea-level, and the Selkirk summit, 4,316 feet. The maximum grade was 116 feet per mile descending west from the summit of the Rockies and for sixteen miles ascending the Selkirk summit and twenty miles descending the same summit . . . Contrasted with the location of the Government line located by Yellowhead Pass, including 140 miles with a grade of 52.8 feet per mile [*i.e.*, '1% grade'], "the company's line included sixty-three miles with two heavy grades of twenty miles each. The use of additional engines and wear of track were balanced against the additional operation of

³⁴Such branches are those of the Great Northern, not then amalgamated with the N.P. Ry., and later than the Canadian Pacific. The Great Northern was completed in 1893; for this, and competition with the C.P.R., see Agnes C. Laut, *The Romance of the Rails*, (2 vols., New York, 1929), II, 467; Innis, *op. cit.*, 189, 206.

³⁵For the "crash of 1873", see Butler, *Wild North Land*, App., 345, *seq.*; A. C. Laut, *op. cit.*, II, 435-457. The dates above are as given by J. M. Hannaford, traffic manager, N.P. Ry.; Letter to W. T. Hornaday, Sept. 3, 1887, *in re* buffalo traffic: Hornaday, "Extirmination of the American Bison", (*Smithsonian Reports*, 1887, part ii, p. 507). Completed Sept. 8, 1883: Laut, II, 457.

seventy-seven miles of line and an increase of two hours for passengers and four hours for freight. . . . The operation costs on concentrated maximum grades were less than on several light grades. . . ."³⁶

Concerning the supposedly "more economical operation", some facts and figures may be instructive. The Canadian Pacific summit level at Stephen is given in the company's own time-table (of March 1, 1931) as 5,332 feet. From there to Field, B.C., is also given as 13.8 miles. This of course includes spiral tunnels, adding practically their own length to the original mileage down the "Big Hill"; which in the earlier days before the tunnelling was always given (by the enginemen) as "eight miles". Field is 4,072 feet, giving a fall of 1,260 feet, a grade of about 1.73%. Continuing westward to Moberly, where the first indicated rise occurs, that point is 55.5 miles W. of Stephen summit; and its stated altitude is 2,553 feet. Thus in 55.5 miles the fall is 2,779 feet; or an average for the entire distance of practically 50 feet per mile; not quite one per cent—say $\frac{20}{21} = 0.95238\%$.

The Canadian National summit at Yellowhead is given in their time-table (January, 1931) as 3,717 feet.³⁷ At the nearest comparative point to the distances cited above, Grant Brook, 14.3 miles W. of Yellowhead, the stated altitude is 3,455 feet; a difference of 262 feet from Yellowhead. This constitutes an average fall of 18.3 feet per mile, just about 0.34% grade. Continuing westward for an approximately similar distance to that from Stephen to Moberly, the nearest station altitude shown is at Valemount, a distance of 57 miles from Yellowhead summit. There the altitude is given as 2,602 feet, a descent of 1,115 feet in 57 miles; equivalent to an average of 21.3 feet per mile, or 0.4% grade. Wherever the "140 miles at 52.8 feet per mile" (i.e., "1% grade") may have originated, a critical historian should have noted the present-day fact that the existing maximum is about 23 miles of 1% grade to the Yellowhead summit, eastbound. The "140 miles" would represent a vertical drop of 7,392 feet from a summit of 3,717 feet! Whereabouts in central British Columbia is this terrific chasm to be found? The Jordan Valley or the Great Rift in Equatorial Africa would be insignificant by comparison.

I should like to watch anyone trying to convince an audience of operating officials and mountain enginemen of the more economical operation on the "pusher grades" out of Field and through the Selkirks, as against the Yellowhead Pass route. In February, 1929, owing to the collapse of a bridge in the Selkirks, almost all the Canadian Pacific traffic westbound was handled over the Canadian National from Edmonton to Kamloops. I wish the learned historian could have witnessed the scornful amazement and contempt of veteran C.P.R. passenger conductors and operating officials—at first!—at the sight of the so-called "teapots" (5100 class of C.N.R. 38% "Pacific type" passenger engines) which took hold of their trains at Edmonton, and their predictions of ignominious failure

³⁶Innis, *Hist. Can. Pac. Railway*, 110-111.

³⁷3,700 by Grant, 1872: *Ocean to Ocean*, 278; 3,400 by W. F. Butler, 1873: *Wild North Land*, App., 348; 3,712 by Protheroe, c. 1910: *Railways of the World*, 672. I believe Protheroe's is the abandoned Grand Trunk Pacific datum; and the 3,717 the Canadian Northern grade-level, now in use at that point.

on learning that similar engines would make the time over the Rocky Mountain summit; followed by their utter confusion when this was done easily, and time picked up on the trip if necessary. The arguments cited by Professor Innis were evidently plausible enough for popular (or parliamentary) consumption in 1881; but that a modern economist could endorse such stuff forty years afterward by printing it without a word of critical comment, passes comprehension.

Although C. 1881 fell within the very period in railway engineering when the low grade was not the supreme consideration it was with the weak locomotive power of George Stephenson's day—who refused to lay out heavy freight lines steeper than one in 330 = 16 feet per mile³⁸—or in that of Charles M. Hays, when the "Big Hill" grades would have been dismissed as prohibitive; yet Sir Edward Watkin, of the Grand Trunk, had no illusions about "more economical operation". He was then chairman of the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire, later Great Central, and now the London and North Eastern main line between Manchester and London; with its "gable" between Sheffield and Manchester, including one in 97 near Guide Bridge.³⁹ He was also well acquainted with British main-line gradients in general, which are frequently severe;⁴⁰ and his comments on the Canadian Pacific change of route are highly instructive.⁴¹

We are further mystified by the really extraordinary circumstance that having found this wonderful maximum grade of two per cent., it was not utilized; and here is where the famous "Big Hill" itself first makes its appearance.

Professor Innis gives as the reason (1884):—

"On the Rocky Mountain section the company was obliged to apply for authority to construct a temporary line for about thirteen

³⁸F. S. Williams, *Hist. of the Midland Railway, Its Rise and Progress*: (London, n.d.; c. 1882), 41. For this reason, Sheffield, the fifth city in England, was not placed on the Midland main line until 1870.

³⁹See the *Railway Magazine* (London, 1897 *et seq.*), XI, 97-109; XIII, 148, 189.

⁴⁰For example, the West Coast Route (L.M.S.) to Carlisle and Glasgow, including four miles at 1 in 75 "over Shap"; and six at 1 in 75 up "Beattock bank": (*Railway Magazine*, XIII, 128-131, 466-471; XIV, 248, 339, 418; XV, 33-35).

The Midland, with its Sharnbrook and Desborough "banks" between Bedford and Leicester; 1 in 90 south of Sheffield, and up to Peak Forest summit, and steeper on the northern side of the same, near Chinley: its fifteen-mile stretches of 1 in 100 over Ais Gill summit on the road to Carlisle; and its two-and-one-eighth of a mile at 1 in 37 down Bromsgrove Lickey between Birmingham and Worcester, which handles the Bristol, Southampton, W. of England, and South Wales traffic over the L.M.S. (See on these, F. S. Williams, *Our Iron Roads* (Nottingham, 8th ed. n.d.; c. 1886), 98-101; his *Midland Railway*, pp. 146-150, 376, 415, 442, 478-543, 551-554; *Railway Magazine*, XIV, 145, 221; XV, 318-324; LXV, 203-211; &c.

Compare further the terrific grades in Devon and Cornwall: (*Railway Magazine*, XI, 441, 536; XIII, 31-36, 139-147; XV, 35, 167, 196-200), &c, &c; and the worst of them, Bromsgrove Lickey (*Ibid.*, XV, 318-324), only 66% as steep as the "Big Hill".

⁴¹See Watkin's remarks on the change: *Canada and the States, 1851-1886*, 63-66, 130-131, 451-452; cf. also F. A. Talbot, *Railway Conquest of the World*, 224-239; his *Railway Wonders of the World* (London, 2 vols., 1912), I, 4-6, 88-94, 193-202; and on Grand Trunk Pacific grades, *Ibid.*, II, 744-752; and his *Making of a Great Canadian Railway* (London, 1912). See further, E. Hungerford, *The Modern Railroad* (New York, 1911), 141-142; Cecil J. Allen (editor, *Railway Magazine: the ultimate authority for practically every authenticated railway run in the world*), *Railways of To-Day*, (London, 1929), 34-37.

miles, dropping into the Kicking Horse Valley with a grade of about 232 feet per mile for four miles, and joining the original line at a point west of the most troublesome portion, it was estimated that the rapid construction of the permanent line to complete it in the time required by the contract would increase the cost of construction to an extent sufficient to build a temporary line. To this the Government agreed on May 30 . . . [1884]."⁴²

The historical *fact* of this application is proved unimpeachably by Professor Innis's citation of the *Sessional Papers* of parliament; but that brings us no nearer to a satisfactory solution. It seems nothing less than astounding that while the "popular" history of the Kicking-Horse route is so well known, I have never yet found any shred of allusion in any source of information available to me, to the renowned "Big Hill" being only a temporary divergence from an easier grade already located.

My category includes published works, both critical and of the aforementioned "slushy" character; former associates who were engaged on the mountain construction; and old railroaders with whom I have worked, some of them handling trains on the Big Hill for years.

The time-argument, as put forth in 1884, is in my view utterly preposterous. I have pointed out that the *original* mileage down the Big Hill, with which we have to do, was not thirteen, but (approximately) eight miles. But conceding the thirteen, for the sake of the argument, how long was this difficult section of the "permanent" survey, whose temporary elimination could justify such a terrific alternative as four miles at 232 feet per mile, or about one in 23, equal to a fraction less than a grade of 4.5%;⁴³ and to effect which only thirteen miles were necessary? It must apparently have been so long, that it could not have been completed within the time-limit imposed by the contract, May 1, 1891.⁴⁴ Such a ratio suggests the Isthmus of Suez or of Panama; and no other place in the world known to me.

And having located a 2% grade, which for some reason not divulged had to be temporarily laid aside, why was it not utilized when the time for re-alignment of the route came in due season? I am informed that the new maximum grade is 2.1%, or 110.88 feet per mile, after the colossal expenditure on the Cathedral tunnels.

I suspect that when the Bow River Pass, to which they had irrevocably committed themselves, was found to lead to the appalling grades of the Kicking-Horse as the only way out, the energetic and masterful field-commander was not very long at a loss. His admirers tell us that "*fail* was not in his dictionary".⁴⁵ As prize-day rhetoric for the inspiration of ambitious schoolboys, such phraseology may pass; transferred to the Court of Logic, it inescapably involves a determination to win by any possible means that may offer, fair or foul. He was far too astute and shrewd a man to go either to parliament or the people, and confess that it was for a

⁴²Innis, *Hist. Can. Pac. Railway*, 121.

⁴³See authorities cited, above in Note 41. Some say "1 in 23"; some "232 feet per mile". One mile = 5,280 feet. One in 23 is practically 229.5 feet per mile = $23 \times 229.5 = 5,278.5$ feet; 4.5% = 232.3 feet per mile.

⁴⁴Innis, *op. cit.*, 99. Everybody knows they finished 5½ years ahead.

⁴⁵See Walter Vaughan, *Life of W. C. Van Horne*, (New York, 1920); R. G. MacBeth, *Romance of the C.P.R.* (Toronto, 1924); J. H. E. Secretan, *Canada's Great Highway* (London, 1924); &c. &c.

4.5% grade that the easy route through the Yellowhead Pass had been abandoned; or to be very long in finding a way of avoiding such a discreditable humiliation. The "approval of parliament", while constitutionally indispensable, is often—as in this case—logically, morally, economically, and scientifically worthless. The golden catchwords, "time", and "economy", would justify anything to the harassed politicians and financiers at Ottawa; faced with an impatient British Columbia on the one hand and the money market on the other. Party discipline could take care of the government supporters; and in any case, nobody knew enough about the region to ask any inconvenient questions. Considerations of the foregoing character render impossible any critical acceptance of the ostensible reasons offered—either for changes of detail such as the Big Hill; or for the fundamental change to the southern route as a whole.

Nor do I believe the solution lies in any question of the respective fertility and physical attractiveness of the rival routes. Although Professor John Macoun undoubtedly threw himself into the work of "demonstrating" the agricultural superiority of the southern territory more contiguous to the international boundary, with an ardour which led—as he querulously complained⁴⁶—to the charge that his change of front was influenced by unworthy motives, yet other factors must not be forgotten. At the time he met the "syndicate" in St. Paul in the spring of 1881, he was himself the foremost and unrestrained champion of the vastly greater agricultural potentialities of the two northern routes; yet according to all indications he found a change of route already in the air when he reached St. Paul. So that all that Macoun really appears to have done was to furnish the agricultural argument for a region already selected for other reasons; which is a quite sufficient responsibility for one man to bear.

I believe the true explanation of the change lies in something which has been a quite characteristic feature of railway construction in the western plains territories at large. A vast amount of fine writing has been expended on the "energy" and "resourcefulness" of the "indomitable pioneers" who moved their embryo towns one, two, three miles, over to the tracks which had not quite followed the route that was expected of them by the "hardy fore-runners" of the steel. But few—and in relation to Canada, literally none, that I have found—have stopped to ask why such a step should have been necessary; in regions where the scribe surpassed himself in describing prairies "as flat as billiard tables", where the surveyor might go where he would. This has been another of those pleasant dreams, like the hatred of the Indian, or the presence of bad men, cyclones, rattlesnakes, or "the Great American Desert", which were quite fittingly true of the United States; but could not possibly have been the case in Canada!

The plain truth is that railways west of the Mississippi, whether in the United States or in Canada, have never been very favourable toward the idea of increasing the value of other folks' townsite properties. They have much preferred to own and develop their own. Two American authors, whose subject—no less a person than "Buffalo Bill" (W. F.

⁴⁶Macoun, *Manitoba*, 473, 609. "Macoun. . . . enjoys the distinction of being the first 'booster' of the farm lands of Southern Alberta. . . ." C. M. MacInnes, *Shadow of the Rockies*, 253. The "political" history of the fertile belt needs (at least) a paper to itself.

Cody) was temporarily despoiled by the process—describe the thing with a candour and openness sometimes lacking in more purely railway historians, on the Kansas Pacific Railway in Kansas, 1867.⁴⁷ The settlers, facing the alternatives of settling on the company's townsite or having their own (earlier) town left without railway facilities, chose the former; and hauled their settlement bodily across the intervening mile or so. The two great eras of transcontinental railway construction in Canada furnished several examples of similar policies.

The original survey of the Canadian Pacific ran through Selkirk (where it was intended to cross the Red River) instead of Winnipeg; which latter place was to be served by a short branch or "spur". The announcement caused a *furor*, as well it might; and after a bitter struggle, the company was forced to make the change, bringing the main line into the city.⁴⁸ The original alignment, heading westward direct for Selkirk, with its sudden right angled turn in the Gonor-Bird's Hill district southward into Winnipeg, still (I believe) exists; a silent testimony, in that level region, to the transparent falsity of those "engineering reasons" which were the alleged explanation of the first choice, made at the time.⁴⁹ The old two-stall roundhouse of c. 1880 was still standing as late as 1924, an object of contemptuous local merriment.⁵⁰ The engineering reasons which precluded direct entrance into Winnipeg from the east in the beginning, did not prevent the later construction of a "cut-off" which eliminated the afore-mentioned right-angle; but everybody knows that engineering science has made wonderful strides in the last fifty years.

Even at the time when the railway survey "through Edmonton" still held the field, a route was favoured along the line of the old telegraph line by Hay Lake, westward thence by (the later) Leduc, some twenty miles south of Edmonton, and thence onward toward the Yellowhead Pass;⁵¹ the present capital of Alberta also to be served by a short branch. Before leaving this district, we may note (following upon the completion of the Calgary and Edmonton Railway) the persistent efforts to "move" Edmonton across the Saskatchewan River, to the company's town-site of "south Edmonton". The transfer of the land office (by order from Ottawa) was successfully resisted by a "Vigilance Committee", in defiance of the law.⁵²

I have never read any "official" account of the change of the divisional point from Port Arthur to Fort William; but the local version at the former place is of a railway magnate's declaration—following upon a disagreement *re* taxation—that he "would make the grass grow in your streets".⁵³

When at last Battleford got its railway, some twenty years over-due, it was another of those short branches; the main line running through "North Battleford", some few miles away. At Wainwright, "engineering

⁴⁷Walsh and Salsbury, *The Making of Buffalo Bill*, (Indianapolis, 1928), 103-104.

⁴⁸Innis, *Hist. Can. Pac. Railway*, 92.

⁴⁹Read Innis's entire chapter (*op. cit.*, 75-96, and notes); and observe the consequences to Sandford Fleming.

⁵⁰Described to me by a former resident, ignorant of its actual history. R. G. MacBeth also pokes fun at the thing—characteristically, without in the least discerning its significance—in his (appropriately named) *Romance of the C.P.R.*, 41, 84.

⁵¹See Rev. W. Everard Edmonds, *Edmonton Journal*, Aug. 30, 1930.

⁵²See the early files of the *Edmonton Bulletin* on this.

⁵³*Ex. inf.* natives and old residents of long standing.

reasons" again prevented the adoption of the (previously-established) town of "Denwood", some three miles east;⁵⁴ and *at the top of the hill* at the bottom of which is Wainwright. Here also the local version differs materially.⁵⁵ On the shore of Buffalo Lake, Central Alberta, the old settlement at Lamertom (c. 1888) and the later divisional point at Mirror (1910) are another case in point; the supposed engineering reasons here being equally problematical. Here the town refused to move the two miles; and has gradually sunk into decay where it stood.

It must be recognized that either at the time by resentful residents of the ill-treated place; or later by critical students (unless, in the latter case, later engineering works in the "impossible" region assist to establish his contention), it is extremely difficult to prove, however strongly one may suspect, the fallacy of the orthodox plea to which I have several times referred. Criticism on the spot is often poisoned at the source by the palpable fact that it emanates from real-estate promoters in the beginning; who are equally as anxious to force the railway through their townsite holdings and nowhere else, as the railway company are to keep out. I have no doubt whatever that the failure of the Selkirk scheme warned the promoters of the riskiness of going too near to any town they wished to avoid entering directly. Edmonton and Battleford were places of (relatively) long standing, where land would have to be bought; hence the drastic change of route. I believe this solution fits the facts as no other does.

Even so, this is not necessarily to say that these men were sinners above all the Galileans. They only followed the methods common to railway-builders on this continent. One firm conclusion emerges, however. It is high time that the history of Western Canada was written in the same critical manner as that of, say, ancient Rome or mediaeval England; and no longer left to purblind rhapsodists of the school of "Romance" and "Remarkable History".

⁵⁴F. A. Talbot, *Making of a Great Canadian Railway*, 151-152; *Place-Names of Alberta* (Nat. Geog. Board, Ottawa, 1928), 130.

⁵⁵*Ex. inf.* local residents, well-known to me. Every freight had to be "pushed out" of Wainwright east for years; at vast expense.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL APPROACH TO EUROPEAN HISTORY

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The environmental factor in history has not perhaps been stressed as much as it deserves by past and present historians. Yet it has not been wholly neglected. The late Marion Newbigin, the Scottish geographer, has led the way with her modern studies of southern Europe (*Mediterranean Lands*, London, 1924). The present writer for the past eight years has been lecturing on the liaisons between geography and history, and is of the opinion that it is a field worthy of greater exploitation. It is a commonplace that while men like Charlemagne or Napoleon have altered the map of Europe most drastically, some factor seems to wipe out most of their regional alterations within a few decades of their deaths. In general the national areas revert to something of their condition before the great conqueror took charge. The main reason for this reversion seems to be that there is a large number of environmental and cultural factors which only act very slowly on national development, but in the long run seem to the writer to outweigh the control exercised by personality, however vigorous it may seem to be for a time.

Few students seem to have made use of graphical methods in investigating their historical problems. These are of course the chief characteristic of geographical research. Especially is this true in regard to the use of isopleths (lines of equal abundance), which can be applied to cultural facts almost as readily as to such features as temperature or elevation. The present writer in his paper on "Environment and Nation" (1934)¹ has linked historical isopleths with those expressing race, climate, topography, language, health, etc. In the present paper he gives seven diagrams in which he correlates graphically the history of Europe with build, corridors, race, language, etc., and illustrates the use of isopleths in studying the spread of various culture complexes through Europe.

The most constant factor in European history is of course the build of the continent. Europe is readily divided into three east-west belts. In the north is the very stable area extending from Ireland to the Urals, which consists either of very shallow seas (like the North, Baltic and White Seas), or of vast plains like those of Germany, Poland or Russia. This is mainly due to the presence of the dominant "Russian Shield" which underlies much of this level region and has resisted earth-folding for millions of years. The effect of these unbroken plains on the development of the nations concerned has often been described and will not here be elaborated.

Across the centre of Europe, extending from Brittany and Portugal to the Black Sea, is a series of somewhat isolated blocks, which represent the *relics* of ancient mountain-arcs which were buckled up about 150 million years ago. (They are shown as black patches in Fig. I at A). Lastly there is the almost complete rampart of *young mountains* extending from Gibraltar to the Caucasus; which mainly developed about 10 million

¹*American Journal of Sociology* (July, 1934), 21-33.

years ago (in late Tertiary times) during that phase of crustal folding which is known as the "Alpine Storm". They arose where formerly had been the "Tethys Sea" (Fig. 7, inset C). Its weak sediments yielded in the Alpine Storm, and became two sets of more or less parallel folds which are shown as heavy lines in Fig. 1, inset A. These folds are known as the Alpides and the Dinarides. Thus the major elevations of southern and central Europe are of two quite different types, the ancient relic-blocks and the young fold-mountains. These, as we shall see, have had somewhat different effects on human affairs. During the Alpine Storm while certain parts of the crust were sharply buckled upward, others were depressed to form earth-hollows. The latter are called *downfolds*. They necessarily became filled either with water or with river-silts. These three types are distinguished in the block-diagram constituting Fig. 1. If these types are tabulated we may be able to make some useful generalizations.



Fig. 1.—Block diagram of the Topographic Units in Southern Europe.

Inset A, the Folds of the Young Mountains.

Inset B, Culture Foci along some of the Main Corridors. (Young Folds are black.)

A. RELIC-BLOCKS

Region	Elevation	Some Historical aspects
Spanish Meseta	2,000 feet	Unusually dry. Splits the national stocks.
Brittany	500	Helped to maintain Breton culture of Alpine race.
Cevennes	3,000	Tip of Alpine Wedge. Focus of revolt, (Albi, etc.)
Ardennes	1,000	Deflects trade and war into Brabant Corridor.
Bohemia	2,000	Main factor in maintaining Czech culture.
South Carpathians	7,000	See later.

B. YOUNG FOLD-MOUNTAINS

<i>Region</i>	<i>Elevation</i>	<i>Some Historical aspects</i>
Sierra Nevada	11,000 feet	Marginal, not significant.
Pyrenees	11,000	Separate the French and Spanish cultures.
Western Alps	15,000	Separate French and German from Italian cultures.
Eastern Alps	13,000	Bound Italian culture. German in broad valleys.
Apennines	9,000	Helped to delay Italian unity.
Dinarics	8,000	Conserved Montenegrin and Albanian cultures.
North Carpathians	8,000	Conserve Slovak and Ruthenian cultures.

The resistant relic-blocks were mostly somewhat re-elevated during the Alpine Storm, and to-day they appear as rather rugged plateaux with their edges eroded by numerous rivers. On the whole their effect has been to preserve culture-groups of some importance, which however are not so isolated that they do not benefit from intercourse with other cultures. Their rich minerals (common in ancient rocks) have often led to important industrial communities.

The second group, the young mountains, are quite different in structure. They consist of steeply folded ridges, whose summits have been removed by erosion. Since they represent the sediments of the Tethys Sea of fairly late geological age they do not contain ores to the same extent as do the ancient rocks (e.g., Harz, Erz Gebirge, etc.) of the relic-blocks. They are far higher and more rugged than the relic-blocks, and usually act as barriers between culture groups to a much greater extent. Where they serve as refuges their sterile character usually forbids the development of any noteworthy population, and their peoples are usually much more primitive than those found on the relic-blocks.

The role of the Southern Carpathians seems to be somewhat of an exception at first glance. It clearly forms part of the arc of Alpides, and yet it has been the prime factor in the preservation of the remarkable Rumanian culture in the face of almost continuous barbarian invasions (from 5th to 12th century) from Asia. Indeed I have been accustomed to refer to these as "Eight invasions in eight centuries". The explanation is that the southern Carpathians (between the Danube and the Oitoz Pass) are not true young-mountains, but represent former relic-blocks "caught up" in the Alpine Storm, but still preserving their plateau character (see Fig. 1.). In these upland pastures the Rumanian culture was preserved.

The downfolds are of course the complements of the upward crustal buckles, but they comprise some of the most attractive regions of Europe. For instance the whole development of the Magyar people since A.D. 895 (when they crossed the Carpathians) is based on the flat silted plain of the Alföld, a typical downfold. So also the only large fertile area in Italy, and the leading region throughout her struggle for liberty, is the Po Basin. This is another downfold filled with debris torn from the Alps and the Apennines. An analogous area is the Wallachian Plain, which is however so open on the east that it has acted primarily as a corridor of invasion from the Asiatic Steppes. To-day it constitutes the richest area of Rumania and controls the rest of the country. A smaller elongated area of similar origin extends from Geneva to Vienna. It is marked by numerous

lakes, which indicate that the silts have not yet filled up the downfold. Its presence has decided that the dominant culture-group in Switzerland shall be the German cantons, which are only separated by the Rhine from the similar downfold in Bavaria. The importance of the Vienna gate linking the Bavarian downfold to the Hungarian downfold is obvious.

A survey of the great European barrier thrown up some ten million years ago in the Alpine storm, shows that there are seven noteworthy gaps linking the cool wet forested northern environments with the hot dry-summer regions of the Mediterranean.² There is of course a geological reason for each of these depressions, which is worthy of mention. One of these gaps, the Dardanelles, is below sea-level, and hence throughout early European history it was by far the most important corridor of commerce. It is due to the faulting of the crust during the Alpine Storm. It led to the growth of Troy at one end, and to Byzantium at the other end. To Europe as a whole Constantinople was probably a more vital centre of culture than Rome, which sank into relative obscurity after the fifth century. Rome's importance was largely man-made, for it has no great natural advantages justifying it as an imperial centre.

The second corridor is that up the Vardar valley and down the Morava (Fig. 1). It lies between the Alpides and the Dinarides folds (Inset A), but is somewhat rugged and flanked by young mountains for long distances. Still the Plain of Kossovo on this route has seen many critical incidents in European history. A branch to the east (*via* Nish and Sophia) to Constantinople has somewhat rivalled it in importance. The third corridor is the Pear-Tree Pass, a low gap in the Dinarides, linking the Adriatic to the Danube basin. It has been used from the legendary time of the Argonauts by barbarians attacking Italy. The fourth is the Brenner Pass, which was the main pass linking Germany to Italy. It is only 4,400 feet high, whereas most of the other passes in the Alps are about 7,000 feet above the sea. It occurs where the core of hard *Crystalline* rocks is only 7 miles wide, in place of the usual 30 miles. Its command materially contributed to the rise of the Hapsburg dynasty, and it is the basis of the Trentino Irredenta of to-day.

The fifth corridor rivals in interest that of the Dardanelles. It is a somewhat similar sunken part of the crust, which is called the "Rhône Graben" by the geologist and the "Way of Light" by the cultural geographer. The *Pax Romana*, the Christian religion and many a later culture complex reached the northwest of Europe by this corridor. The sixth corridor, that of Narbonne, is of less significance; and the seventh at Gibraltar, while it breaches the young mountains, leads to America rather than to northern Europe.

During the palmy days of the Roman Empire the great land-route from west to east was that used and described by the Bordeaux Pilgrim in A.D. 333. He travelled to Palestine by way of the Narbonne Gate, the Geneva Pass over the Alps (Fig. 1), the Pear Tree Pass, the Nish and Maritza route to Constantinople, and thence to Palestine. This is the line joining "5" to "1" in the Inset in Fig. 1 at B. The same corridor has determined the migration of cultural concepts, as is well illustrated in studying the revolts against orthodox religion. Ever since the days of the early Church there have been small groups of recalcitrants; and if the

²See E. Semple, *Geography of the Mediterranean region* (1931).

foci of the chief of such revolts be charted we find that they lie along the same historic corridor. Though not always related, these foci gradually move to the west along the track indicated. Thus the Paulicians, a sect who rejected the orders of the church, spread through Anatolia (1 in Fig. 1, Inset B), and many migrated to Thrace in 752 (2 in Fig. 1B). One hundred thousand are said to have been massacred here in 850. A century later Bogumil led a revolting group in the Balkans (3 in Fig. 1B). In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the Cathars and Patarenes opposed the orthodox religion in the northern parts of Italy (4), while the Waldenses became prominent in the Savoy after 1170. In the next half century the south of France was the scene of fierce crusades against the heterodox Albigenses.

It was in the 14th century that the chief focus of dissent shifted north to Wyclif in England (7). Thereafter it passes to the centre of Europe, and John Hus of Bohemia was the chief opponent of orthodox Catholicism in the 15th century. The student of cultural geography can use other features besides religion to show the gradual shift of foci from the east to the west, then to the north and then to the centre. We shall see something more of this "Migration of foci" in charting the development of the Renaissance.

The cartographic approach is very helpful in making a quantitative summary of the facts of history. The plan of using the vertical ordinate of a graph for the time-factor, and the horizontal ordinate for the area-factor (of various nations) gives a time-space diagram, which has been illustrated and described in the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* (November, 1935, page 548). In Fig. 2 herewith is shown a technique analogous to that used in the study of the build of a country. Here a series of vertical columns give the historical strata for each nation (which is named at the side). Necessarily the strata are rather generalized. The vertical scale gives the time interval, and the classes of government are shown in the legend. Taking Spain as an example, we see that Rome was in control from A.D. 0 to 400. Then the Goths ruled till 700, and the Moors until 1500. Self-government (i.e., rule by a leader of similar nationality) has been in vogue since that date. I know no better method for charting some of the main facts for every nation throughout nineteen centuries upon one diagram.

It is easy to draw up the two inset maps, which are of a more usual pattern. In Inset A in Fig. 2, we see the three zones where Roman culture was dominant for "over five", "four", and "one to three" centuries respectively. In Inset B is a less familiar chart in which the favourable situation of the Nordic nations is emphasized. It is readily deduced from the historic strata in the main map. Here again Europe is divided into three zones, but now running from southwest to northeast. In the southeast are the regions long subjected to Asiatic invasions, whether Early Siberian (5th century to 12th century), Mongol (1200 to 1400), Turkish (1550 to 1650) or Moorish (8th century to 15th century). The last mentioned was essentially an invasion by peoples of Arab culture, and therefore also of Asiatic type.

The second zone (shown by the dots in Inset B) is the protector zone. Here aided by the environment of forest, bogs and young mountains, the nations indicated (such as the North Russians, Poles, Austrians, North

Spanish, etc.) devoted a large part of their energies to holding back the Asiatic invaders. The third zone consisted of the protected nations, who almost exactly agree with those of Nordic race. This relative relief from warfare is a factor which is often ignored by those who advocate the superiority of the Nordic peoples of Europe. An allied method of illustrating the effect of three variables (such as race, religion and language) upon the European nations has been published in the *American Journal of Sociology*, July 1934, page 33.

A third method of approaching history is given in Fig. 3. Here in the




Fig. 2.—A Time-Space Chart showing Historical Strata for the major nations of Europe. Also the spread of Roman culture (Inset A); and the Protector and Protected States (Inset B). (N.B.—Self Government means that the ruler was of similar nationality.)

central map is shown the build of England and Wales, represented in a somewhat novel fashion which I have named a "mantle-map". To the layman the ordinary geological map presents so complicated a picture that it is of very little use to him. But in the mantle-map the geological formations are somewhat simplified, and the younger formations are shown as "mantles" flung over the older formations. In England, for instance, the older *basal* strata are in the west. The formations numbered 1 to 5 belong to the Paleozoic rocks, and are grouped by geographers as the "older-mass". The later formations or "mantles" (numbered 6 to 10) clearly lie regularly one over the other, and are known as the "younger-mass". In general the second group consists of much softer rocks than those of the older-mass. But even in the younger-mass two "mantles" (7 and 9) are considerably harder and stand out as long ridges of limestone or chalk.

These ridges are known as Cuestas and they alternate with low flat Vales. It is my present purpose to show how this arrangement of older-mass, younger-mass, Cuesta and Vale has dominated English history to a degree not always appreciated by students.

Surrounding the main map are six smaller maps each representing culture-groups at various periods in England's development. Fleure and others have shown that in Neolithic times the primitive population was distributed as in the top-left map.³ Clearly it is controlled by the older-mass and the two Cuestas. They represent the more open uplands of Britain, for Neolithic man could cope neither with the forests nor with the wild beasts of the Vales. In the second map the distribution is quite different. The Romans controlled the softer weaker rocks of the younger-mass, where agriculture was possible, but left the older-mass to the less




Fig. 3.—A Mantle-Map of England and Wales. The effect of the Build on the population at six stages of English history is shown in the six inset maps.

cultured British tribes. They only maintained scattered garrisons in the rugged older-mass. In the third map the racial strains of to-day are charted. Before 450 A.D. the people of England were mainly of the brunette Mediterranean race. The composition of the people was radically altered with the coming of the blonde Nordics, known as the Anglo-Saxons, chiefly during the fifth and sixth centuries. The two Danish invasions of the 9th and 11th centuries also added many allied blonde stocks to the nation. The race map shows the division of England and Wales into a west portion consisting of the rugged older-mass, which is essentially Mediterranean (brunette) in race, while the eastern younger-mass is essentially Nordic. However, the Pennine area, although a part of the older-mass, was not rugged enough to serve as a refuge for the Mediter-

³This relation is discussed more fully in the writer's book, *Environment and Race* (Oxford, 1927), 128.

raean peoples, though they seem still to dominate in the Chiltern Cuesta and the swampy areas north of London.

In Stuart times (1643) the cleavage between royalist and parliamentarians was in part based indirectly on the build. Thus the older-mass was wholly royalist while the younger-mass was wholly for the parliament, except for the region around Oxford. Here again the marginal rugged country seems to have been a stronghold of conservative ideas, while London and the more progressive southeast supported the Puritan party. The distribution shown for 1701 (based on Muir)⁴ shows the control of the dense populations by the farm-lands of the Vales (e.g., 6, 8 and 10 in Fig. 3). Here also the charcoal produced in the forests in the same areas was the basis of many of the industries of that date. In 1900, however, the Industrial Revolution had taken place, with the result that the coal supply (5 in Fig. 2) was the chief factor in determining the dense populations, except as regard London. It seems likely that similar correlations could be demonstrated for any other area of somewhat complex build and culture. It is therefore surely impossible to deny the importance of studying the environmental factors in all detailed historical research.

Some authorities have adopted as the briefest of all the definitions of geography the phrase "the science of isopleths". This term is somewhat new in science, being first used about 1909. It is a general term for all such lines as isotherms, isobars, contours, etc. Since the most important function of geography is to explain the causes of various distributions, these isopleths are important tools in modern geographical technique. Obviously many cultural distributions are of great importance in historical research, though isopleths are not in general use therein. I have chosen two subjects, the evolution of architecture and the spread of the Renaissance to illustrate the use of isopleths in history.

In Fig. 4 the main features of the spread of the chief types of medieval architecture are charted. The diagrams are self-explanatory. The generalized isopleths in Fig. 4 represent the outer fringe of the various types at the dates specified. The data are generally taken from the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, and do not pretend to be exhaustive. The Romanesque style (akin to Lombard in Italy and to Early Norman in England) seems to have migrated about 800 A.D. up the Brenner Gate into South Germany at a very early stage in its development. The eleventh century saw an imposing number of Romanesque cathedrals built in England, France and northern Spain. The cold cloudy environment of northern Europe led to the development about 1100 of better-lighted buildings than the Romanesque, and this in part accounts for the rise of Gothic. By 1200 such churches were fairly numerous near Paris, while a few had been built in northern Spain. The spread into England and into western Germany occurred mainly in the 13th century as the second map in Fig. 4 demonstrates. By 1400 the Italians were experimenting with a return to classical architecture, and during the 15th century many Renaissance buildings were erected in north Italy and northern Spain. In the 16th century this style of architecture spread through southern Spain and France, and reached England about 1620. The writer submits that these three maps with their characteristic isopleths epitomise the whole subject and lead one to profitable lines of enquiry far better than

⁴Muir, Philip and McElroy, *Philip's Historical Atlas* (London, 1927), 74.

do several pages of text. (Indeed the two concepts in the previous sentence rather clearly indicate the value of the isopleth technique).

In Fig. 5 a number of isopleths illustrating the spread of the Renaissance are charted. In "I" some of the chief teachers of Renaissance ideas about 1350, such as Petrarch and Boccaccio, are localized. Later writers dealing with the "life of the times in living languages" (a phrase which in part describes the Renaissance) were Wyclif, Froissart and Chaucer. Hence toward the end of the 14th century we see the new ideas moving north up the "Way of Light". In diagram II (Fig. 5) I have stressed the spread of printing as perhaps the most characteristic feature of the second period of the Renaissance (1450 to 1550). Modern research (by J. H. Hessels and others) seems to refer the invention of movable type to




Fig. 4.—Isopleth maps illustrating the spread of three types of Architecture in Western Europe.

Costar of Haarlem about 1446. It had spread to Mainz and the vicinity by 1460, moving along the "Rhine-Way", and reached Rome by 1465 and Paris by 1470. We have here an interesting example of a culture spreading along a new route, far removed from the familiar "Way of Light". Other isopleths showing the rapid spread of printing throughout western Europe by 1480 are also charted.

In the third diagram of Fig. 5, I have plotted the "schools" of the famous teachers in the third period of the Renaissance (1550 to 1650). Here I have not attempted to draw isopleths. But when I labelled each teacher as concerned either with science or letters, it was surprising to find that practically all the former were to be found in the eastern portion of the map, and all the latter in the western part. This is an interesting distribution which is in part no doubt associated with the leading religions



Fig. 5.—Isopleth maps illustrating the spread of the Renaissance in the three periods 1350-1450, 1450-1550, and 1550-1650.

of the two areas. The conservative west held by the old Catholic faith for the most part, while the eastern region was that where the reformed religion had the chief control. This distinction in turn is of course bound up with the deep-seated inheritance of Roman culture in France and Italy which was wanting east of the Rhine (see Fig. 2 inset A). The votaries of medieval science were not encouraged by the orthodox Roman Catholic Church, so that naturally they were not numerous in the western part of diagram III.

In Fig. 6. I illustrate certain relations between nation, topography, race and language which are perhaps not sufficiently stressed in most discussions of central Europe. The three races of Europe are shown in Fig. 7A. The "pioneer fringe" of civilization in the later Roman Empire was not far from the line of the Danube in the region shown in Fig. 6 at B. To the north of this lay a zone of grasslands, crossed by the young mountains at Vienna and Orsova-Belgrade. To the north again of the




Fig. 6.—At A, Races and Languages of Europe. At B, Migrations of Culture-Groups in Central Europe.

grasslands was the zone of dense forests. After the fall of Rome central and southeast Europe (from the 5th to the 8th centuries) was subject to immigration from two environments, the folk of the forest on the north and the folk of the steppes on the east. As is well-known the Bohmer-Wald and the Alps formed the early bulwark against the eastern barbarians. Then the Vienna Gate became of greater significance in the struggles between the Teutons and heathen Magyars, just as still later the Carpathians aided the civilized Magyars to withstand the invading Turks.

In the 5th century the cradle of the Slavs in the Vistula Basin poured Czechs into Bohemia, and in the sixth century thousands of Slavs migrated into the southern Balkans. In the seventh century the Chrobats and Sorabs of the Vistula region gave rise to the Croats and Serbs of the northern Balkans. These great Slav movements did not alter the racial composition materially, since they were all members of the "Alpine wedge", which is illustrated in Fig. 6, at A. It was merely a transfer of folk of Alpine race from the north to a region already occupied in part by that race in the south. So also the migration of the Vlachs from the Dinarics into modern Rumania brought a Romance culture into the latter country, but did not

alter the races involved for the same reasons. Nor did the influx of thousands of Magyars into the Alfold (around 900) change the race, although their language was non-Aryan and akin to Finnish and Turk. On the other hand it seems likely from present-day surveys that the Bulgars from the Volga, who reached the Danube in the 7th century, were Finns of the Nordic race. Hence we find along the Black Sea to-day a region of rather narrow-headed people (shown black in Fig. 6A) not unlike the Ests and Western Finns of the Baltic. The main bulk of the Bulgars migrated from the Vistula and were governed by the Volga overlords. But the Slav culture and language of the peasant became dominant, just as the Saxon culture ultimately dominated the Norman in England.

We can now examine briefly the composition of the Austrian Empire as it was prior to 1918. Its area is roughly indicated by the circle in Fig. 6A, around Buda-Pest. To the west are German Austrians, Catholic Slavs are found in Bohemia and Poland, non-Aryan Magyars are in the centre, Ruthenian Slavs of Greek Uniate religion are in the northeast, Rumanians with a semi-Romance speech are in the east, Serbian Slavs of Orthodox Greek religion in the southeast, Bosnian Slavs of Moslem religion in the south, and Croat Slavs of Roman Catholic religion in the southwest. Here indeed is a diversity of national groups, but the chief point that I wish to bring out is that they are all Alpine in race. Indeed our generalized map (Fig. 6A) shows that the "Hapsburg circle" lies entirely within the "Alpine wedge". Since race is a biological function, while language and religion are merely man-made cultural functions, it is obvious that they cannot possibly be interchanged. Yet no concept is so often wrongly labelled as race.⁵ I dwell on this because cultural differences are merely a matter of education. They could be wiped out in one generation given enough commonsense and goodwill. Racial (i.e., biological) differences of course only change very slowly; but contrary to common opinion these are not factors in the national troubles of Central Europe.

What is the purpose of studying European History? Surely one main reason is to see how the nations of Europe have become grouped into the very definite pattern which is apparent in Fig. 7. European history traces the rise of the Roman Empire with its many colonies, and of the folk-wandering with its transfers of whole nations. It discusses the conquests of soldiers like Charlemagne, Saladin, Suliman and Napoleon. Yet it is almost impossible to find any trace of the changes which they brought about in the European *population-pattern* of to-day, which is perhaps the most characteristic result of social development. Far more significant are the controls summed up in the word environment. Build, temperature, rainfall and coal dominate Europe to-day, and to them alone is due the significant distribution of the peoples of Europe.

In Fig. 7 is shown the population-pattern, and in the small insets A, B, C, are shown the climatic and structural controls. The sparsest areas in the north (A1, A2, A3) are in the realm of King Frost, who has resisted all invaders (Fig. 7, inset at A). In the southeast (B and E) are regions ruled by King Drought. Of the remaining sparse areas F is also too dry for notable settlement, while G and G2 are young mountains

⁵Most of the topics discussed in this address are elaborated in the writer's book, *Environment and Nation* (just published by the University Presses of Toronto and Chicago).

(inset B). The remainder of Europe has a good climate and is accordingly somewhat densely populated. The densest areas of all (T, X, Y, Z) have their populations determined by the presence of the coal trough (inset C), which in turn results from the environment of 200 million years ago.

These facts are perhaps not unfamiliar to many historians. But if the emphasis of modern history is to be laid upon social history, then I hope that my colleagues in the sister discipline will devote a little more time in their studies to the less spectacular environmental factors. These have in the long run exercised as great a control on European affairs as have the *human* factors which they so adequately discuss.



Fig. 7.—The present Population-Pattern of Europe, which is dependent on the Controls shown in the inset maps. A shows Climate controls; B shows Build; C shows the Tethys Sea (of Early Tertiary times), the Coal Trough, and the Russian Shield.

FAUX ET FAUSSAIRES

EN HISTOIRE CANADIENNE

Par GUSTAVE LANCTOT

C'est au moyen-âge que s'épanouit avec le plus de succès l'art et le métier de fabriquer le document. Le faux le plus remarquable de cette époque est peut-être le recueil de lettres papales publiées en Espagne au IX^e siècle sous le nom d'Isidore Mercator. Acceptées comme authentiques, elles firent autorité dans l'enseignement ecclésiastique, et même des papes les citèrent dans leurs actes officiels. Ce n'est qu'au 18^e siècle qu'on les mit définitivement au rancart et qu'elles reçurent le nom de *Fausses décrétales*.

Avec la découverte de l'imprimerie, le faux se raréfie, mais ne disparaît pas de l'histoire. On rencontre en Angleterre un cas fameux de fabrication historique, en 1757. C'est l'ouvrage connu sous le titre de *Commentariolum Geographicum de Situ Britanniae*, attribué à Richard de Cirencester et décrivant la domination romaine en Grande Bretagne. L'influence de ce livre ne peut guère s'exagérer. Il a servi de source historique jusqu'à nos jours. On en trouve des traces même dans les cartes contemporaines et les histoires de comté. Aujourd'hui la fausseté en est parfaitement démontrée; et son auteur est connu; c'est Charles Julius Bertram, qui vivait au milieu du XVIII^e siècle.

On peut encore signaler les "Squire Papers", collection de trente-cinq lettres prétendument écrites par Cromwell, mais forgées par William Squire, de Yarmouth. Carlyle les accepta avec enthousiasme et les publia en 1847. Soupçonneux, des érudits en démontrèrent l'indéniable fausseté, cependant que Carlyle continuait d'affirmer que Squire, qu'il avait interrogé, ne pouvait mentir avec ses "large grey eyes full of innocence."

En France, les fabrications ne manquent pas plus qu'ailleurs, ainsi que le prouvent les lettres apocryphes de Marie-Antoinette, les prétendus *Mémoires* de Fouché, ministre de Napoléon, qui furent rédigés par Beauchamp et publiés en 1824; et les *Mémoires* de Robespierre, fabriqués par Reybaud.

Au passage, il convient, cependant, de saluer le prince des faussaires Denis Vrain-Lucas, qui prospérait au milieu du dernier siècle. Avec une audace incroyable, il fabriqua successivement des lettres de Platon, d'Alexandre le Grand, de Lazare, de Marie-Madeleine et de Shakespeare, ainsi que des billets de Cléopâtre à Jules César. Toutes ces pièces, rédigées sur papier et en vieux français, il les offrait à un membre de l'Institut, Michel Chasles, qui était d'une naïveté monumentale. En neuf ans, il lui avait vendu des milliers d'autographes au prix de \$30,000 avant d'être arrêté et condamné à deux ans de prison.

Évidemment, on ne rencontre pas tous les jours, et c'est heureux, des experts comme Vrain-Lucas ni des imbéciles comme M. Chasles, mais il n'en faudrait pas conclure que la fabrication n'existe plus. Se limitant à l'histoire canadienne, on peut en signaler des exemplaires remarquables. Pour le moment, il suffira d'en indiquer les plus notables dont l'influence subsiste encore en partie.

En 1730, paraissait à Maestricht l'ouvrage suivant: *Les Aventures*

de Monsieur Robert Chevalier dit de Beauchêne, capitaine de flibustiers dans la Nouvelle-France. Rédigées par M. LeSage. Ce M. LeSage n'est ni plus ni moins qu'Alain René LeSage, l'un des grands romanciers du 18^e siècle. L'ouvrage raconte les prétendues aventures de Beauchêne qui, né au Canada, est capturé par les Iroquois, à l'âge de sept ans. Elevé par eux, il s'adapte si bien à son milieu qu'il prend rang comme l'un de leurs meilleurs guerriers. Fait prisonnier dans une rencontre avec les Français, il s'enrôle dans les troupes de la Marine et devient ensuite le chef d'une bande d'Algonquins. Du Canada, il passe avec ses sauvages en Acadie, où il figure, sous M. de Subercase, à la défense de Port-Royal contre les Anglais. Après quoi, il s'engage comme matelot sous les ordres du corsaire Morpain et poursuit une carrière aussi étonnante que vague et nébuleuse.

A une époque où les relations exotiques jouissaient d'une grande vogue, et la connaissance du Canada restait fort superficielle, l'ouvrage recueillit un succès incontestable. Il en parut plusieurs éditions et même une traduction anglaise en 1745.

Au début, on considéra comme un roman cet ouvrage paru sous le nom d'un romancier à la mode, mais plusieurs finirent par y voir un mémoire historique. De nos jours, un historien aussi renseigné que M. de la Roncière, dans son *Histoire de la Marine française*, lui décerne un brevet d'authenticité, disant: "Tout est d'une exactitude absolue dans cette autobiographie qui tient, il est vrai, du roman." C'est le contraire qu'il fallait dire: tout est d'une inexactitude absolue dans ce roman qui tient, il est vrai, de l'autobiographie. De même, un autre écrivain, Joannès Tramond range Beauchêne parmi les grands flibustiers dans son *Manuel d'histoire maritime de la France*, de 1927.

Or, au premier coup d'oeil, du moins pour un lecteur canadien, l'ouvrage s'annonce fort suspect. Il est d'une imprécision extraordinaire quant aux dates et aux lieux, et d'un vague non moins curieux dans le récit. Ainsi alerté, le lecteur qui a le loisir de faire quelques recherches, se rend vite compte qu'il se trouve en présence d'une belle fantaisie.

Il est certain que le nommé Beauchêne a existé, puisqu'il est mort à Tours le 11 décembre 1731, étant né, semble-t-il, à la Pointe-aux-Trembles en 1686. Avec ces deux dates, il devient assez facile de soumettre à la critique les affirmations de l'aventurier.

D'abord, le titre lui-même de l'ouvrage est fautif, qui le dénomme: capitaine de flibustiers dans la Nouvelle-France. Il n'y a pas eu de flibustiers en Nouvelle-France. C'est là un simple détail, mais qui excite déjà la suspicion. Le premier nom que mentionne Beauchêne, est celui de l'abbé Pénac: or ce nom est totalement inconnu jusqu'à présent dans les annales du clergé canadien. Beauchêne affirme ensuite que c'est en 1682 que les Iroquois le firent prisonnier. Or, comme il est né en 1686, il est réellement trop précoce: être capturé quatre ans avant sa naissance, c'est ce qu'on pourrait appeler un trop beau début dans la vie. De plus, notre héros place son irruption iroquoise en 1682 puisqu'il la situe après le départ de Frontenac qui quitta Québec cette année-là. Ensuite, il l'attribue à un désir de revanche d'une expédition française de 1681 sous les ordres de Callières, de Denonvillé et de Vaudreuil. Or le premier arriva en Nouvelle-France en 1684, le second en 1685 et le troisième en 1687. Quant à M. de Maricourt, dont Beauchesne fait le chef d'une expédition en 1682, il n'avait alors que 19 ans et, de fait, ne débuta dans la carrière des armes que quatre ans plus tard. Quant à son enlèvement

et à son adoption dans sa jeunesse par les Iroquois que raconte Beauchêne, ce sont de pures inventions.

L'aventurier consacre ensuite des chapitres entiers à un officier canadien du nom de Legendre, et c'est un autre personnage qui n'a jamais existé, sauf dans son imagination. Il parle aussi d'un fort situé à 50 lieues au dessus de Chambly, fort qui n'a jamais été bâti. Il invente enfin une querelle, en 1701, avec LaMothe-Cadillac, que son frère aurait chargé l'épée à la main. Lui-même l'aurait également attaqué, mais ce grave délit ne lui aurait valu que l'envoi au cachot, ordonné par l'intendant Champigny en présence du gouverneur de Montréal, M. de Ramezay. Ridicules inventions que tout cela. Un tel attentat aurait certainement valu à Beauchêne, selon le code du temps, d'avoir la tête cassée par ordre d'une cour martiale. De plus, l'intendant n'avait rien à voir en matière de discipline militaire et finalement M. de Ramezay n'était pas gouverneur de Montréal en 1701; il ne le devint qu'en 1703. Toujours d'après son récit, Beauchêne aurait, en 1708, conduit 20 Algonquins à la défense de Port-Royal. Encore une fausseté, il n'y avait pas d'Algonquins à Port-Royal sous M. de Subercase.

Inutile de pousser plus loin notre examen critique. Ces impossibilités, ces faussetés et ces inventions suffisent à réduire à néant la valeur historique de l'ouvrage. D'autre part, Beauchêne a vécu à Montréal et a retenu les noms des officiers du temps; il a dû passer en Acadie vers 1708, alors qu'il avait 22 ans. Il a certainement servi à Port-Royal: le détail qu'il donne de la construction de la frégate *La Biche*, pour laquelle Subercase demande des recrues à Vaudreuil, est conforme à la vérité documentaire: c'est un détail qu'il n'a pu connaître que sur place. Il servit probablement, sous le corsaire Morpain, mais comme simple matelot. Quant au reste de l'ouvrage, c'est une succession de récits fabriqués de toutes pièces, où Beauchêne se donne constamment le beau rôle de la bravoure et des exploits et où s'entremêlent les erreurs, les anachronismes, les invraisemblances et les vantardises. Au point de vue documentaire, on n'en saurait tirer un seul renseignement: c'est tout au plus du mauvais roman historique.

Après le dix-septième siècle, le dix-huitième fournit à son tour un cas intéressant de faux historique. En 1777, parut à Londres une petite brochure sous le titre de *Lettres de Monsieur le Marquis de Montcalm*, London, Almon, 1777, Pp. 28. Ces lettres, apparemment écrites en 1757, 58 et 59, deux au ministre Berryer et l'autre à M. de Molé, discutaient la situation politique des colonies anglaises et françaises en Amérique. La deuxième, celle de 1758, contenait les phrases suivantes: "Toutes les connoissances que je reçois tous les jours me confirment dans l'opinion que l'Angleterre perdra un jour ses colonies du continent de l'Amérique. . . . Il y a un point essentiel à savoir: c'est, qu'elles ne sont jamais taxées. . . . Aujourd'hui si elle (l'Angleterre) vouloit l'établir (la taxe), j'ai des assurances certaines, que toutes les colonies prendroient feu, et l'incendie croit si loin surtout, si l'on scavait le souffler sourdement, que l'Angleterre seroit bien embarrassée pour l'éteindre." (pp. 18-19). Dans la lettre à M. de Molé, Montcalm allait plus loin: "Les colonies angloises, disait-il, auroient, depuis longtemps, secoué le joug . . . si la crainte de voir les Français à leur porte, n'avoit été un frein qui les avoit retenu . . . mais que le Canada vint à être conquis . . . et la première occasion ou l'Angleterre sembleroit toucher à leurs droits, croyez-vous que ces colons obéiroient?"

En 1777, alors que les colonies américaines, après la conquête du Canada, étaient en pleine révolte contre l'Angleterre qui avait voulu, entre autres choses, leur imposer de nouvelles taxes, ces paroles de Montcalm en 1757 prenaient une véritable allure de prophétie. Dans un autre passage, ses lettres prévoyaient encore par quelle tactique Wolfe battrait l'armée française devant Québec: et l'événement s'était exactement produit selon les prévisions de Montcalm. Aussi ces lettres soulevèrent-elles la curiosité et un intérêt considérable. En 1782, l'ex-jésuite Roubaud qui, après avoir vécu en Canada de 1754 à 1764, était passé à Londres afin de se mettre au service de l'Angleterre, affirme avoir présenté au roi une copie des prétendues lettres de Montcalm, dont l'auteur, dit-il, était un officier anglais. Il ajoute qu'en 1777, on n'en avait publié que trois par un abus de confiance, dont il avait été la victime. Le "Monthly Review" d'octobre 1802 écrivait que ces lettres n'étaient pas de Montcalm, mais d'un officier de l'armée anglaise qui les avait rédigées en Amérique au cours de la guerre de Sept Ans.

Il est évident que ces lettres ne sont pas de Montcalm. Elles prédisent si exactement des événements futurs, surtout la tactique de Wolfe aux Plaines d'Abraham, que manifestement elles furent rédigées après coup. De plus, les deux premières lettres sont adressées à M. de Berryer, ministre de la Marine, et datées de Montréal le 4 avril 1757 et le 1er octobre 1758. Or le ministre ne s'appelait pas M. de Berryer, mais Berryer tout court; ensuite, il n'était pas ministre en 1757 ni en 1758: il ne le devint que le 1er novembre 1759. De plus, le 1er octobre 1758, Montcalm n'était pas à Montréal, mais à Carillon. Enfin, les lettres de Londres débutent par le mot: *Monsieur*, et se terminent par la formule: *J'ai l'honneur*. Or, Montcalm écrivant au ministre de la Marine, Moras, en 1758, débute toujours par le mot de: *Monseigneur*, et finit ainsi: *Je suis, avec respect, Monseigneur*. Notons que le style des lettres, soigné et visant aux formules, diffère entièrement de celui de Montcalm. Enfin, chez Montcalm, les lettres discutent toujours de cas concrets relatifs au Canada, et ne se lancent jamais, comme celles de Londres, dans de véritables dissertations politiques sur les colonies anglaises.

Qui donc est l'auteur des lettres? La réponse s'impose: c'est Roubaud. *Nemo gratis mendax*: on ne ment pas sans intérêt. Or, l'ex-jésuite vivait des renseignements qu'il fournissait au ministère de Londres. Il avoue avoir présenté 95 mémoires en vingt ans. Pour se bien faire venir des ministres et en soutirer des louis sterling, il leur apportait de prétendus documents découverts ici et là. Montcalm mort se prêtait naturellement à des attributions de mémoires et de lettres, sans risque, pour le faussaire, de protestation. Aussi Roubaud l'adopta-t-il comme l'auteur de maintes productions de sa plume. Pour en justifier la présence entre ses mains, il affirmait que le bagage de Montcalm avait été laissé à St. François-du-Lac qui était sa mission.

Les Archives d'Ottawa possèdent justement deux manuscrits de prétendus *Extraits des Mémoires de M^r. le Marquis de Montcalm* et ils sont de la main de Roubaud. N'oublions pas, en outre, que les premières copies des lettres londoniennes de Montcalm se rencontrent dans les mains de l'ex-jésuite. Lui seul sait qu'il y en avait plus de sept. Il est vrai qu'il affirme qu'elles furent écrites par un Anglais, et imprimées à la suite d'un abus de confiance, mais ces affirmations sont faites pour se protéger contre le mécontentement du roi lors de leur publication, parce qu'elles constituaient une condamnation de sa politique. Roubaud

faisait ainsi porter par un autre la responsabilité de cette supercherie; sans quoi ses propres fabrications qu'il présentait sous le nom d'*Extraits* des papiers de Montcalm risquaient fort de perdre tout leur crédit. Enfin, simple détail, mais d'une singularité excessivement probante, dans les lettres londoniennes se rencontre cette idée que c'est dans les *archives* que s'étudient les conditions politiques d'une colonie. Or, cette idée et ce mot, on les chercherait en vain dans les écrits authentiques de Montcalm, mais on les retrouve tous les deux dans les documents qui sont de la tête et de la main de Roubaud. Voilà le cas où une idée et une expression décèlent clairement l'unité d'origine de deux sources apparemment distinctes.

Autre corroboration: aux Archives d'Ottawa, dans la Série C.O. 42, vol. 13, on trouve une prétendue lettre de Montcalm adressée à M. de Maupoux, premier président au Parlement de Paris, et datée du 21 août 1759. D'où vient-elle? De Roubaud lui-même. C'est bien le spécialiste en la matière. Fait curieux, il y commet les mêmes erreurs que l'auteur des lettres de Londres au sujet des destinataires. La lettre londonienne à Molé est du 24 août 1759; et celle de la série C.O. 42, à Maupoux est du 21 août. Or, chose qui serait extraordinaire de la part de Montcalm, écrivant à trois jours d'intervalle, les deux destinataires reçoivent le même titre de cher cousin et de premier président du Parlement de Paris. Il y a supercherie évidente dans l'un ou l'autre cas, ou plus probablement dans les deux. De fait, Maupoux ne devint président au Parlement qu'en 1763 et non en 1759. Dernière preuve du double faux, c'est que les deux premiers paragraphes des deux lettres sont identiques, à quelques mots près: elles sont donc bien sorties de la même plume, celle de Roubaud. Il est donc bien l'auteur des *Lettres de Montcalm* qui perdent du coup toute valeur historique, malgré l'usage qu'en ont fait plusieurs historiens.

Mais le faux en histoire canadienne ne s'arrête pas au dix-huitième siècle. Il en existe un exemple contemporain, puisque son auteur mourut en 1885. Il s'agit de la brochure de Félix Poutré, publiée en 1862, sous le titre: *Échappé de la potence, Souvenirs d'un prisonnier d'État canadien*. En voici un résumé. En 1838, Poutré, jeune homme de vingt-deux ans, joint le mouvement révolutionnaire, prêche la révolte et assermente les recrues. Capitaine d'une compagnie, il assiste à la bataille d'Odelltown. De là, il rentre à Saint-Jean et se cache dans les bois. Deux semaines plus tard, il se livre aux autorités pour empêcher la ruine des propriétés paternelles, et va augmenter le nombre des patriotes détenus dans la prison de Montréal.

Le lendemain, 22 décembre, de l'exécution de Cardinal et de Duquette, il déclare à Béchard, un coprisonnier, que, pour sauver sa tête, il va simuler la folie. Le jour suivant, commence la série de ses actes de pseudo-dément-épileptique. Il débute par une crise d'épilepsie, se proclame le gouverneur du pays, bouscule les prisonniers et assomme les tourne-clefs. Et puis cela continue tous les jours avec quelques variations au programme. Un jour, il saisit le vieux médecin anglais, dur aux prisonniers, le secoue violemment, l'étouffant à demi en dépit de ses gémissements. Un autre jour, il pêche avec une canne, ou s'en sert pour tuer des ours ou des éléphants. Parfois il dit la messe, aspergeant les prisonniers avec de l'eau bouillante, prononce des discours décousus, ou fait culbuter le poêle, sous prétexte de l'équilibrer. Traduit devant les juges, il leur sert le grand jeu de l'épilepsie, ou leur tient des discours

insensés. M. Leclère, surintendant de police et M. Delisle, greffier de la cour, s'interposent alors en sa faveur, le déclarent incurablement fou, et lui obtiennent son pardon. Telle est l'histoire mise en circulation par Poutré, et dont il fit, la voyant non contredite, la matière d'une brochure en 1862, qui fut même traduite en anglais. Le récit devint si populaire que Fréchette en tira un drame en 1871. Les "Souvenirs" de Poutré atteignirent une troisième édition et l'*Almanach du Peuple* les reproduisit dans un de ses numéros, il y a quelques années.

Mais depuis 1871, les archives de la police montréalaise se sont ouvertes et voici qu'on y trouve deux pièces officielles, publiées par l'auteur du présent mémoire en 1913. La première est un rapport d'espionnage signé par Félix Poutré, devant le surintendant de la police, P. E. Leclère, le 1er février 1840. Il y déclare qu'à la demande de Leclère il se rendit aux États-Unis "et que le but particulier de sa mission était de voir et de fréquenter les Canadiens qui s'y sont réfugiés depuis l'existence des troubles en ce pays, afin de s'assurer de leurs sentiments à l'égard du gouvernement anglais, et s'il existait quelque projet prémédité d'insurrection ou d'invasion du territoire britannique." Il ajoute qu'il rencontra plusieurs chefs canadiens, entre autres Goddue, Hébert et Meretti (probablement Merissi), que les réfugiés sont d'opinion que les Canadiens ont abandonné la cause de la révolte, qu'ils ne croient plus à la possibilité de renverser le gouvernement anglais au Canada, que leur espoir est dans une guerre entre la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis et qu'ils sont bien résolus d'inquiéter le gouvernement en répandant de fausses rumeurs d'invasion.

La seconde pièce du dossier est une lettre du même jour de M. Leclère à M. Montizambert, assistant secrétaire du gouverneur, annonçant l'envoi d'un rapport de Félix Poutré, "personne respectable, dit la lettre, attachée au personnel de la police pour fins secrètes." Aucun doute n'est permis, ni possible. Les deux documents établissent, en toute évidence, le fait que Poutré était un espion à la solde des autorités.

Maintenant se pose la question: Qu'y a-t-il de vrai dans les "Souvenirs" de Poutré? Espion en 1840, il a pu être patriote en 1838. Ouvrons sa brochure. Poutré nous y conte qu'avant de devenir le No. 300 à la prison de Montréal, il prit part, le 7 novembre, à la bataille d'Odelltown, qu'il fait durer deux jours. Après la défaite, on l'envoie à Lacolle chercher des armes que l'on sait ne pas y être. Alors, accusant ses chefs, Nelson et Côté, de trahison, il rentre à Saint-Jean, chez son père, le 9 novembre, et se cache dans les bois. Il y passe deux semaines. Il en sort le 25 novembre pour se livrer aux autorités, afin de sauver de la ruine son père dont on a menacé d'incendier les propriétés, à moins qu'il ne révèle la retraite de son fils. Poutré, dans un grand geste, se constitue prisonnier et va rejoindre ses frères d'armes dans la nouvelle prison de Montréal, le 26 novembre 1838.

Or, ce récit, du premier au dernier mot, est un tissu de faussetés. D'abord le combat d'Odelltown que Poutré confond avec celui de Lacolle qui est du 7 novembre, eut lieu le 10 novembre et non pas le 7, comme il l'affirme. Il commença le matin et se termina dans l'après-midi. Les troupes du gouvernement entrèrent le lendemain, 11 novembre, dans Napierville, et le 13 novembre, Félix Poutré était arrêté, comme le démontrent les registres de la prison, alors que, selon lui, il était encore caché dans les bois de Saint-Jean. Ainsi donc l'histoire de la bataille de deux jours, le voyage inutile pour quérir des armes à Lacolle, la trahison

des chefs, sont des mensonges. Mensonge aussi que sa fuite dans les bois, et mensonge encore que son grand geste, quand il se constitue prisonnier pour sauver son père de la ruine et de l'incendie.

Reste à étudier sa conduite en prison. D'après lui, c'est le 22 décembre, lendemain de l'exécution de Cardinal et de Duquette, qu'il déclare son plan de jouer la folie, et le 23 décembre qu'il en commence l'exécution par une fausse attaque de fausse épilepsie. Selon lui, il contrefit le fou pendant "quelques mois." Or, l'expression "quelques mois" ne peut comprendre moins de deux mois, et comme il commença son rôle d'épileptique le 23 décembre, il a dû le prolonger durant janvier et février, et ne sortir de prison au plus tôt qu'en mars 1839.

Or, tout ce récit de folie simulée, d'attaques épileptiques, se continuant durant des mois, s'écroule d'un seul coup devant la date historique de sa sortie de prison que le livre d'écrou signale le 26 novembre 1838. Le registre porte, en effet, l'entrée suivante: Félix Poutré, arrêté le 13 novembre 1838, libéré le 26 novembre 1838. S'il était libre le 26 novembre, comment a-t-il pu commencer à simuler la folie le 23 décembre et soutenir le jeu pendant des mois. Cette simple entrée sur un registre suffit à elle seule à réduire à néant tout ce tissu de mensonges, ourdi par le faux patriote de Saint-Jean.

Avec le père Louis Hennepin, récollet, se présente le cas plus curieux d'un auteur qui, après nous avoir donné une relation oculaire, sérieuse et véridique, la reprend dans un ouvrage subséquent, en lui ajoutant une partie nouvelle de pure invention. Le P. Hennepin débarque à Québec en 1675. De 1676 à 1678, il séjourne au fort Frontenac où commande La Salle. En 1678, ce dernier organise son voyage de l'Ouest et, dans l'été de 1679, il arrive au Sault Ste. Marie avec 32 hommes et les récollets de la Ribourde, Membré et Hennepin. Après beaucoup de difficultés, l'expédition atteint la rivière des Illinois. En février 1680, La Salle retourne à Frontenac, pendant que Hennepin avec deux Français descend l'Illinois jusqu'au Mississippi qu'il remonte jusqu'au Wisconsin. En avril, un parti de Sioux les fait prisonniers et les amène dans leur village, où ils restent en captivité jusqu'à l'été. En juillet, au retour d'une chasse, les Sioux font la rencontre du sieur du Luth et d'un parti de Français. Du Luth obtient la libération de ses compatriotes et Hennepin rentre finalement, à l'automne de 1680, à Michillimakinac où il passe l'hiver. En avril 1681, il quitte ce poste pour revenir à Frontenac et de là se rendre à Québec. Revenu en France, en 1681 ou 1682, il publie en 1683 son premier ouvrage: *Description de la Louisiane nouvellement découverte au Sud-Ouest de la Nouvelle-France par ordre du roi, avec la carte du pays, les moeurs et la manière de vivre des Sauvages. Dédié à Sa Majesté par le R. P. Louis Hennepin.*

L'ouvrage eut un grand succès: à l'Europe, entichée d'exotisme, il révélait les pays et nations que le missionnaire avait visités: le haut Mississippi et la vallée jusqu'à la rivière des Illinois, la chute prodigieuse de Niagara, les troupeaux de bisons et les tribus indiennes avec le calumet et le canot d'écorce, tout un monde inconnu et curieux. Aussi deux nouvelles éditions parurent-elles en 1684 et 1688, ainsi que plusieurs traductions. Le P. Hennepin devenait du coup une célébrité du jour.

Or, voici qu'en 1697, Hennepin publie un deuxième ouvrage: *Nouvelle Découverte d'un très grand Pays situé dans l'Amérique entre le Nouveau Mexique et la Mer Glaciale.* Fait à remarquer, il n'est pas dédié au roi de France, comme le précédent, mais à Sa Majesté Britannique.

Or, la *Nouvelle Découverte*, c'est simplement, sauf quelques additions, le texte de la *Description de la Louisiane* avec huit chapitres nouveaux. Ces chapitres, du 34^e au 44^e, racontent la descente par le brave récollet du Mississippi jusqu'à son embouchure, en 1680, c'est-à-dire deux ans avant sa découverte par La Salle, qui est du mois d'août 1682. C'est donc le renversement d'un fait historique indisputé jusque là. Par malheur, tout ce récit est une pure invention de la première à la dernière ligne. S'aidant des ouvrages antérieurs, du journal du P. Marquette, et surtout de l'ouvrage du P. Leclercq, *Premier Établissement de la Foy*, qui avait utilisé les relations des PP. Anastase Douai et Zénobe Membré, compagnons de La Salle, et s'aidant peut-être aussi de la relation du chevalier de Tonti qui a pu paraître avant la sienne, le père Hennepin a composé un récit assez plausible de son imaginaire expédition.

C'est, à la fin du chapitre 36^e, que l'auteur nous annonce cette étonnante révélation que c'est lui, et non La Salle qui a découvert la Louisiane: "C'est ici, dit-il, que je veux bien que toute la terre sache le mystère de cette découverte que j'ai caché jusques à présent pour ne pas donner du chagrin au Sieur de La Salle qui voulait avoir seul toute la gloire et toute la connaissance la plus secrète de cette Découverte." Mais le brave récollet oubliait que dans sa *Description de la Louisiane*, de 1683, il avait déjà écrit les lignes suivantes, qui réfutaient d'avance son mensonge: "Nous avions quelque dessein de nous rendre jusqu'à l'embouchure du fleuve Colbert (le Mississippi) qui probablement se décharge plutôt dans le Sein du Mexique que dans la Mer Vermeille; mais ces nations qui se saisirent de nous ne nous donnèrent pas le temps de naviguer haut et bas de ce fleuve." Le mensonge est flagrant dans l'un ou l'autre cas: ou il a menti en 1683, en disant qu'il n'a pas fait le voyage, ou en 1697, en déclarant qu'il l'a fait.

Ensuite, la supercherie d'Hennepin se découvre par l'absurdité qui découle de la nécessité d'insérer le voyage entre deux dates connues, entre le 12 mars et le 11 avril, c'est-à-dire, comme il l'affirme lui-même, dans une période de *trente jours*. Or, même en admettant, comme il le prétend, qu'un canot d'écorce peut faire 10 lieues par jour en pays inconnu, il n'aurait, après tout, parcouru que 300 lieues pour se rendre au golfe du Mexique. Or la distance réelle à couvrir est plus de 1000 lieues. Il est évident que le bon père n'a jamais fait le voyage. D'autre part, il écrit qu'il n'a pas révélé sa découverte de la Louisiane, dans son ouvrage de 1683, afin de ne pas chagriner M. de La Salle. Mais alors pourquoi ne pas l'avoir fait dans sa nouvelle édition de 1688, alors que La Salle était mort depuis un an?

Le véritable motif de la supercherie du P. Hennepin, c'est qu'en 1697, il s'était brouillé, on ne sait exactement pour quelle raison, avec le gouvernement français et, de plus, était passé au service de l'Angleterre par l'intermédiaire de M. de Blathwayt, ministre de la Guerre, celui-là même à qui La Hontan adressait plus tard un plan de conquête du Canada et qui était évidemment le directeur des services d'espionnage britanniques. C'est pourquoi on le voit, lui, missionnaire catholique, dédier son nouvel ouvrage à Guillaume III d'Angleterre, en l'exhortant, lui, prince hérétique, "à fonder une Eglise dans le Nouveau-Monde." De fait, le motif de l'invention de sa prétendue découverte, c'est à la fois le désir de la gloriole et du succès financier de son livre, mais surtout le désir et l'obligation de plaire à son nouveau maître, le roi d'Angleterre, en détruisant le titre de propriété par première découverte que la France

possédait sur la Louisiane en vertu de l'expédition de La Salle de 1682. En réclamant pour le Belge Hennepin, sujet britannique, la primauté de la découverte de la Louisiane, le roi d'Angleterre pouvait prétendre à des droits sur ce territoire. Aussi, dès l'année suivante, on publiait en Angleterre même deux éditions de la *Nouvelle Découverte* de Hennepin et Guillaume III envoyait, en 1699, Lewis Bank avec une corvette remonter le Mississipi en expédition de reconnaissance. Mais l'arrivée de d'Iberville à Biloxi, en janvier 1700, fit échouer le projet britannique. Ainsi la prétendue découverte de la Louisiane en 1680 par Hennepin se révèle une fabrication évidente imaginée pour des fins personnelles et politiques.

On pourrait encore citer un dernier faux, celui de La Hontan au sujet de la découverte de la rivière Longue, prétendu affluent du Mississipi. La Hontan, jeune officier du Béarn, passe en Nouvelle-France, en 1683, à l'âge de 17 ans. En 1684, il va prendre le commandement du fort St. Joseph à l'entrée du détroit sur le lac Érié. Ayant incendié son fort en août 1688, il se réfugie à Michillimakinac, où il hiverne et, le 8 juin 1689, quitte ce poste pour rentrer à Québec. Il prend part à la défense de Québec contre Phipps, en 1690, et porte en France les dépêches de Frontenac en 1691. En route pour revenir au Canada, il se trouve et se distingue au siège de Plaisance en 1692. Comme récompense de sa conduite, il est nommé lieutenant de roi à Terre-Neuve, mais il se querelle avec le gouverneur, M. de Brouillon, et décide par un coup de tête, à 27 ans, de s'enfuir afin d'éviter une arrestation qu'il redoute. Ne pouvant obtenir la permission de rentrer en France pour s'y justifier, il voyage à l'étranger. En 1703, devant le succès des ouvrages sur l'Amérique, il rédige ses *Nouveaux Voyages dans l'Amérique Septentrionale*, dédié au roi de Denmark. Les trois volumes qu'il publie connurent treize éditions en quatorze ans.

Or, c'est dans cet ouvrage que La Hontan prétend avoir découvert une rivière, affluent du Mississipi, qu'il appelle la *Rivière Longue*, où il aurait rencontré plusieurs nations sauvages, les Eokoros, les Essanapés et les Gnacsitaires. Ces derniers auraient eu pour ennemis, les Mozeemleks à la barbe touffue, voisins des Tahuglauks, non moins barbus. Le 20 janvier 1689, il aurait pris possession du pays par la plantation d'un poteau aux armes de France.

Aujourd'hui la majorité des historiens déclarent que cette découverte est une fabrication. A peu près seul, un humoriste, M. Stephen Leacock, soutient la cause de la véracité de La Hontan dans le *Canadian Geographical Journal* de mai 1932. Que faut-il en penser? Ce qui surprend, c'est que cette découverte de 1688-9 ne paraisse au jour qu'en 1703, quatorze ans plus tard. Est-ce possible, d'abord, que les compagnons de La Hontan n'auraient pas soufflé mot de leur expédition et que le commandant de Michilimakinac n'aurait pas mentionné le voyage de cet officier au gouverneur? N'est-ce pas curieux, ce voyage, dont personne, ni les soldats, ni les missionnaires, ni les Indiens, ni les officiers, ni les traiteurs, ni les autorités n'ont jamais rien su, et dont le secret ne s'est jamais ébruité? Fait d'autant plus singulier, que Nicolas Perrot visitait cette même région, au printemps de la même année, sans rencontrer aucune trace de l'expédition de La Hontan. Premier motif de doute.

Deuxièmement, est-ce probable que La Hontan aurait gardé le silence sur un fait de cette importance? C'était l'époque des Joliet et des La Salle; on ne parlait que découverte et exploration. Le roi les

désirait, les gouverneurs les suscitaient. C'était la route ouverte de la gloire, de l'avancement et des avantages, et La Hontan aurait, devant tout cela, gardé un silence impénétrable. Or, justement, à ce moment, il sollicite des faveurs, en faisant valoir les services de son père, et cherche à se mettre en lumière par le projet d'établir une flottille sur les lacs. Or, il avait là, dans ce voyage, la plus belle occasion possible d'obtenir ce qu'il désirait, et il l'aurait mise de côté. Ce n'est pas dans la psychologie humaine.

Mais il y a autre chose. Si le voyage s'est fait, comment expliquer qu'on n'a jamais retrouvé cette rivière, dont il a laissé la carte. Aucune rivière, même pas la Minnesota, qui est à la latitude de la rivière Longue ne répond au relevé de La Hontan. Dans son tracé, on ne trouve pas la soudaine courbe sud-ouest de la Minnesota, courbe qui existe, mais on y trouve des lacs nombreux qui n'existent pas le long de la Minnesota.

N'est-il pas non moins curieux que de tous les noms des tribus indiennes donnés par La Hontan, seuls les noms des peuplades de la rivière Longue ne se rencontrent nulle part. Autre curiosité, La Hontan déclare que les Mozeemleks et les Tahuglauks portent des barbes touffues. Or, l'histoire ne connaît dans tous ces territoires aucune nation qui fut le moins barbu.

Sans aligner encore d'autres preuves, ce faux historique reste établi tant qu'on n'aura pas répondu aux critiques précédentes. Nous sommes bien en présence d'une fabrication qui s'explique très facilement. Devant le succès du livre d'Hennepin sur sa découverte de la Louisiane, La Hontan a voulu pour grossir le nombre de ses lecteurs et le chiffre de son tirage, pouvoir aussi annoncer une découverte. Les résultats ont justifié son calcul. De plus, à ce moment, il était en communication avec le service d'espionnage de l'Angleterre; l'annonce d'une grande découverte ne pouvait que le bien faire venir auprès des ministres anglais, qui s'intéressaient énormément au Mississippi, vers lequel ils songeaient à faire des établissements. Quant à la plausibilité du récit, il ne faut pas en être surpris. La Hontan avait lui-même voyagé dans l'Ouest, et pour les territoires qu'il ne connaissait pas, il avait devant lui une abondante documentation formée par les ouvrages du P. Marquette, de Hennepin et de LeClercq, et le récit de Tonti. Rien n'était plus facile que de les démarquer. La Hontan a su bien exploiter ses sources, mais il ne lui a manqué qu'une chose: c'est d'avoir découvert trop tard une rivière qui n'existait pas.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE KOMAGATA MARU AFFAIR, 1914

By ERIC W. MORSE

The relations between Canada and India, two of the most important parts of the Empire, have not always been of the happiest. They have pertained very largely, either to immigration (where Canada has felt it necessary to make certain demands of India), or to the status of East Indians in Canada (where the reverse order of demands was made). The most advertised and spectacular incident in Indo-Canadian relations, in fact, probably the most dramatic occurrence in the history of Canadian immigration, was the attempt, in 1914, to land a party of some four hundred East Indians on board the *Komagata Maru*, at Vancouver, in the face of Canadian immigration regulations that made their admission illegal. What followed might almost be described as Gilbertian, but there was underneath an element of seriousness, even of danger. The vessel was in the harbour of Vancouver for eight weeks, by the end of which time three riots had occurred, there had been several broken bones, Hindu lives had been very nearly lost, half the Canadian navy (consisting of H.M.C.S. *Rainbow*) had been called out, together with several detachments of the militia and permanent force, so that, altogether, everyone was very much relieved when finally the *Komagata Maru* steamed away.

Immigration of East Indians to Canada began shortly after the turn of the century, and, in the years 1905-07, over 5000 entered. Nothing up to this point had been done to restrict their entry, since it was felt that they were, after all, British subjects and were not entering in any great numbers. In 1907, as a result of the increasing numbers of orientals entering the coast province, the Asiatic Exclusion League was formed in Vancouver, and in September an anti-Asiatic riot occurred that caused \$36,000 worth of damage to Chinese and Japanese property. It was realized then that barriers would have to be put up against Hindu immigration. The difficulty was that there was a growing measure of unrest in India; discrimination against East Indians in other parts of the Empire had already been sharply resented there; somehow, therefore, for the sake of imperial relations, restriction would have to be effected in Canada without allowing the words "Hindu" or "East Indian" to appear in the statute books.

This difficulty was rather ingeniously overcome. An Indian statute (of 1883), it was discovered, already made emigration of indentured labour to Canada illegal. To take care of other classes the Laurier government passed two orders in council,¹ the one requiring all Asiatic immigrants to have \$200 (instead of \$25 as heretofore) in their possession on landing, and the other order stipulating that all immigrants must henceforth have come by "continuous journey and on through tickets from the country of their birth or citizenship". No outward cause for offence was contained in these provisions, yet they succeeded in restricting fairly effectively the further immigration of Indians to Canada. Such was especially true of the second order, the effectiveness of which rested on

¹P.C. 1255 and P.C. 27, 1908.

the fortuitous absence of direct steamship communication between India and Canada.

During 1913 a small party of East Indians arrived and made a test case of the validity of these orders, and, having won their case on a legal technicality, paved the way for the entry of some ninety of their countrymen in that year. The orders, however, were soon re-issued in a legal form,² and at the same time, to strengthen the restrictions, the government passed another order, which, "in view of the present overcrowded condition of the labour market" in British Columbia, made it illegal for "artisans or labourers, skilled or unskilled" to land at any port of entry in that province.³

In 1914, therefore, three different orders in council stood in the way of Indians entering Canada.

Leaving, for the moment, the matter of immigration, it is necessary to examine the effect which these and similar regulations had upon certain East Indians along the Pacific coast of North America.

It can readily be imagined that restriction of Hindu immigration by such measures met with no popular favour among the Hindu colony in British Columbia, very few of whom failed to see through the *de facto* discrimination that had been imposed upon their countrymen. They felt they had, too, other grounds for complaint. There existed in Canada at the time a virtual prohibition on their bringing in their wives and families. Not even Indian students, merchants or tourists were admitted freely for temporary visits. Added to this, the peculiar dress and customs of most of the Indians had drawn upon them much derision and ill-treatment in British Columbia. Petitions to Ottawa, over a period of six years, had seemed to fall on deaf ears; and they had received little more satisfaction from the India office. East Indians, therefore, on the coast in 1914 laboured under a sense of grievance and frustration.

Many East Indians had crossed from British Columbia into California, Oregon, and Washington, and others had gone there direct. These states became a fertile field for unrest. Not long before this time there had gone to San Francisco from India a prominent agitator by the name of Hardayal. Bitterly opposed to everything British, he and his colleagues had succeeded in organizing associations among the Indians along the whole Pacific coast with the object of inciting a revolution in India and upsetting the British Raj. A Hindustani newspaper called the *Ghadr* (mutiny) was established, which poured forth pamphlets breathing murder and revolt; and the Ghadr movement, as it became known, urged Indians from such parts overseas as United States, Canada, the Phillippines, and the Far East to prepare themselves for returning to the Punjab to participate in a second Indian mutiny and drive the British out of India.⁴

It is not difficult to understand that, due to the sense of grievance which Canadian immigration requirements had aroused, Hardayal's doctrines found a ready acceptance among most of the Hindus in British Columbia. Thus, even before 1914, the Indian community there was seething with sedition.

²P.C.'s 23 and 24, 1914.

³P.C. 2642, 1913.

⁴For a full description of this conspiracy cf. India Sedition Committee ("Rowlett Commission") Report, 1918. (Cmd. 9190, 1918), 62 *et seq.*

It is against such a background that the *Komagata Maru* affair must be studied.

The *Komagata Maru* was a Japanese vessel that had been chartered at Hong Kong. On board were three hundred and seventy-six East Indians that had been picked up at Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Yokohama. It arrived at Vancouver on May 23, 1914. The real motives behind the expedition were not understood for some time. Though they are most interesting to examine, there is time here to give them in only the briefest outline. Gurdit Singh, the leader of the enterprise, was an agitator in the Punjab; he was a man of considerable wealth, who had made his money in the lumber trade. He appears to have been associated with the Ghadr movement in America, and before a royal commission it was brought out later that his prime motive in bringing over the passengers was to add to the political unrest in India.⁵ He was fully aware of the illegal nature of the enterprise, and probably guessed what the outcome would be, a guess which proved to be a shrewd one in view of subsequent developments. On the other hand, the expedition was in the nature of a major test case⁶ for the Canadian immigration restrictions against Hindus, and if they were broken down, Gurdit Singh would no doubt have been quite satisfied, and would have inaugurated a regular service from India to Canada.⁷ A good deal was said, after the War broke out, hinting at German complicity, but (though the vessel had been chartered through an agent of German nationality at Hong Kong) such charges appear to be quite groundless.⁸

In this paper, it is not the motives behind the incident that are intended to be dealt with, but the way in which the affair was handled at Vancouver, more particularly as regards the cause of the vessel's eight weeks' delay in harbour and the final negotiations that made its peaceable departure possible.

Ottawa had been notified about seven weeks previously of the *Komagata Maru's* coming, and when the boat arrived at Vancouver the immigration authorities had been instructed not to allow it to dock, in view of the existence of the three orders in council noted above. The vessel was, therefore, moored out in the harbour and immigration officials went on board to proceed with their long work of examining the passengers. First there was a medical examination, and ninety were declared medically unfit to land. Then a number of the passengers claimed to have Canadian domicile; to be quite legal, it was necessary for the board of inquiry to sit on each case separately, which made progress very slow. Finally, however, twenty of them substantiated their claim and were allowed to land. The rest were ordered to be deported, and the incident should have closed there, with the *Komagata Maru* sailing back to Hong Kong. An explanation is needed as to why the vessel remained in Vancouver harbour for a total of eight weeks.

⁵*Ibid.*, 62. Also cf. Enquiry Commission Report, 1915, as quoted in *Ottawa Citizen*, Jan. 16, 1915.

⁶Cf. Statement of Gurdit Singh in *Pioneer Mail*, Allahabad, India, June 12, 1914.

⁷*Ibid.* Also statement in *Montreal Star*, April 16, 1914.

⁸I have investigated this fairly thoroughly, both at Ottawa and London. The evidence on this and several other points touching the *Komagata Maru* affair, I hope, will be published before long in more complete form in a book on Immigration and Status of British East Indians in Canada. E.W.M.

The first delay was perhaps unavoidable, for it would have been high-handed indeed to have refused them a medical examination or a chance to prove their Canadian domicile. From this point, however, the delay in harbour was due in part to the obstinacy of the immigrants, in part to the activity of their countrymen on shore, and in part to poor handling by the immigration authorities concerned.

The deportation order that was served on Gurdit Singh when the work of examination had been completed, instead of being heeded, was resolutely resisted by him, and a writ of habeas corpus was demanded for each of his passengers on the ground that the order in council barring the landing of artisans and labourers in B.C. was ultra vires. It took a great deal of unnecessary time to settle this point, since, instead of at once facing the issue and making a single test case, each case was allowed to be brought up separately.

The Indians possibly had grounds for believing that at first there was obstruction of justice. During all the time that the cases were being tried the immigration authorities took the greatest care that no communication should take place between the passengers and either their solicitors or their countrymen on shore. Mr. Bird, their solicitor, wired to the prime minister on June 23: "Was refused right to go on board Komagata Maru this morning to take instructions for test case."⁹ As late as July 8 Gurdit Singh wired the governor-general: "Reid disallows my landing; unable to sue for damages amounting to \$150,000."¹⁰ The board of inquiry, moreover, failed to give a decision at the end of each case, so that the Indians were prevented from approaching the courts to make an appeal. Some of the local politicians and immigration officials urged the government to take strong action—such as ignoring the mandamus and avoiding appeal to the courts, if possible. The prime minister, however, when the matter came to his attention, would not hear of such procedure. The board, he said, should hasten to complete its inquiry, and give its decision. To Inspector Reid, Sir Robert Borden wired (June 25): "You should take no step which in any way admits the jurisdiction of the Court to *interfere*, but if the immigrants initiate proceedings, it is important to secure a hearing before the Court which will give a reasonable construction to the Act and regulations."¹¹

All this while the passengers were on very short rations, since the charterers of the boat, though clearly liable, refused to supply food or water. The immigration authorities, though under no responsibility, provided a certain amount, but from messages of the passengers to the governor-general this could hardly have been adequate. In the meantime, the situation was growing tenser.

The Indian community in B.C. sent messages of protest to the government against the treatment of their countrymen, describing it as "a lot to which even cattle would not be subjected", and urging the government to save the immigrants from the high-handedness of the immigration depart-

⁹Borden Papers (private collection), Bird to Sir Robert Borden, June 23, 1914 (telegram).

¹⁰Borden Papers, Gurdit Singh to Governor-General, July 8, 1914 (telegram).

¹¹Borden Papers, Sir Robert Borden to Malcolm Reid, June 25, 1914 (telegram).

ment.¹² At the same time urgent cables were sent to the secretary of state for India and the viceroy. The India office wired Ottawa making a plea for the admission of the passengers. Cables of protest arrived, too, from Indians all over the world.

The Canadian Government, however, was in a position to show no leniency, even had they been so disposed, since—quite apart from the danger of establishing a precedent that might flood the country with East Indians—public feeling on the coast was charged to fever-point. Together with the cables of protest that were arriving at Ottawa from all over the world, wires were arriving from every sort of public body in British Columbia—labour organizations, boards of trade, city councils, political associations, Orange Lodges, and the provincial government itself—petitioning the government to stem the threatened invasion.

It was not till July 9, six weeks after the arrival of the *Komagata Maru*, that the matter of the validity of P.C. 897, 1914, (the artisans and labourers regulation) was settled. The board of inquiry had finally made a test case, "In re the Immigration Act and Munshi Singh, 1914,"¹³ and the Victoria court of appeal sustained the validity of the order in question. Why this was not done earlier, it is hard to understand. For some time, diplomatic handling of the situation had been growing increasingly difficult. When there was no longer any doubt as to the legal admissibility of the immigrants, deportation orders were forthwith re-issued. Nevertheless, it was not until a fortnight later that the vessel finally got away. For an explanation of this later delay, we must turn to another cause, collusion between the Hindus on board and those on shore to prevent the vessel's departure.

The subversive and revolutionary character of the whole enterprise is recalled. When it became apparent, soon after its arrival, that the boat was not even going to be docked, but moored out in the harbour and patrolled by immigration launches, a committee of fifteen of the local Hindus, under the leadership of two of the most notorious of the Ghadr agitators, H. Rahim and Bhag Singh, was formed; the committee discussed ways and means of getting the passengers landed. It was decided to raise sufficient money to take over the charter of the *Komagata Maru* from Gurdit Singh, for, with the charter in the hands of persons on shore, legal action would be greatly facilitated, and there would be a better chance of having the vessel brought to dock. A meeting was, therefore, held at the Sikh temple at which a large number of Indians were present. Inflammatory speeches were made, urging those present to raise enough money to take over the charter and secure the release of their countrymen. About \$5,000 was collected at once and about \$17,000 more was raised at a number of subsequent meetings. The charter now fell into the hands of the "Temple Committee".¹⁴

Rahim and Bhag Singh announced to the authorities that the charter had been taken over with a view to obtaining possession of the cargo of coal on board, by the sale of which (plus an outward cargo for the return voyage), they said they hoped to make a substantial profit for the sub-

¹²Borden Papers, Khalsa Diwan, Vancouver, to Prime Minister, June 22, 1914.

¹³Western Weekly Reports (1914), Vol. VI, 1347.

¹⁴For details of this meeting and the work of the "Temple Committee", cf. Burrell Papers, H. C. Clogstoun Report (No. 1), November 5, 1914.

scribers. It was, they explained, merely a commercial transaction. Such motives were, however, disproved at a subsequent inquiry, where it came out that the real reason for taking over the charter was to land the passengers, whose escape from the *Komagata Maru* would be made much easier if the vessel could be brought to dock. Rahim actually admitted later on that, "After the Order (P.C. 897) had been declared invalid, we no longer thought of the passengers; we wanted our money back."¹⁵ The transaction, thus, was not a commercial, but a political one, and the subscribers, though in a sense they had been exploited by the committee, were fully aware of the subversive nature of what they were doing.

The action taken by the committee explains the final trouble and delay. When, after July 9, the court decision made it apparent that the prospect of landing the immigrants was pretty well hopeless, the Indians became desperate. Those on board were faced with frustration of all their efforts and their plans; many had put all their money into the venture and all of them resented bitterly the treatment they had received. Those on shore were faced with the loss of their money, and some had given amounts as high as \$500. At all costs they felt the *Komagata Maru* must be prevented from departing, at least until they had got their money back.

And so it was that when the time came, July 17, for carrying into effect the deportation order, a riot broke out on board and the passengers seized control of the ship from the Japanese crew and prevented the captain from weighing anchor. A party of 150 immigration officials and police attempted to board the ship and restore control to the captain, but was repelled. Fortunately, though several of the officials were injured, no bloodshed occurred among the Hindus as the immigration officials had been cautioned not to use force. On shore, at the same time, the Hindus there threatened to join in the disturbance, and when some of their number were arrested, five hundred rounds of ammunition were found on their persons.

Negotiations were now carried on between the authorities and the immigrants as to the conditions on which the latter would consent to leave peaceably. Supplies of food and medicine were demanded, and when these were promised all seemed to have been satisfactorily settled. July 21, the second date set for departure arrived, however, and found the Hindus still unprepared to give up control of the ship to the captain, and to sail away from the land to which they had come so far to seek entry, while those on shore were still unprepared to relinquish claim to their \$22,000.

The situation had by now grown to be charged with very grave danger. On the same day, July 21, there arrived at Vancouver the Hon. Mr. Martin Burrell, (at that time minister of agriculture) who had been commissioned by Sir Robert Borden to proceed from his home in B.C. to the scene of action and take charge of affairs. He found the immigration and other officials and the public generally, very worked up. The militia had been ordered out by the magistrates and also certain detachments of the permanent force. It was known that the Hindus on shore had been attempting to smuggle in arms from across the border. After the riot of July 17 on board, it had been decided to send for the cruiser *Rainbow*, at the time undergoing repairs at Victoria. The assistant-superintendent of immigration had issued a press notice that had appeared only the previous day

¹⁵*Ibid.*

saying that the *Rainbow* had been authorized, "to effect a landing, when, if necessary, in order to secure and maintain control, the full number of Hindus will be handcuffed, a proceeding which in view of their violent actions last night, is fully justifiable."¹⁶ After the second unsuccessful attempt to have the vessel get away, on the 21st, Inspector Reid, the local immigration officer in charge, wired the department at Ottawa: "We urge immediate action owing to danger of anti-Oriental outbreaks in Vancouver when facts are made public. The men aboard are undoubtedly in a desperate and fanatical condition. It is utterly impossible to reason with them or to handle them in the ordinary manner. The peculiar situation of this riot occurring on board a ship anchored in the stream makes ordinary police methods utterly useless, as police and guards do not wish to use firearms to retaliate, and can do no effective service without."¹⁷

Mr. Burrell, arriving fresh on the scene, sensed the need for conciliation, which neither the immigration nor the local authorities were by that time probably in a physical condition to do. He got into immediate touch with Mr. MacNeill, counsel for the Hindus on shore, and ascertained that the cause of the trouble was perhaps as much on shore as on board, and he then wrote to Mr. MacNeill a letter which proved to be not only the crisis in negotiations but the focal point of a controversy that continued for two years after the *Komagata Maru* had sailed away. It, therefore, deserves to be quoted in full.

Vancouver, B.C., July 21/14.

A. H. MacNeill, Esq.,
Dear Mr. MacNeill:

I understand from you that one of the difficulties in the way of the *Komagata Maru* at once leaving this port is that the assignees (of the charter) and others believe they are entitled to a repayment of the money advanced by them in good faith to the owners in the belief that they would be repaid by the value of the cargoes. As a member of the Government, I shall wire to the Prime Minister asking that these claims should be thoroughly looked into by an impartial Commissioner, and will urge that full and sympathetic consideration be given to those who deserve generous treatment. I must point out, however, that this is conditional on the passengers now on the *Komagata Maru* adopting a peaceable attitude, refraining from violence, and conforming to the law by giving to the captain control of his ship immediately, and agreeing to peaceably return to the port whence they came. May I add that it is necessary that a decision should be reached *at once*."

Yours truly,

M. Burrell,
(Min. of Agriculture)¹⁸

It is to be observed that Mr. Burrell merely said he would ask for an inquiry to investigate claims, *and urge sympathetic consideration for those who deserved it*. Probably Mr. MacNeill in his negotiations with the committee had to go rather farther than that verbally. At any rate the

¹⁶Borden Papers, E. Blake Robertson Memo for Press, July 20, 1914.

¹⁷Borden Papers, Malcolm Reid to E. Blake Robertson (description of riot, July 21).

¹⁸Burrell Papers [In possession of the Dept. of Immigration], M. Burrell to A. H. MacNeill, July 21, 1914. (Also attached to P.C. 1263, 1915).

committee agreed to the proposals and left at once for the *Komagata Maru* to persuade the passengers to yield control of the ship. Provisions were to be loaded during the next two days, and the departure was to take place the next afternoon.

The boat, as a matter of fact, did not leave until the morning of the day after, the 23rd. In the meantime H.M.C.S. *Rainbow* had arrived all prepared with broad gang planks and fire-hose to "capture" the *Komagata Maru*, if necessary. The passengers realized the force that was at the disposal of the authorities, and, conciliated with \$4,000 worth of provisions that the Canadian government had placed on board for the return trip, and with Mr. Burrell's promise of an inquiry with a view to reimbursement of deserving Indians on shore, they had agreed to allow the vessel to definitely take to sea the following morning.

At five o'clock on the morning of July 23, just two months after the *Komagata Maru* had arrived, the shore and the house tops of Vancouver were crowded with thousands of citizens who, despite the earliness of the hour, had come to view the spectacle of the vessel's departure. The wharves were lined with troops, and, as the *Komagata Maru* weighed anchor and drew off, the *Rainbow* fell in behind to escort her out to sea. Ironically enough (as Dr. Skelton, in his "Laurier"¹⁹ has suggested), the nucleus of the new Canadian navy, intended as an imperial gesture, had first been used to prevent the landing of British subjects on British soil.

There were two factors that contributed to the final persuasion of the Hindus to depart peaceably. One was the presence of the *Rainbow*, which the immigration authorities had sent for; the other was the conciliatory handling of the situation by the Hon. Mr. Burrell. It is difficult to place one of these in importance before the other. Probably without the show of strength their departure might have been delayed indefinitely; on the other hand, conciliation showed a way out. Both the passengers and those on shore were in a sufficiently fanatical state of mind to cause serious trouble, had force alone been used. In this respect it is possible to see the value of Mr. Burrell's presence at the critical moment, and of his final negotiations. Up till the time of his arrival, the affair had been badly handled by the local authorities, backed up as they were by public opinion on the coast. Their attitude, in the words of Mr. MacNeill, solicitor for the Hindus, "was such as not to admit of any negotiations or settlement on any terms". "I can assure you," he wrote to Sir Robert Borden, "that, were it not for Mr. Burrell's presence here, no settlement could possibly have been arrived at."²⁰ As a single illustration of the hysterical condition which the immigration and local political authorities had reached, we have Inspector Reid's statement to the immigration department that, when the provisions were shown to the committee on the wharf, "in order to reach same they [i.e., fifteen unarmed men] were paraded between the troops with fixed bayonets."²¹

Mr. Burrell, with the war within a week of breaking out in Europe, with the settlement of a heated race problem on his hands involving two parts of the Empire, and with the law to enforce, had been faced with a

¹⁹O. D. Skelton, *Life and Letters of Sir Wilfred Laurier* (Toronto, 1921), II, 352, fn.

²⁰Borden Papers, A. H. MacNeill to Sir Robert Borden, July 22, 1914.

²¹Borden Papers, M. J. Reid to Dept. of Immigration, July 22, 1914.

delicate task. Had bloodshed occurred among the Hindu passengers (which was not without the bounds of possibility, while the situation remained in the hands of the local authorities), repercussions might have resulted that would have rocked the Empire; and, with Japanese sailors' lives involved, the complications might have been endless. If the bringing up of the *Rainbow* was indispensable to the satisfactory settlement that was arrived at, no less so was Mr. Burrell's diplomatic handling of the affair, which proved to be the turning point in negotiations. He was in a position to, and did, deal with the situation on broad lines, which saved the day.

There were two aftermaths of the *Komagata Maru* affair, one in Canada and one in India.

In Canada, the special commissioner appointed to investigate the matter of the transfer of the charter advised that very few persons could come within the intention of Mr. Burrell's letter, as most of the Hindus had been actuated by dishonest and seditious motives in attempting to secure the escape of the passengers. The Hindu leaders showed they felt they had been duped by the government, from whom they had expected to be fully recouped for the money paid for the charter. They seem to have felt that a *bona fide* assurance was given by Mr. Burrell, and relying upon this they had yielded at a most critical moment and allowed the *Komagata Maru* to leave.²² Whatever may have been communicated verbally to them by their solicitor, Mr. MacNeill, however, it seems quite obvious from reading Mr. Burrell's letter that they had no grounds for believing they had been dishonestly dealt with. After two years and a further expense of about \$3,000 to the government, the affair was wound up. Legal proceedings against the committee (with government assistance where needed) were instituted by certain of the subscribers, and were won. The committee by this means was discredited in the eyes of the Hindu public.²³

In India, the aftermath was more serious and more unfortunate. When the *Komagata Maru* docked at the mouth of the Hooghli on September 27, the passengers (who were stepping off the boat for the first time in six months) were in a dangerous frame of mind. They refused to board a special train that had been sent down for them, and when force had to be used, there ensued the celebrated Budge-Budge riot, which caused loss of life on both sides. When the passengers were finally released from prison they committed several crimes, such as mail robbery and removal of rails in the Punjab. They became centres of infection, spreading germs of disaffection among the troops and villages, wherever they went. A subsequent royal commission²⁴ disclosed that not a little of the Indian war-time conspiracies, particularly in the Punjab, and the difficulties that the Indian government encountered in preserving order there, could be traced directly to dissatisfaction roused over the *Komagata Maru* affair in British Columbia.

Fortunately, however, the comradeship of the war served to improve relations between Canada and India, and there has been no recurrence of such feeling on the same scale since.

²²Burrell Papers, H. C. Clogstoun Report (No. II), November, 1915.

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴India Sedition Committee, 1918 (Cmd. 9190).

LE 17 OU LE 18 ?

Par ARTHUR SAINT PIERRE

Un débat, qui n'est pas nouveau, a pris tout récemment un regain de vigueur et d'actualité. Il s'agit de savoir si Montréal a été fondé le 17 ou le 18 mai 1642.

Mademoiselle Marie-Claire Daveluy, femme de lettres et historien consciencieux, a soutenu devant la Société Historique de Montréal, la thèse du 17. Quelques semaines plus tard, devant la même société, M. Victor Morin, un de ses anciens présidents, érudit qui connaît notre histoire à fond, vint présenter un volumineux factum pour défendre la thèse du 18. Grâce à eux, nous avons devant nous toutes les pièces du débat, accompagnées d'excellents commentaires. Il nous devient donc possible, à nous les profanes, de nous faire une opinion sur cet important point d'histoire. C'est, dans tous les cas, ce que j'ai cru pouvoir faire sans témérité et, je viens dire tout simplement à quelle conclusion j'en suis venu et les motifs de mon choix.

L'histoire est un tribunal, qui recueille les témoignages de ceux qui ont pris part aux événements qu'elle entreprend de raconter, ou qui du moins, en ont eu une connaissance suffisamment certaine pour mériter d'être écoutés. Mademoiselle Daveluy a rappelé avec beaucoup de clarté, ce qui fait la valeur du témoignage en histoire, comme du reste en toutes circonstances où il faut y recourir : la loyauté, le désintéressement du témoin, une connaissance personnelle des faits, et suffisamment d'intelligence pour bien comprendre et rapporter ce dont il parle. Un témoignage a d'autant plus de valeur qu'il répond à toutes ces exigences ; dans la mesure où il s'en écarte, il devient sujet à caution et perd de sa force probante.

Un seul témoin de la fondation de Montréal, nous en a laissé le récit, mais c'est un témoin d'importance. Il n'a pas seulement *vu* les événements qu'il raconte, il y a joué un rôle de premier plan et pour comble de bonheur, il les a immédiatement ou presque immédiatement consignés par écrit à l'intention de son Supérieur de France. Ce témoin idéal, c'est le R. Père Barthélémy Vimont, un Jésuite, Supérieur de la résidence de Québec, d'où il était venu tout exprès avec le Gouverneur de Montmagny, avec de Maisonneuve et sa Recrue pour assister à la fondation de notre ville, et appeler les bénédictions du ciel sur une entreprise qui devait en avoir grandement besoin, tant elle apparaissait à tous d'une inconcevable témérité.

Or que dit le père Vimont ? "Le dix-septième de May de la présente année 1642, monsieur le Gouverneur mit le Sieur de Maisonneuve en possession de cette Isle, au nom de Messieurs de Montréal, pour y commencer les premiers bastiments; le R. Père Vimont fit chanter le *Veni Creator*, dit la Sainte messe, exposa le Saint-Sacrement, pour impêtrer du ciel un heureux commencement à cet ouvrage : l'on met incontinent après les hommes en besognes; on fait un réduit de gros pieux pour se tenir à couvert contre les ennemis."¹

Voilà qui paraît clair, précis, tout-à-fait dépourvu d'ambiguïté, et c'est sur ce texte lumineux, le seul encore une fois que nous ait transmis

¹*Relation de 1642* (Québec, 1858), Chap. 9, p. 37.

un témoin oculaire, que s'appuie Mlle Daveluy pour fixer au 17 de mai la fondation de Ville-Marie.

Mais alors, d'où peut venir le malentendu qui divise nos historiens? Voici. Trente-et-un ans après la fondation de Montréal, un Sulpicien, Dollier de Casson, depuis peu arrivé de France en notre ville, émerveillé de tout ce qu'il entendait raconter d'extraordinaire sur ses origines, entreprit d'en écrire l'histoire. Et voici comment il s'exprime sur le point qui nous intéresse:

"Monsieur le chevalier de Montmagny étant un véritable homme de coeur et qui n'avoient d'autres intérêts que ceux de son roy voulut participer à ce premier établissement en l'honorant de sa présence, c'est pourquoi il monta dans une barque et conduisit lui-même toute cette flotte à Montréal où on mouilla l'ancre le 18 mai de la présente année: ce même jour, comme on arriva de grand matin, on célébra la première messe qui ait jamais été dite en cette Isle."²

Vingt-quatre ans plus tard, en 1697, soit cinquante-cinq ans après les événements, une religieuse de l'Hôtel-Dieu de Montréal, soeur Morin, voulant écrire les annales de sa communauté, commença par jeter un regard en arrière, jusqu'à ses origines, et se trouva amenée à raconter à son tour les merveilleux commencements de Ville-Marie. Voici un peu abrégé, sans que cependant rien d'essentiel ait été omis, le récit qu'elle en a fait.

"Cette sainte et vénérable troupe s'embarqua avec monsieur de Chomedey dans une chaloupe ; ils partirent de Québec à ce qu'on peut conjecturer, dans le commencement du mois de may, puisqu'ils arrivèrent à l'Isle de Ville-Marie le 17^e. du dit mois. Aussitôt qu'ils aperçurent cette chère ville future dans les desseins de Dieu ils chantèrent des cantiques de joie et d'action de grâces et mirent pied à terre dans le lieu où est bâtie la ville à présent. Après avoir mis pied à terre, monsieur de Maisonneuve se jeta à genoux pour adorer Dieu dans cette terre sauvage et toute la compagnie avec lui. . . . Ils chantèrent encore des psaumes et des hymnes au Seigneur, puis les hommes travaillèrent à dresser des tentes ou pavillons.

"Le lendemain matin on dressa un autel sur lequel le R. Père Dupairon, jésuite, offrit la sainte Victime, J.C.N.S. Le 18^eme jour du mois de May de l'année 1641 on ne peut pas dire la joie et la consolation que ressentit alors cette troupe élue. . . . ; on entendait de tous côtés que des voix en actions de grâces et de louanges à Dieu, surtout de nos Dames qui en firent leur principale affaire, pendant que les hommes commencèrent à travailler. Monsieur de Maisonneuve voulut abattre le premier arbre".³

Tous les historiens de Montréal qui sont venus par la suite se sont inspirés de l'un ou l'autre de ces trois récits, parfois, comme Faillon dans son Histoire de la Colonie Française, en les utilisant tous les trois. Ayant donc le dossier devant nous, il nous reste à considérer quelle est la valeur probante et la signification précise des documents qui le composent.

Un seul des trois est, à proprement parler, un témoignage ou récit par témoin oculaire des événements qu'il rapporte; c'est celui du Père Vimont. Ce Père était présent, il raconte ce qu'il a fait et ce qu'il a vu.

²Dollier de Casson, "Histoire du Montréal", dans les *Mémoires de la Société Historique de Montréal* (1869), 37.

³Soeur Morin, "Annales des Hospitalières de Ville-Marie," *Mémoires de la Société historique de Montréal* (Montréal, 1921).

Les autres n'étaient pas là, ils répètent seulement ce qu'ils ont entendu dire. Et voilà qui assure à la *Relation* du Jésuite une écrasante supériorité de principe sur les autres.

Remarquons, ensuite, que seul Dollier de Casson est en contradiction formelle avec le Père Vimont sur ce qui me paraît être le point essentiel du débat: il dit que les fondateurs sont arrivés et débarqués à Ville-Marie le 18, alors que Soeur Morin, confirmant en cela la *Relation* du Père Vimont, déclare qu'ils "arrivèrent à l'Isle de Ville-Marie le 17 et mirent pied à terre dans le lieu où est bâtie la ville à présent."

Il n'y a désaccord réel entre le Père Vimont et la Soeur Morin que sur la date de célébration de la première messe: le Père Jésuite qui a dit cette messe, la fixe au 17, dans un document rédigé presque aussitôt après l'événement. La Soeur Morin, qui écrit cinquante-cinq ans plus tard, en utilisant des renseignements qui lui ont été fournis par d'autres, puisqu'elle n'est venue à Montréal que plus tard, la Soeur Morin donc prétend que cette première messe a été célébrée le 18. On ne voit pas très bien comment il est possible d'écarter le témoignage du Père Vimont, pour accepter de préférence le récit de la religieuse ou celui de Dollier de Casson.

C'est pourtant ce que fait monsieur Victor Morin, après Faillon du reste, et voici aussi succinctement, mais aussi fidèlement résumé qu'il m'a été possible de le faire, son raisonnement. Il s'attaque d'abord à la valeur historique des *Relations* des Jésuites en général, et de celle du Père Vimont en particulier. Ces *Relations*, dit-il, ne sont pas de l'histoire⁴ et les Pères qui les ont écrites ne sont pas des historiens. Ce sont simplement des auteurs de lettres édifiantes à l'intention des personnes pieuses qui, en France, s'intéressaient aux missions du Canada. Par suite, elles n'ont ni la précision, ni l'exactitude que l'on est en droit d'exiger en histoire.

Et alors, si l'on tient compte de ce fait, dit monsieur Morin, si l'on ne voit pas dans la *Relation* du Père Vimont une rigueur d'exposition qui ne s'y trouve pas, on s'aperçoit en la relisant avec soin, que son auteur paraît attribuer au 17 mai une série d'événements qui, de toute évidence, n'ont pas pu se produire en une seule journée.

Monsieur Morin admet que les fondateurs sont arrivés et descendus à Montréal le 17 et reconnaît implicitement sur ce point capital l'inexactitude de Dollier de Casson. Mais il soutient que la première messe n'a été célébrée que le lendemain 18, et que c'est ce jour-là que notre ville a été fondée.

Le temps me manque, et sans doute aussi la compétence, pour discuter de la valeur historique des *Relations des Jésuites*. Mais il est un fait qui me paraît certain, c'est que monsieur Morin en a exagérément restreint la portée, en les présentant comme de simples lettres édifiantes à l'usage des âmes pieuses. C'était au contraire, et bien évidemment, des rapports officiels adressés par les Jésuites du Canada à leur Supérieur de France, sur tout ce qui se passait d'important de ce côté-ci de l'Atlantique. Elles étaient donc rédigées avec le soin scrupuleux que l'on est en droit d'attendre d'un Jésuite en pareille circonstance. Au reste, nous avons sur la valeur historique des *Relations* un témoignage d'une autorité exceptionnelle, que j'ai rencontré dans mes lectures il y a déjà quelque temps et qui m'a frappé suffisamment pour que j'en prenne copie, sans

⁴Si ce n'est pas de l'histoire c'est la sorte de matériaux dont les historiens se servent pour en faire. Bien heureux sont-ils quand ils peuvent en trouver de cette qualité!

prévoir qu'un jour j'aurais à l'utiliser. Ce témoignage est celui du grand historien américain Francis Parkman :

"I should add, that the closest examination has left me no doubt
"that these missionaries wrote in perfect good faith, and that
"the *Relations* hold a high place as authentic and trustworthy
"historical documents."⁵

Il ne paraît donc pas que l'autorité du témoignage du Père Vimont puisse être valablement mise en doute.

En est-il de même des auteurs qu'on lui oppose? Pas au même degré à mon avis, et pour des raisons très simples où, cela va sans dire, leur bonne foi n'est aucunement concernée.

1^o—Ce ne sont pas des témoins oculaires, mais des chroniqueurs qui rapportent ce qu'ils ont entendu dire.

2^o—Ils ont écrit longtemps après les événements, à un moment où les témoins oculaires eux-mêmes, qu'ils ont eu la chance d'interroger, pouvaient bien être un peu mêlés dans leurs souvenirs.

3^o—Leurs récits contiennent des erreurs palpables, reconnues de tout le monde, qui en diminuent incontestablement l'autorité.

4^o—Dans le cas de Dollier de Casson, lui-même déclare dans son introduction qu'il ne faut pas s'attendre à trouver dans son ouvrage une grande exactitude "pour les dates et les temps", et il en donne plusieurs bonnes raisons. On aurait tort, me semble-t-il, d'attribuer à son histoire une rigoureuse précision, qu'il avoue avoir été incapable de lui donner.⁶

On nous dit que Dollier de Casson et la Soeur Morin nous rapportent les témoignages des témoins oculaires qu'ils ont pu interroger. Mais, sauf Jeanne Mance, on ne nomme aucun de ces témoins, tous restent anonymes. Quant à Jeanne Mance, elle était malade, quand Dollier de Casson a pu la rencontrer pour l'interroger sur les origines de Montréal, et après 31 ans écoulés, il est fort possible que sa mémoire ait fait défaut quant à la date précise de la fondation de Ville-Marie. Du reste, Dollier de Casson ne dit nulle part que cette date lui a été fournie par Jeanne Mance, on suppose seulement qu'il la tient d'elle. Quant à monsieur de Maisonneuve, il était retourné en France et il ne semble pas que Dollier de Casson ait pu se renseigner auprès de lui. Tout cela ne veut pas dire que l'*Histoire du Montréal* est un ouvrage sans valeur historique; mais on ne saurait raisonnablement lui attribuer une valeur égale ou supérieure au récit du Père Vimont, surtout lorsque celui-ci raconte ce qu'il a fait et ce qu'il a vu.

Parce que la Soeur Morin rapporte des conversations qu'elle a eues avec Jeanne Mance, on est porté à la considérer et à la représenter comme une sorte de secrétaire, écrivant sous la dictée de la co-fondatrice de Ville-Marie. C'est là une opinion qui me paraît inadmissible, d'abord parce que la Soeur Morin ne dit nulle part qu'elle a rempli un tel rôle à l'égard de la grande fondatrice de l'Hôtel-Dieu; puis parce qu'elle a com-

⁵Francis Parkman, *The Jesuits in North America* (Boston, 1897), I, 6. Ce témoignage est à opposer surtout à la note péjorative que consacre Hector Garneau aux *Relations*. Appendice CXXIV, I, 554. F. X. Garneau, *Histoire du Canada* (Paris, 1920).

⁶"Comme je ne voudrais point tromper ceux qui se voudront donner la peine de lire cette Relation, je veux bien les avertir qu'ils ne peuvent pas espérer de moi que ce soit sans quelques erreurs légères pour les dates, les temps. . . ." *Histoire du Montréal*, Introduction.

mencé d'écrire 24 ans après la mort de Jeanne Mance⁷, et, enfin, parce que son récit de la fondation de Montréal est rempli d'erreurs très graves, reconnues de tout le monde.⁸

Il ne me paraît donc pas possible d'établir une parité de valeur entre le récit de la fondation de Montréal, laissé par le Père Vimont et ceux des historiens ou annalistes qui sont venus après lui. Encore moins devrait-il être question d'attribuer une autorité supérieure aux derniers sur le premier.

Voyons maintenant quelle est la signification précise du témoignage du Père Vimont. Quels sont donc ces événements qu'il paraît bien attribuer tous au dix-sept mai, alors que, d'après monsieur Morin guidé, j'allais dire égaré par Faillon, ils ne pourraient de toute évidence s'être déroulés en un seul jour. Je résume le texte du Père Vimont que je vous ai lu tantôt. Premièrement le gouverneur, M. de Montmagny met M. de Maisonneuve en possession de l'île de Montréal; deuxièmement, le Père Vimont fait chanter le *Veni Creator* et célèbre le Saint-Sacrifice de la messe, puis il fait l'exposition du T. S. Sacrement; troisièmement, les hommes construisent un réduit de gros pieux pour protéger les pionniers de Montréal contre leurs ennemis. Et c'est tout.

La prise officielle de possession d'un territoire était une cérémonie qui pouvait durer une demi-heure, dit Mlle Daveluy. Le chant du *Veni-Creator* et la messe ont pu prendre trois quarts d'heure. Un autre quart d'heure pour le salut précédant l'exposition du Saint-Sacrement; puis le déjeuner. Deux heures et demie au plus après le débarquement, les hommes pouvaient donc commencer la construction du réduit.

Ont-ils eu le temps de la terminer le même jour ainsi que le récit du Père Vimont semble bien l'indiquer. Cà n'est pas impossible, car ils étaient une quarantaine et l'endroit choisi, dès le mois d'octobre 1641,⁹ pour l'établissement de Ville-Marie, était depuis le temps de Champlain fréquenté par les Français, qui y avaient fait du défrichement et même certains travaux de défense, ce qui, évidemment, facilitait grandement la tâche des ouvriers. Mais cela n'a aucune espèce d'importance en soi: Montréal n'a pas été fondé *après la construction du réduit*, mais avant.

Nous abordons ici le point essentiel du débat. Je l'ai déjà soulevé, à la suite de la conférence de monsieur Morin, à la Société Historique, mais le temps nous a manqué pour l'examiner. Voici comment la question m'apparaît.

Il est incontestable que les fondateurs arrivèrent à Montréal le 17 et mirent pied à terre à l'endroit même où devait s'élever la ville: le Père Vimont l'écrit et la Soeur Morin le corrobore sur ce point. On ne voit pas très bien en vertu de quel principe de critique historique on refuserait de les croire. Monsieur Morin, du reste, je l'ai déjà fait remarquer, admet l'arrivée et le débarquement sur l'île le 17. Mais il est disposé à

⁷Ce qui en ferait, si on veut me permettre un peu de légèreté dans un sujet aussi grave, une secrétaire à retardement!

⁸Par exemple, elle se trompe de gouverneur, elle fait fonder Montréal en 1641 au lieu de 1642, et elle fait célébrer la messe, à la place du P. Vimont, par le Père Dupairon, qui n'était même pas à Ville-Marie ce jour-là!

⁹Voir la *Relation* du Père Vimont et l'*Histoire du Montréal*, de Dollier de Casson, p. 33. A ce que le Père Vimont déclare avoir été un simple voyage d'exploration pour le choix de l'endroit où l'on viendrait l'année suivante jeter les bases de la ville, Dollier de Casson ajoute une cérémonie de prise de possession officielle en tout semblable à celle qui eut lieu le 17 mai 1642. On se demande pourquoi une pareille cérémonie aurait eu lieu deux fois. Ici encore, le témoignage du Père Vimont apparaît plus vraisemblable que le récit de Dollier de Casson.

croire à la suite de Faillon¹⁰ que ce débarquement eut lieu sur un point quelconque à l'extrémité est de l'Île, et qu'il fut suivi d'un second, le lendemain 18, à l'endroit de fondation de Ville-Marie. Mais comme ni le Père Vimont, ni Dollier de Casson, ni la Soeur Morin ne parlent de cette double descente sur l'île, on ne peut s'empêcher de trouver que Faillon, dont l'histoire est pourtant basée sur leurs trois écrits, a fait preuve, cette fois du moins, d'un excès d'imagination.

Voici donc nos fondateurs à Montréal ou Ville-Marie le 17. Qu'est-ce qu'ils y font. Le Père Vimont nous a décrit trois phases principales de leurs activités.

1^o—Une cérémonie civile: la remise officielle de l'Île de Montréal par le gouverneur monsieur de Montmagny, représentant du Roi, à monsieur de Maisonneuve, représentant les Associés de Montréal.

2^o—Une cérémonie religieuse, la messe, dite par le P. Vimont et à laquelle évidemment tout le monde assiste.

3^o—La mise en train du travail manuel de défrichement et de construction.¹¹

Quel est le fait qui, dans tout cela, constitue essentiellement l'acte de fondation de Ville-Marie? C'est la messe, croit monsieur Morin, et comme, d'après Dollier de Casson et Soeur Morin, cette messe a été célébrée le 18, il s'en suit que c'est le 18 que Montréal a été fondé.

J'ai déjà expliqué pourquoi le témoignage du Père Vimont, qui déclare avoir célébré la messe le 17¹² doit être préféré aux affirmations de Dollier de Casson et de la Soeur Morin. Mais même si l'on concédait que la première messe a été célébrée à Montréal le 18 mai, il n'en resterait pas moins vrai que la ville a été fondée le 17. Car ce qui constitue l'acte essentiel de fondation, ce n'est évidemment pas le travail manuel de construction, qui se continue encore de nos jours, ni même la célébration de la Sainte-Messe, car bien des prises de possession de territoires, nombre d'établissements officiels de centres nouveaux se sont produits dans notre histoire, sans qu'il y eut là de prêtre pour célébrer les saints mystères.

Ce qui constitue l'acte essentiel de la fondation de Montréal, c'est la remise officielle de l'île à monsieur de Maisonneuve par monsieur de Montmagny, pour occupation immédiate et permanente, et il est incontestable que cette cérémonie s'est déroulée le 17.

J'estime donc, pour ma part, que Mademoiselle Daveluy a très solidement établi sa thèse et que c'est bien le 17 mai 1642 que notre ville a été fondée. Par suite, la commémoration de cet événement capital devrait désormais se faire le 17, et non plus le 18 comme par le passé.

¹⁰*Histoire de la Colonie Française, en Canada*, (Paris, 1865), I, 439-443.

¹¹Ce dernier trait se comprend parfaitement si l'on admet le débarquement des fondateurs le 17, qui était un samedi. Il devient inadmissible si le débarquement s'est fait le 18. On comprendrait mal que ces excellents chrétiens eussent fait tout exprès pour arriver à Montréal et commencer le travail de défrichement le dimanche!

¹²Il va sans dire que cette messe dite le samedi n'a pas empêché la célébration du Saint-Sacrifice le lendemain, dimanche. Si le Père Vimont n'en dit rien, c'est que sans doute la messe du dimanche lui paraissait une chose tellement ordinaire, qu'il n'y avait pas lieu de la signaler.

PRESERVING CANADA'S HISTORIC PAST

BY THE NATIONAL PARKS BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

During the past year the National Parks Service made favourable progress in the restoration and marking of historic sites and the commemoration of events which played an important part in the early history of the Dominion. The Parks Service is advised in this phase of its work by the Historic Sites and Monuments Board of Canada, an honorary body composed of recognized historians, each representing different sections of the country.

The annual meeting of the board was held at Ottawa on May 29 to 31, 1935, inclusive, when a number of new sites suggested for marking were reviewed, and from these a selection was made to receive attention at a later date. From the total number of sites which have to date been considered by the board, 303 have been recommended for attention, and of this number, 230 have been marked.

During the fiscal year 1935-36 the following memorials were erected:

First Organized Land Survey, Holland Cove, P.E.I.

A cairn with tablet was erected at the summer cottage colony near the South Shore Road, on a small plot of land donated by Mr. Robert L. Cotton of Charlottetown, to commemorate the first organized land survey. Following the Treaty of Paris in 1763, the British government ordered a systematic survey of its possessions in North America. Captain Samuel Holland was placed in charge of the district lying north of the Potomac and, because of the importance of the fisheries, was instructed to begin with Prince Edward Island. In October, 1764, he established his headquarters at Holland Cove and completed his survey of the Island in 1765.

Liverpool Privateersmen, Liverpool, N.S.

A cairn with tablet was erected in Fort Point Park, by consent of the town council, in memory of the privateersmen of Liverpool Bay, who maintained and defended their trade with the West Indies, and waged successful war upon the enemies of Great Britain in ships fitted and armed at their own expense. Foremost among them were: Alexander Godfrey of the brig *Rover*, who routed a Spanish squadron off the Spanish Main and captured its flagship in September, 1800; and Joseph Barss, Jr., of the schooner *Liverpool Packet*, who, in nine months of the War of 1812, captured more than 100 American vessels off the coast of New England. They upheld the best traditions of the British navy.

The 104th New Brunswick Regiment, Fredericton, N.B.

A cut stone monument with tablet was erected in the small park at the junction of Brunswick, King and Smythe Streets, by permission of the city council, to commemorate the distinguished services of the 104th New Brunswick Regiment in the defence of Canada in 1813-14, its endurance in the winter march through the wilderness from Fredericton to Quebec, its fortitude and valour at Sackett's Harbour, Beaver Dams, the blockade of Fort George, the Battle of Lundy's Lane, and the assault on Fort Erie.

Simon Newcomb, Wallace Bridge, N.S.

A cut stone monument with tablet was erected on a small plot of land donated by Mr. Harvey A. Betts, adjacent to the Wallace-Pugwash highway, to mark the birthplace of Simon Newcomb, 1835-1909, who, self-taught, in the face of adversity, became one of the world's greatest scientists. Migrating to the United States at the age of eighteen, he devoted his life to astronomy. For his contributions to science he was awarded the Copley Medal of the Royal Society of London, made a Foreign Associate of the French Academy of Sciences, and honoured by many universities and learned societies throughout the world.

First Agricultural Fair in Canada, Windsor, N.S.

A cut stone monument with tablet was erected in the small park between King and Gerrish Streets, by consent of the town council, to commemorate the first agricultural fair in Canada, authorized on the creation of the township of Windsor in 1764 and held at Fort Edward Hill on the 21st May, 1765. In 1766 the trustees of the fair received a royal charter which was renewed in 1815. Since that date the fair has had an uninterrupted existence.

First Patent in Canada, Quebec, P.Q.

A tablet was affixed to the stone wall on the east side of Cote de la Montagne Street, adjacent to the Laval-Montmorency Park, by permission of the Department of National Defence, to commemorate the first patent of invention, issued by the Province of Lower Canada in the parliament buildings which stood on that site. This patent was granted on the 8th June, 1824, for a washing and fulling machine in favour of Noah Cushing of Quebec.

Chambly Road, St. Hubert, P.Q.

A cairn with tablet was erected at the entrance to the St. Hubert airport, by consent of the Department of National Defence, to mark the Chambly Road, the first highway of importance in Canada, built to connect Montreal with the chain of forts erected along the Richelieu River for protection against the Iroquois. It was opened in 1665 under instructions of M. de Courcelle, governor of New France.

Lachine Massacre, Lachine, P.Q.

A cut stone monument with tablet was erected on a site provided by the city council, adjacent to St. Joseph Street, to commemorate the massacre which took place on the night of the 4-5 August, 1689, when fifteen hundred Iroquois landed at Lachine and placed themselves in small groups near all the houses along the shore. At a given signal the massacre began; two hundred persons perished and one hundred and twenty were taken into captivity. The year 1689 was long known as "The year of the massacre".

Soulanges Canal, Cascades Point, P.Q.

A cairn with tablet was erected adjacent to the main highway, near Lock No. 3, by consent of the Department of Railways and Canals, to commemorate the construction of the Soulanges Canal. This canal was built in 1892-1900 to overcome the Cascades, Cedars and Coteau Rapids

and replaced the old Cascades Canal, constructed by the Royal Engineers in 1779-1783—one of the eight canals which by way of the great lakes and the St. Lawrence River connect Western Canada with the ocean.

Lansdowne Iron Works, Lyndhurst, Ont.

A cairn with tablet was erected on a small plot of land donated by Mr. F. W. Bresee, at the corner of Cook and Charles Streets, to mark the site of the Lansdowne iron works. These works were built by Wallis Sunderlin in 1801 and operated until 1811. This was the first successful effort to develop the manufacture of iron from local ore in Upper Canada.

Kingston Navy Yard, Kingston, Ont.

A tablet was attached to the Stone Frigate Building, Royal Military College, by permission of the Department of National Defence, to mark the site of the British naval station for Lake Ontario during the years 1788-1818. Here were built the King's ships: *Speedy, Swift, Duke of Kent, Earl of Moira, Duke of Gloucester, Royal George, Wolfe, Melville, Sir Sydney Smith, General Beresford, Prince Regent, Princess Charlotte, St. Lawrence, and Canada*. In the war of 1812-14 this naval force enabled the army to retain control of Upper Canada.

Burlington Heights, Hamilton, Ont.

A stone monument with tablet was erected in Harvey Park, by consent of the Board of Park Management, to mark the place where, in June, 1813, General John Vincent assembled troops that made the successful night attack on the invaders at Stoney Creek. From this point of vantage, in December, 1813, the force which retook Fort George and carried Fort Niagara by assault, began its march. On these heights stood the strong point of reserve and depot of arms for the defence of the Niagara peninsula and support of the navy on Lake Ontario.

The Tigress and Scorpion, Penetanguishene, Ont.

A cairn with tablet was erected in Huronia Park, on a site provided by the town council, in memory of the gallant capture in Lake Huron of the United States ships of war, *Tigress* and *Scorpion*, on the 3rd and 6th September, 1814, by seamen of the Royal Navy under Lieutenant Miller Worsley, after a memorable voyage in an open boat from Nottawasaga Bay to Mackinac, aided by soldiers of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment commanded by Lts. Armstrong, Bulger and Radenhurst. In compliance with the Rush-Bagot agreement, these ships were sunk in Penetanguishene Bay.

Discoverer of the Canadian Prairies, The Pas, Man.

A cairn with tablet was erected in Devon Park by permission of the town council, in memory of Henry Kelsey, Hudson's Bay Company fur trader and explorer; the first white man to travel inland from Hudson Bay to eastern Saskatchewan and to see the Canadian prairies, 1690-1692; the first white person to record the existence of the musk-ox of the north, the buffalo herds and the grizzly bears of our plains.

Battle of Fish Creek, near Fish Creek, Saskatchewan.

A cairn with tablet was erected in the cemetery located on Legal Subdivision 15 of Section 23, Township 41, Range 2, West of the 3rd Meridian, to commemorate the engagement which took place on the 24th April, 1885, when troops under the command of General Middleton, while moving to capture Batoche, were attacked by halfbreeds under Gabriel Dumont, from concealed rifle pits near the mouth of Fish Creek. The rebels were defeated and driven from the field. The soldiers who were killed in this engagement were buried in the cemetery.

The Peacemakers, Wetaskiwin, Alta.

A cut stone monument with tablet was erected in the park facing Edward Street, between Lansdowne and Pearce Streets, by consent of the city corporation, in grateful remembrance of the public services of the Reverend Father Lacombe, O.M.I., and the Reverend John McDougall. During the troublous days of 1885 their influence with the Indians was a powerful factor in the preservation of peace in Alberta.

Fort Alexandria, near Alexandria, B.C.

A cairn with tablet was erected adjacent to the Cariboo Road, about four miles north of Alexandria, on a site provided by the provincial government, to mark the site of Fort Alexandria, built in 1821, the last post established by the North West Company west of the Rocky Mountains, and Sir Alexander Mackenzie's farthest point in the descent of the Fraser River in 1793. After 1826, when the trade of New Caledonia found outlet to the Pacific, instead of the Atlantic, it was the point of transfer from the land to the water brigade and so it remained until the gold discoveries transformed the conditions.

PRESERVATION WORK

Preservation and other development work was carried out at the following sites, funds for the larger portion of this work having been provided under the Public Works Construction Act:—

Fortress of Louisbourg, near Louisbourg, N.S.

Further progress was made in connection with the development of this historic site. Excavation of the rooms on the east side of the barracks and officers' quarters in the Citadel was carried out to the basement floor level. The ruins of two large baking ovens, which were exposed during excavation, were repaired and partially reconstructed. On the west side the cobblestone walk running along the building was uncovered, together with sections of the surface drain along that side. The small guardhouse in the King's Bastion was cleaned out and the ruins of the walls exposed. The walls of four rooms at the south end, which formed part of the governor's apartment, were partially exposed. Additional surfacing was carried out on the entrance road, and the protection crib along this road which was commenced the previous year, was continued and completed. The frame building formerly used as the caretaker's quarters was demolished and a new fireproof museum erected along the architectural lines of the original fortifications.

Prince of Wales Tower, Halifax, N.S.

Through the co-operation of the Department of National Defence, the exterior walls were repaired and pointed, the wooden floor of the first storey was renewed, new doors and sashes installed and concrete laid on the ground floor. The concrete roof was also repaired and waterproofed and the interior of the tower whitewashed.

Fort Beausejour, near Aulac, N.B.

A new fireproof museum was constructed within the park and further improvements were made to the grounds, such as placing direction signs and markers throughout the grounds, and cleaning the old trenches known as Monckton's lines. Additional restoration work was also carried out on the stone wall at the main gateway to the original fort.

Fort Chambly, Chambly, P.Q.

Repairs were made to the walls of this old structure and a new fireproof museum was built within the fort to accommodate the increasing number of relics, etc., which are gradually being obtained.

Fort Lennox, Ile-aux-Noix, P.Q.

A complete drainage system was installed; the remains of the two large kitchens and ovens located in the inner embankment of the moat behind the officers' quarters were repaired and the stone floors of the arcades of the officers' quarters and guardhouse were taken up and re-laid. The commissariat building was re-roofed; galvanized iron gutters and down pipes were installed on the men's barracks and extensive repairs carried out on the guardhouse.

Fort Prince of Wales, Churchill, Man.

Further restoration work was carried out on the ruins of this historic landmark under the supervision of the resident engineer of the Department of Railways and Canals. The entrance walls of the fort inside the gate, the arch of the fort, the ravelin in front of the gate, the whole of the south or front wall and the interior wall east of the entrance walls, were rebuilt. The courtyard was cleaned out to the cobblestone pavement, the ruin of rock which was formerly the west wall of the fort, was cleared away; the brush around the fort was cut and eight additional gun foundations were constructed, making a total of 27 built and 13 remaining to be constructed.

Fort Langley, Langley, B.C.

Extensive repairs were made to the old fort which is now being used by the Native Sons of British Columbia for museum purposes. The entire east wall was torn down and rebuilt with new material, the new timbers being framed and scored with a broad axe to resemble the original as much as possible. The south wall was rebuilt with salvaged material, new rafters were placed where necessary and the roof reconstructed. The timber in all the walls was caulked with oakum. Iron tie rods, with turnbuckles and washers, were placed at the four corners of the building and across the centre, to prevent the walls from spreading. The ground floor was torn up, concrete piers were placed under the cross beams and new beams put in where required. New flooring was laid throughout, and the walls, both

inside and out, together with the ceiling of the main floor, were white-washed. Electric lighting also was installed in the building. A well was sunk and cribbed and excellent water obtained at a depth of 35 feet. A fence was erected along a portion of the boundary of the property.

ACQUISITION OF SITES

Jean Pierre Roma, near Georgetown, P.E.I.

Mr. William Stewart of Montague, and Mr. Henry Parker of Georgetown, have kindly consented to donate a small plot of land as a site for the memorial it is proposed to erect to mark the place where, in 1732, Jean Pierre Roma founded a base for control of the gulf fisheries and for trade with France, Quebec and the West Indies. His establishment was destroyed after the fall of Louisbourg in 1745.

Prince of Wales Tower, Halifax, N.S.

The Prince of Wales Tower, situated in Point Pleasant Park, together with a circular piece of land having a radius of 80 feet, the centre of the circle being the centre of the tower, was transferred from the Department of National Defence to the Interior Department for historic sites purposes.

Roseau Route, Letellier, Man.

Permission was obtained from the council of the municipality of Montcalm to place a monument adjacent to the Jefferson highway to mark the war road of the Sioux leading to the Lake of the Woods. This was the earliest route to the West and was first used in 1733 by the French. La Jemeraye, in 1736, was buried near the mouth of the Roseau River.

Fort Assiniboine, Alta.

The University of Alberta has kindly provided a plot of land on the south west quarter of Section 1, Township 62, Range 6, west of the 5th Meridian, to commemorate the substitution of land for water transport on the trade route to the Pacific. The original route from the Saskatchewan to the Athabaska was by canoe, following Churchill River, Lac Ile à la Crosse, Beaver River, Lac and Riviere La Biche. In 1825, Sir George Simpson changed it to the North Saskatchewan as far as Edmonton, and thence by pack train to this point, effecting material savings in time and expense.

Great Fraser Midden, Vancouver, B.C.

Permission was obtained from the city of Vancouver to place a monument in Marpole Park, to mark the site of one of the largest prehistoric middens on the Pacific Coast of Canada. The implements and utensils found in this midden have thrown much light upon the culture status of prehistoric man in this vicinity.

Kootenae House, near Invermere, B.C.

Mrs. A. M. Hamilton has kindly donated to the Crown a plot of land comprising 11.61 acres covering the site of David Thompson's Post, Kootenae House, B.C.

WORK FOR THE FUTURE

The following have been recommended to the Department for attention by the Board and will be dealt with from time to time:—

Mohawk Indian Fort, near Hogg Island, N.S.
 Fort Chedabucto, Guysborough, N.S.
 Thomas Chandler Haliburton, Halifax, N.S.
 Halifax-Castine Expedition, 1814, N.S.
 Baie Verte-Misseguash Portage Route, N.B.
 Petitcodiac-Washademoak-Canaan Portage Route, N.B.
 First Stage Coach Service, Quebec, P.Q.
 Fort Temiscamingue, near Ville Marie, P.Q.
 The Postal Service, Montreal, P.Q.
 Cavalier de la Salle, Lachine, P.Q.
 First Canadian Hospital, Quebec, P.Q.
 Champlain's Landing Place, Morrison's Island, Ont.
 Indian Treaties, near Orillia, Ont.
 Officers and Seamen of the Royal Navy, Kingston, Ont.
 Mission of Ste. Marie I, near Midland, Ont.
 Glengarry Landing, near Edenvale, Ont.
 First Salt Works in Canada, near St. Catharines, Ont.
 First Petroleum Wells in Canada, near Bothwell, Ont.
 Arctic Discovery and Exploration, Ottawa, Ont.
 Yonge Street, Toronto, Ont.
 St. Clair Flats Canal, Lake St. Clair, Ont.
 Murray Canal, Ont.
 Admiral H. W. Bayfield.
 Danforth Road, near Toronto, Ont.
 Alexander Graham Bell Homestead, Brantford, Ont.
 Fort St. Pierre, Rainy Lake, Ont.
 First Cheese Factory in Canada, near Norwich, Ont.
 Discovery of Red Fife Wheat, near Peterborough, Ont.
 Galops Canal, Iroquois, Ont.
 Rapide Plat Canal, near Iroquois, Ont.
 Farran's Point Canal, Farran's Point, Ont.
 Cornwall Canal, near Cornwall, Ont.
 Fort Malden, Amherstburg, Ont.
 Bridge Island, near Brockville, Ont.
 Gananoque, Ont.
 York Factory, Man.
 Norway House, Man.
 Dawson Road, Ste. Anne des Chenes, Man.
 Forts Maurepas and Alexander, Man.
 Duck Lake Battlefield, Duck Lake, Sask.
 Cumberland House, Cumberland Lake, Sask.
 Fort a la Corne, near Prince Albert, Sask.
 Methye Portage, Sask.
 Fort Chipewyan, Lake Athabaska, Alta.
 Fort Assiniboine, Alta.
 Great Fraser Midden, Vancouver, B.C.
 Captain George Vancouver, Vancouver, B.C.
 Kootenae House, Invermere, B.C.
 Canadian Pacific Railway, Port Moody, B.C.
 Samuel Hearne.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY

By NORMAN FEE

The annual meeting of the Canadian Historical Association for 1935-36 was held in Ottawa on May 26 and 27. Following the practice of the previous year, joint sessions were held on one day with the Canadian Political Science Association. On the afternoon of May 26, the attention of the joint session was directed to western Canada. Professor W. A. Mackintosh of Queen's University, Canadian editor of the excellent series on "Canadian frontiers of settlement" which is now in course of publication, gave an admirable analysis of the chief characteristics of economic development in pioneer communities. Professor A. S. Morton of the University of Saskatchewan described "The North West Company's Columbian enterprise and David Thompson", and in doing so criticized rather sharply Thompson's slowness in reaching the mouth of the Columbia river. In the evening of the 26th the presidential addresses were delivered by Professor E. R. Adair of McGill University on "The military reputation of Major-General James Wolfe", and by Mr. R. H. Coats, the dominion statistician, on "Statistics comes of age". On the morning of the 26th a round-table session was given to the question of local history, historical societies, and archives. Professor Fred Landon of the University of Western Ontario was in the chair. The session was opened by Professor D. C. Harvey, the archivist of Nova Scotia, and Dr. J. J. Talman, the archivist of Ontario, who were followed by a discussion in which the importance of encouraging the collection and preservation of historical materials in local communities was strongly emphasized. Professor Landon was later appointed to investigate the means by which the association might contribute to the development of local historical collections.

Following dinner on May 26 a discussion on the teaching of international relations in Canadian universities was led by Professor W. E. C. Harrison of Queen's University. The Canadian Institute of International Affairs combined with the two associations in this session.

On Wednesday May 27th sessions were held in the Public Archives when papers were read as follows: *John Simpson, 1788-1873, Percepteur des Douanes et Député*, by F. J. Audet, Public Archives, Ottawa. *Le 17 ou le 18?*, by Arthur Saint-Pierre, Montréal. *Faux et Faussaires en histoire canadienne*, by Gustave Lanctot, Public Archives, Ottawa. *Selkirk and Louisiana*, by J. P. Pritchett, Vassar College. *Sir Charles Bagot as an Authority on American-Canadian Boundary Questions*, by Wm. O. Mulligan, Montreal. *Public Opinion and the McLeod Case*, by A. B. Corey, The St. Lawrence University. *An Unsolved Problem of Canadian History*, by F. G. Roe, Edmonton. *Some Aspects of the Komagata Maru Affair, 1914*, by E. W. Morse, Ottawa.

At the evening session Professor Griffith Taylor, recently appointed to the newly created chair in geography at the University of Toronto, spoke on "The geographical approaches to European history". His highly interesting and profusely illustrated lecture was followed by a lively and critical discussion.

On the afternoon of the 27th the Women's Canadian Historical

Society of Ottawa entertained the association at tea at the Bytown Museum which houses a valuable historical collection.

The principal officers elected for this year are: President, Professor C. W. New, Hamilton; vice-president, Professor D. C. Harvey, Halifax; chairman of the management committee, Professor R. G. Trotter, Kingston; English secretary and treasurer, Mr. Norman Fee, Public Archives, Ottawa; French secretary, Major Gustave Lanctot, also of the Dominion Archives. Major Lanctot and Professor G. de T. Glazebrook of the University of Toronto, were appointed an editorial committee.

A constitutional amendment was passed to provide for the retirement of one-third of the twelve members of the association's council each year and the election of four new members. The membership fee for local historical societies was reduced from \$5.00 per year to \$3.00 per year. The association also established a student membership at \$1.00 per year, open to graduate or undergraduate students registered at universities, and arranged for joint membership with The Canadian Political Science Association at \$4.00 per year; joint membership to include subscription to the *Canadian Historical Review* or to the *Bulletin des Recherches Historiques* and to the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*.

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING APRIL 30, 1936

RECEIPTS		
April, 1935—	Balance on hand.....	\$ 423.05
May, 1935 {	Membership fees and sale of reports.....	1,202.78
to {	Bank interest.....	4.95
April, 1936 {		

DISBURSEMENTS		
	Cunningham & Co., auditors.....	\$ 10.00
	Canadian National Railways.....	3.14
	University of Toronto Press (for printing annual report).....	389.46
	Bulletin des Recherches Historiques.....	104.00
	Canadian Historical Review.....	418.25
	International Committee of Historical Sciences (membership fee).....	50.00
	The Jackson Press.....	21.81
	Progressive Printers.....	7.95
	C. A. Curtis.....	4.12
	Petty cash { postage.....\$28.50	
	{ sundry expenses.....6.50	35.00
	Miss N. Stratton (clerical assistance).....	50.00
	Allowance to French Secretary.....	100.00
	Allowance to English Secretary and Treasurer.....	150.00
	Bank exchange.....	21.45
		<hr/>
		1,365.18
	Balance on hand.....	265.60
		<hr/>
		\$1,630.78 \$1,630.78
Examined and found correct.		
CUNNINGHAM & CO., C.A.		
Auditors.		

NORMAN FEE,

Secretary-Treasurer.

OTTAWA, May 20, 1936.

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FOR LIFE MEMBERSHIP FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING APRIL 30, 1936

RECEIPTS		
April 30, 1935—	Balance on hand.....	\$302.54
" 30, 1936—	Bank interest.....	6.07

DISBURSEMENTS		
April 30, 1936—	Balance on hand.....	\$308.61
		<hr/>
		\$308.61 \$308.61

NORMAN FEE,

Secretary-Treasurer.

Examined and found correct.

CUNNINGHAM & CO., C.A.,

Auditors.

OTTAWA, May 20, 1936.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

AFFILIATED SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

- Acadia University Library*, Wolfville, N.S.
- Antiquarian and Numismatic Society of Montreal*, Château de Ramezay. Victor Morin, LL.D., President, 57 rue Saint-Jacques Ouest, Montreal, P.Q.; Pemberton Smith, Treasurer, 414 St. James St., Montreal, P.Q.
- Antiquarian Society of Montreal (Women's Branch)*. Madame J. I. Tarte, President; Miss Lois C. Malcolm, Secretary, 1 Rosemount Ave., Apt. 63, Westmount, P.Q.
- British Columbia Historical Association*. F. V. Longstaff, President, Victoria, B.C.; G. M. McTavish, Hon. Treasurer, Victoria, B.C.; H. T. Nation, Hon. Secretary, 2380 Windsor Road, Victoria, B.C.
- Canadian Military Institute*, 426 University Ave., Toronto, Ont.
- Clark University Library*, Worcester, Mass., U.S.A. Louis N. Wilson, Librarian.
- Cleveland Public Library*, 325 Superior Ave., N.E., Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A. Miss Leta E. Adams, Order Librarian.
- Hamilton Public Library*. Mrs. Lurene Lyle, Librarian, Hamilton, Ont.
- Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery*, San Marino, Cal. Leslie E. Bliss, Librarian.
- Historical Society of Alberta*. Dr. A. C. Rutherford, President; W. Everard Edmonds, Secretary, 1146-91st Ave., Edmonton, Alta.; M. H. Long, Treasurer.
- Kingston Historical Society*. H. F. Price, President; W. S. Lavell, Secretary, 151 Earl St., Kingston, Ont.; J. H. Mitchell, Treasurer, 87 L. Union St., Kingston, Ont.
- Last Post Fund*. Arthur H. D. Hair, Secretary-treasurer, P.O. Box 1382, Montreal, P.Q.
- Legislative Library of Ontario*. A. F. Wilgress, Legislative Librarian, Toronto, Ont.
- Library of Parliament*. Felix Desrochers, General Librarian; Hon. Martin Burrell, Parliamentary Librarian, Ottawa, Ont.
- Literary and Historical Society of Quebec*. Count de Bury, President; A. Robertson, Recording Secretary; Col. F. M. Stanton, Corresponding Secretary; R. L. Smyth, Treasurer, P.O. Box 187, Quebec, P.Q.
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- McGill University Library*. Gerhard R. Lomer, M.A., Ph.D., Librarian, Montreal, P.Q.
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- Norwich Pioneers' Society*. A. L. Bushell, Secretary, Norwich, Ont.
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- Ohio State University, University Library*, Columbus, Ohio, U.S.A.
- Ontario Historical Society*. J. McE. Murray, Secretary-treasurer, Normal School Building, Toronto, Ont.
- Ottawa, Société Historique d'*. Rev. Père Thivierge, Secretary, Université d'Ottawa, Ottawa, Ont.
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- Provincial Library of British Columbia*. Dr. W. Kaye Lamb, Provincial Librarian and Archivist, Parliament Buildings, Victoria, B.C.
- Provincial Library of Manitoba*. W. J. Healy, Provincial Librarian, Winnipeg, Man.
- Thunder Bay Historical Society*. Miss M. J. L. Black, President; Mrs. E. R. Patrick, Secretary-treasurer, 54 Shuniah Rd., Port Arthur, Ont.
- Toronto Public Library*. George H. Locke, M.A., LL.D., Librarian, College St., Toronto, Ont.
- University of California Library*, Berkeley, Cal., U.S.A. Harold L. Leupp, Librarian.
- University of Cincinnati Library*, Burnet Woods Park, Cincinnati, Ohio, U.S.A.
- University of Manitoba Library*. Frank E. Nuttall, Librarian, Fort Garry Site, Winnipeg, Man.
- University of Toronto Library*. W. S. Wallace, Librarian, Toronto, Ont.
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- Yale University Library.* C. L. Cannon, Accessions Division, New Haven, Conn., U.S.A.

(B) LIFE MEMBERS

- | | |
|--|---|
| Audet, Dr. F. J., Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa | Lyman, A. C., 3520 McTavish St., Montreal |
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| Hastings, G. V., 55 Donald St., Winnipeg | Simpson, Mrs. J. B., 173 Percy St., Ottawa |
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| Laurie, W. Pitt, 125 Ave. des Braves, Quebec | Wilson, Hon. Cairine, Rockcliffe, Ont. |

(C) ANNUAL MEMBERS

- | | |
|--|--|
| Abbott, Dr. Maude E., Medical Museum, McGill University, Montreal | Barbeau, C. M., 260 McLaren St., Ottawa |
| Adair, E. R., McGill University, Montreal | Baylis, S. M., 3574 University St., Montreal |
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| Allard, Hon. Jules, Palais de Justice, Montréal | Birks, W. M., c/o Henry Birks & Sons, Montreal |
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| Baldwin, Robert McQueen, 35 Heath St. W., Toronto | Brisebois, Napoléon, 1931 rue Centre, Montréal |
| Balkwill, M. A., 147 Winchester Street, Toronto | British Museum, Dept. of Printed Books, London, W.C. 1, England |
| | Britnell, G. E., University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon. |
| | Brough, T. A., 1351 Broadway West, Vancouver |

(C) ANNUAL MEMBERS—*Continued*

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
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